Nat'l Bus. Aviation Ass'n, Inc. v. Fed. Aviation Admin.

• Decision Date: 09 October 2020
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 18-1719 (RBW)
• Parties: NATIONAL BUSINESS AVIATION ASSOCIATION, INC., et al., Plaintiffs, v. FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION and Steve Dickson, in his official capacity as Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

496 F.Supp.3d 102

NATIONAL BUSINESS AVIATION ASSOCIATION, INC., et al., Plaintiffs,

v.FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION and Steve Dickson, in his official capacity as Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration,¹ Defendants.

Civil Action No. 18-1719 (RBW)

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

Signed October 9, 2020

Richard K. Simon, Pro Hac Vice, Law Office of Richard K. Simon, Malibu, CA, Barbara M. Marrin, Zuckert, Scoutt & Rasenberger, L.L.P., Jolyon A. Silversmith, Kma Zuckert LLC, Washington, DC, for Plaintiffs National Business Aviation Association, Inc., Santa Monica Airport Association, Inc., Bill's Air Center, Inc., Kim Davidson Aviation, Inc., Redgate Partners, LLC.

Jolyon A. Silversmith, Kma Zuckert LLC, Washington, DC, for Plaintiff Wonderful Citrus LLC.

Gary Daniel Feldon, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

REGGIE B. WALTON, United States District Judge

The plaintiffs, the National Business Aviation Association, Inc.; the Santa Monica Airport Association, Inc.; Wonderful Citrus LLC; Bill's Air Center, Inc.; Kim Davidson Aviation, Inc.; and Redgate Partners, LLC, bring this civil action pursuant to the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (2018) and the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 – 02 (2018), against the defendants, the Federal Aviation Administration ("FAA") and Steve Dickson, in his official capacity as the Administrator of the FAA, alleging that the FAA acted outside the scope of its statutory authority by entering into a settlement agreement (the "Settlement Agreement") with the City of Santa Monica, California (the "City"), regarding the City's obligation to continue operating the Santa Monica Municipal Airport (the "Airport"). See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief ("Compl.") ¶¶ 5–11, 36–40. Currently pending before the Court is the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss ("Defs.’ Mot."). Upon careful consideration of the parties’ submissions,² the Court concludes for the following reasons that it must grant the defendants’ motion.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Santa Monica Municipal Airport

In 1941, the United States leased the land where the Airport now sits from the City of Santa Monica "as part of its effort to develop military aircraft during World War II." Defs.’ Mem. at 2; see Compl. ¶¶ 12–14.³ In 1948, after World War II had ended, the United States "executed an agreement ([the] ‘Instrument of Transfer’) conveying its leasehold interest in the leased portion of the Airport [p]roperty back to the City[.]" Defs.’ Mem. at 3. Pursuant to the Instrument of Transfer, "no property transferred by th[at] instrument shall be used, leased, sold, salvaged, or disposed ... for other than airport purposes without the written consent of the Civil Aeronautics Administrator." Id. (first alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Feldon Decl., Exhibit ("Ex.") A (Instrument of Transfer (Aug. 19, 1948)) at 6); see also Compl. ¶ 15 ("Under the deed [conveying the Airport to the City], obligations were imposed upon the City—most importantly, that it operate [the Airport] as a fully-functional airport in perpetuity."). "If the City violated this requirement or any other provision of the Instrument of Transfer," the United States would have the option to reclaim the property rights that were conveyed to the City. Defs.’ Mem. at 3; see Feldon Decl., Ex. A (Instrument of Transfer) at 6.

"The City has operated the Airport since the Instrument of Transfer [was executed]." Defs.’ Mem. at 3; see Compl. ¶¶ 12–14. During that time, the Airport has been designated as a " ‘reliever’ by [the] FAA— [which is] a significant general aviation airport which accommodates traffic that otherwise would utilize already-congested commercial airports, such as [the] Los Angeles International Airport." Compl. ¶ 13.

B. Litigation Between the FAA and the City

"Beginning in the late 1960s, the Airport became the subject of legal disputes among the City, the FAA, City residents, and Airport tenants and users[,]" including "numerous legal challenges to the way the City operated the Airport in state courts, federal courts, and administrative proceedings." Defs.’ Mem. at 3. However, "[m]any of the disputes between the FAA and the City were held in abeyance between 1984 and 2015[,] as a result of an agreement ... concerning the operation of the Airport[.]" Id. This agreement (the "1984 Agreement") expired in 2015. See Feldon Decl., Ex. B (Santa Monica Airport Agreement (Jan. 31, 1984)) at 5.

1. Central District of California Quiet Title Case

In 2013, in anticipation of the expiration of the 1984 Agreement, the City filed a lawsuit (the "Quiet Title Case"), under the Quiet Title Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2409a (2012), in the United States District Court for the Central District of California (the "Central District of California"), seeking "a declaration that it would be free to close the Airport entirely once the 1984 Agreement expired." Defs.’ Mem. at 4. The City argued that its obligation to operate the Airport extended only as long as the United States’ original leasehold in the Airport property would have lasted, but in response, the FAA asserted that the City was "obligated [ ] to operate the Airport in perpetuity[.]" Id. The Central District of California initially dismissed the Quiet Title Case as barred by the statute of limitations, but on appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded the case to the district court for further development of the factual record. See id. at 4–5; see also City of Santa Monica v. United States, 650 F. App'x 326, 327–29 (9th Cir. 2016).

On remand, two of the plaintiffs in this case, Kim Davidson Aviation, Inc. and Bill's Air Center, Inc., moved in August 2016 to intervene in the Quiet Title Case. See Compl. ¶ 28; Defs.’ Mem. at 5. The Central District of California denied their motion to intervene because there was a "unity of interests between" the proposed intervenors and the defendants in the Quiet Title Case. Defs.’ Mem. at 5 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting City of Santa Monica v. United States, No. CV 13-8046-JFW (VBKx), 2016 WL 10576629, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 2016) ). Neither Kim Davidson Aviation, Inc. nor Bill's Air Center, Inc. appealed the denial of their motion to intervene. See id.

2. Settlement Agreement and Consent Decree

In January 2017, the City and the FAA entered into the Settlement Agreement that resolved, inter alia, the Quiet Title Case. See id.; Compl. ¶ 21. Under the terms of the Settlement Agreement,

(1) the City was allowed to immediately shorten the Airport's runway; (2) the City committed to operate the Airport in accordance with certain FAA regulations and specified grant obligations through the expiration of the Settlement Agreement on December 31, 2028; and (3) the FAA released the Airport [p]roperty from all rights and restrictions other than those imposed by the [Settlement Agreement] or by statute.

Defs.’ Mem. at 7; see Compl. ¶ 21. The Settlement Agreement also required that "the parties [ ] jointly move the [Central District of California] to enter a consent decree [(the ‘Consent Decree’)] embodying their agreement." Defs.’ Mem. at 6. However, the Settlement Agreement provided that "[i]f the [Central District of California] failed to [enter the Consent Decree], the [Settlement Agreement] would ‘be of no force and effect and [could] not be used by either [p]arty for any purpose whatsoever.’ " Id. (fifth alteration in original) (quoting Feldon Decl., Ex. C (Settlement Agreement/Consent Decree Between the Federal Aviation Administration and the City of Santa Monica (Jan. 30, 2017) ("Settlement Agreement")) at 4). On January 30, 2017, the City and the FAA jointly filed the Settlement Agreement and the proposed Consent Decree with the Central District of California. See Compl. ¶ 25; Defs.’ Mem. at 7.

On January 31, 2017, one day after the Settlement Agreement and proposed Consent Decree were filed in the Quiet Title Case, two local resident groups who are unaffiliated with the plaintiffs moved to intervene to oppose the proposed Consent Decree. See Compl. ¶ 27; Defs.’ Mem. at 7. On February 1, 2017, the Central District of California denied the resident groups’ motion to intervene and entered the proposed Consent Decree. See Compl. ¶¶ 25, 27; Defs.’ Mem. at 7. In that order, the Central District of California stated that it had "reviewed the Settlement Agreement ... and conclude[d] that" the Settlement Agreement was "not the product of fraud or overreaching by, or collusion between, the negotiating parties, and that the settlement, taken as a whole, [was] fair, reasonable, and adequate to all concerned." Defs.’ Mem. at 7 (first and second alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Feldon Decl., Ex. D (Order Re: Stipulation and Order/Consent Decree (Feb. 1, 2017)) at 1). "Neither resident group appealed" the denial of their motion, "nor did any other non-party move to intervene to challenge the Consent Decree." Id. at 8.

C. The Plaintiffs’ Challenge to the Settlement Agreement in the District of Columbia Circuit

On February 13, 2017, the plaintiffs in this case⁴ filed a petition in the District of Columbia Circuit seeking judicial review of the Settlement Agreement pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 46110 (2012). See id.; Compl. ¶ 31; see also Nat'l Bus. Aviation Ass'n v. Huerta, 737 F. App'x 1, 2 (D.C. Cir. 2018). 49 U.S.C. § 46110 "permits individuals with substantial interests in final orders of the FAA Administrator to challenge those orders[,]" and "[j]urisdiction over such claims is limited exclusively to the [District of Columbia] Circuit or ‘the court of appeals of the United States for the circuit in which the person resides or has its principal place of business.’ " Defs.’ Mem. at 8 (quoting 49 U.S.C. § 46110(a) ).

The FAA subsequently moved to dismiss the District of Columbia Circuit petition for lack of jurisdiction...