Nat'l Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2006-2 v. Gimple
Decision Date | 06 April 2022 |
Docket Number | A169887 |
Citation | 318 Or.App. 672,508 P.3d 561 |
Parties | NATIONAL COLLEGIATE STUDENT LOAN TRUST 2006-2, a Delaware Statutory Trust, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Courtney N. GIMPLE, aka Courtney N. Butler, Defendant-Respondent. |
Court | Oregon Court of Appeals |
James Schultz, Florida, argued the cause for appellant. On the briefs were Ashley N. Wydro, Dayle M. Van Hoose, and Sessions, Fishman, Nathan & Israel LLC, and Julie A. Smith and Cosgrave Vergeer Kester LLP.
Nadia H. Dahab, Portland, argued the cause for respondent. Also on the brief were Innovation Law Lab and Christopher J. Mertens and Mertens Law LLC.
Before Mooney, Presiding Judge, and Egan, Judge, and Pagán, Judge.*
Plaintiff, the National Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2006-2, appeals a general judgment in favor of defendant after the trial court granted defendant's cross-motion for summary judgment on plaintiff's claims for breach of contract and quantum meruit . Plaintiff assigns four errors. We affirm without discussion plaintiff's third assignment. We write only to address plaintiff's second assignment, in which plaintiff contends that the trial court erred in excluding two pieces of evidence that plaintiff asserts should have been admitted as business records under OEC 803(6). We conclude that the trial court did not err as to plaintiff's second assignment. Given that resolution, plaintiff's first and fourth assignments also fail. Accordingly, we affirm.
Generally, when reviewing the trial court's ruling on cross-motions for summary judgment, "we examine whether there are any disputed issues of material fact and whether either party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Providence Health Plan v. Allen , 299 Or. App. 128, 135, 449 P.3d 504 (2019), rev. den. , 366 Or. 257, 458 P.3d 1125 (2020). Here, that determination turns on the admissibility of certain hearsay statements. "We review the court's legal conclusions regarding the admissibility of a hearsay statement under an exception to the hearsay rule for legal error." Morgan v. Valley Property and Casualty Ins. Co. , 289 Or. App. 454, 455, 410 P.3d 327 (2017), adh'd to on recons. , 290 Or. App. 595, 415 P.3d 1165 (2018).
In 2006, defendant applied for and obtained a loan from JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. Bank One (Bank One). In November 2007, defendant filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition in the United States Bankruptcy Court. Defendant's debt was discharged in March 2018. The parties contest whether the loan at issue here was discharged as a part of defendant's bankruptcy.
Approximately 10 years after defendant filed for bankruptcy—in February 2018—plaintiff filed a complaint against defendant in Clackamas County Circuit Court for breach of contract and quantum meruit . Plaintiff claimed that, pursuant to "an assignment agreement," it owned defendant's Bank One loan and that defendant had failed to make monthly payments under the terms of the loan agreement. Defendant responded to plaintiff's complaint with several affirmative defenses. As relevant here, defendant claimed that plaintiff had "failed to allege facts" sufficient "to show [that plaintiff was the] party in interest entitled to enforce the contract."
Subsequently, after the parties sought admissions and both parties responded to those admissions, plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that there was no genuine issue as to any material facts, because defendant "admitted to borrowing, without timely repaying, the funds in question." However, in making that motion, plaintiff acknowledged that defendant had not "admitted * * * that Plaintiff is the correct party to whom she owes repayment of the loan." In support of its motion, plaintiff submitted an affidavit of Jacqueline Jefferis, who explained in her affidavit that she was an employee of Transworld Systems Inc., the Subservicer for plaintiff regarding the educational loan at issue. There were several exhibits attached to the affidavit. To establish that plaintiff was the party that owned defendant's loan, plaintiff attached Exhibit B—the "loan request/credit agreement"—and Exhibit C—the "deposit and sale agreement."1
Exhibit B stated that the original lender was Bank One and that defendant "promise[d] to pay to [the lender's] order, upon the terms and conditions of [the] credit agreement."
Exhibit C put forth the terms of the sale between Bank One and plaintiff. As a part of that exhibit, plaintiff attached a document titled "Pool Supplement." That supplement, which described the transaction between Bank One and plaintiff stated:
Defendant then filed a cross-motion for summary judgment pursuant to ORCP 47 B. Defendant maintained that plaintiff failed to allege facts sufficient to prove that it was the party in interest entitled to enforce the contract. In doing so, defendant asserted that the documents that might support that plaintiff is the party in interest, specifically Exhibit B and Exhibit C, were "inadmissible hearsay not qualifying as business records" because they were "without competent foundation." The court held a hearing on those motions.
Plaintiff, in response to defendant's evidentiary argument, asserted that Exhibit B and Exhibit C were business records, admissible as exceptions to the rule against hearsay under OEC 803(6). To establish those exhibits as business records, plaintiff attached a personal affidavit from an employee—Jacqueline Jefferis—of Transworld Systems Incorporated (TSI). In the affidavit, Jefferis stated that TSI is the subservicer for plaintiff's loan. As the subservicer, TSI was the Jefferis's affidavit additionally stated:
After the court considered the parties’ arguments about the affidavit and exhibits, the trial court admitted the affidavit of Jefferis, but rejected plaintiff's argument that Exhibit B and Exhibit C were admissible. The court reasoned that Jefferis was able to "attest to what she's able to attest to." In essence, the court reasoned that, because Jefferis worked for TSI "to perform the duties of subservices," she has knowledge of how TSI "maintains the dedicated system of record for [its] electronic transactions." Specifically, the court explained, she can attest to her "firsthand knowledge" of "[p]ayments, credits, [and] interest accruals." The court stated that what Jefferis did not have firsthand knowledge of was whether the "loan was extended for defendant to use pursuant to the terms of the loan agreements." Thus, her affidavit could not be used to "introduce the contract, because she has no firsthand knowledge of the...
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