Nat'l Fire Proofing Co. v. Town of Huntington

• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: BALDWIN, C. J.
• Citation: Nat'l Fire Proofing Co. v. Town of Huntington, 71 A. 911, 81 Conn. 632 (Conn. 1909)
• Decision Date: 16 February 1909
• Parties: NATIONAL FIRE PROOFING CO. v. TOWN OF HUNTINGTON et al.

71 A. 911

81 Conn. 632

NATIONAL FIRE PROOFING CO.

v. TOWN OF HUNTINGTON et al.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

Feb. 16, 1909.

Case reserved from Superior Court, Fairfield County; Edwin B. Gager, Judge.

Action by the National Fire Proofing Company against the Town of Huntington and others. On a trial in the Superior Court the case was reserved for the Supreme Court of Errors. Judgment advised for defendants.

This is an action by a subcontractor against the town of Huntington and sundry other subcontractors, who, like the plaintiff, had filed certificates of mechanic's lien on a town schoolhouse, to foreclose the plaintiff's lien, to ascertain what balance was due from the town on the "purchase price," and the respective amounts of the several liens, and to have the balance due from the town apportioned among the several lienors, brought to the superior court for Fairfield county and reserved (Gager, J.) for the advice of this court on a stipulation as to the facts. One of these was that the town of Huntington in the case of the plaintiff's lien and the lien of each of the defendants appearing had on hand at the time of the filing of the lien and of the service of notice of intention to claim lien an amount of money sufficient to pay such lien, and subject to such lien under the contract with the contractor if such lien is valid.

Edward A. Harriman and William S. Downs, for plaintiff.

John W. Banks, for defendants.

BALDWIN, C. J. (after stating the facts as above). Gen. St. 1902, §§ 4135-4138, provide for the creation, under certain conditions, of a mechanic's lien in favor of any original contractor or subcontractor having a claim for over $10 for material furnished or services rendered in the construction of "any building, or any of its appurtenances." These general words, if taken literally, cover every kind of building, public or private. It is clear, however, that they could not be construed to embrace buildings belonging to the state. State v. Kilburn, 81 Conn. 9, 11, 69 Atl. 1028. Nor do they include any public buildings belonging to corporations or communities created by the state as governmental agencies for purely public purposes, to defray the cost of which they can freely exercise the power of taxation.

The mischief which the statute was designed to remedy is an important guide in ascertaining its meaning. A thing within the letter of a statute may be unaffected by its provisions, if not within the intention of the makers, and if what was the intention sufficiently appears from the terms which they used, in connection with the conditions calling for such legislation. Bridgeport v. Hubbell, 5 Conn. 237, 243; Wetherell v. Hollister, 73 Conn. 622, 625, 48 Atl. 826; Kelley v. Killourey, 81 Conn. 320, 70 Atl. 1031. The statute under consideration created a new means of securing the claims of a particular class of creditors. It is in derogation of the common law, and of a kind calling for a strict, rather than a liberal, construction. Chapin v. Persse & Brooks Paper Works, 30 Conn. 461, 79 Am. Dec. 263; Hubbell v. Kingman, 52 Conn. 17, 19. The mischief to be prevented was loss to those furnishing services or materials in the construction...