Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Headrick

• Decision Date: 09 May 1916
• Docket Number: No. 9023.,9023.
• Parties: NATIONAL LIFE INS. CO. v. HEADRICK et al.
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

63 Ind.App. 54

112 N.E. 559

NATIONAL LIFE INS. CO.

v.HEADRICK et al.

No. 9023.

Appellate Court of Indiana, Division No. 1.

May 9, 1916.

Appeal from Superior Court, Marion County; Chas. J. Orbison, Judge.

Action by William D. Headrick and others against the National Life Insurance Company. From a judgment for plaintiffs upon a verdict rendered on appeal from the judgment of a justice of the peace for plaintiffs, defendant appeals. Affirmed.Miller & Dowling, of Indianapolis, for appellant. Headrick & Ruick, of Indianapolis, for appellees.

FELT, P. J.

This suit originated before a justice of the peace, where a judgment was rendered for $100 for legal services alleged to have been rendered appellant at its special instance and request. From the judgment an appeal was taken to the Marion superior court, where the case was tried by a jury on an issue formed by a general denial of all the averments of the complaint. The jury returned a verdict for appellees in the sum of $95, and also answers to interrogatories. From a judgment on the verdict appellant has appealed and assigned as error the overruling of its motion for a new trial and certain other alleged errors, which are not grounds for independent assignments of error, but causes for a new trial.

A new trial was asked on the ground that the court erred in giving the jury certain instructions; that the verdict is not sustained by sufficient evidence; that it is contrary to law; that the assessment of the amount of recovery is erroneous, in that the verdict is too large. In its brief appellant states that:

“The theory ultimately relied on by appellees and adopted by the trial court was that the employment of appellees was not authorized by appellant, but that it ratified it. The theory, therefore, is that of ratification, and this is the theory of the case which must be adopted by the Appellate Court.”

This proposition is not denied by appellees, but they contend that the services were rendered with the knowledge and approval of appellant, under such circumstances as to show an acceptance of the benefit of the services by appellant, and a ratification of the employment. There is ample evidence to show the rendition and value of the services, but the question of ratification is sharply controverted. There is no denial of the fact that services were rendered in connection with the business of appellant under an employment or arrangement by and between appellees and one V. C. Vette, who was at the time general manager of the railroad accident department of appellant at Indianapolis; but it is contended that he held such position under a written contract which did not authorize him to bind appellant by any contract for the employment of attorneys.

The evidence tends to show that appellant's principal office was in Chicago; that Mr. A. M. Johnson was president of the company during 1911 and up to April, 1912; that Mr. Vette was acquainted with Mr. Johnson, and in the summer of 1911 appellee Ruick and Mr. Vette attended a convention of insurance commissioners or state officials appointed by the Governors of the several states, held in Milwaukee, and while there Mr. Vette introduced Mr. Ruick to Mr. Johnson, and in conversation with him in the presence of Mr. Ruick informed him that, if they consummated their contemplated arrangement for Mr. Vette to represent the company, “We will expect to have Mr. Ruick as our attorney,” to which Mr. Johnson answered, “Yes, that is all right;” that during the time the services of appellees were being rendered Mr. Vette spent part of his time in his Indianapolis office and part of the time in the Chicago office of appellant; that Mr. Hallman was chief clerk in appellant's accident department, and Mr. J. B. Boyer was attorney for that department; that one C. H. Boyer was general manager of appellant's casualty department, which included the railroad department.

One Howard Beechem testified that he had worked for Mr. Vette, and had also been employed in appellant's Chicago office, and worked in the accident department from November, 1911, to the latter part of March, 1912, under Mr. C. H. Boyer, and also under instructions of Mr. Vette; that...