Nat'l Silk Dyeing Co. v. Grobart

• Decision Date: 19 October 1934
• Citation: 175 A. 91
• Parties: NATIONAL SILK DYEING CO. v. GROBART et al.
• Court: New Jersey Court of Chancery

175 A. 91

NATIONAL SILK DYEING CO.

v. GROBART et al.

Court of Chancery of New Jersey.

Oct. 19, 1934.

Syllabus by the Court.

Conveyance of land by bounding it on a way described as a street entitles the grantee to the use of the way for egress from and ingress to the conveyed land.

Declarations and admissions made by a former owner of land while holding title are competent evidence against one who has derived title through such former owner.

The judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction on a question of fact puts the matter decided at rest forever and for all purposes not only as between the parties but as to their privies.

A purchaser of land is not chargeable with notice of an easement granted in an earlier deed made by the grantor, if such earlier deed is not in the purchaser's chain of title.

The burden of proof to establish that an easement claimed by complainant over defendant's land commenced and continued by permission is on defendant.

Where the existence and use of a right of way are clearly proven but its exact location and width are in dispute, one interfering with the use of the way may be enjoined until location and width are settled at law.

An unlimited right of way appurtenant to land is not to be restricted to the purpose to which the land was devoted when the right was originally acquired; the use of the land may be changed or enlarged.

One entitled to such right of way may not enjoin the owner of the servient tenement from interfering with passage thereover when the way is used by the owner of the dominant tenement as a means of passage to and from his other adjoining land.

Suit by the National Silk Dyeing Company against Samuel Grobart and others.

Decree in accordance with opinion.

William I. Lewis, of Paterson, for complainant.

Peter Bentley, of Jersey City, and Samuel M. Levy, of New York City, for defendants.

FIELDER, Vice Chancellor.

This controversy concerns complainant's claim to an easement or right of way leading in a southerly direction from Ryle avenue (formerly known as Totowa road or avenue and Water street) in the city of Paterson over lands owned by the defendants, to complainant's land and mill premises, the use of which right of way the defendants deny to complainant and seek to bar. The complainant's claim is based on grant and prescription. Complainant and defendants have a common source of title in George Addy, who acquired his title to both tracts (and more) in 1866. The following conveyances show the source of complainant's title to its lands (the same consisting originally of two parcels) and to its claim to the right of way by grant.

By deed dated May 1, 1867, Addy conveyed to Henry C. Post a large lot of land, part of which fronted on a public street called Geering lane, "together with the privilege of free egress and ingress from and to said lot and through a lane extending to the same from Totowa Avenue, said lane from its beginning point at Totowa Avenue to the southeast corner of the old Lemuel Griffin house being of a width of twelve feet and from said corner of said Griffin house to said lot along the river front a width of twenty feet." Post gave two mortgages on the property which were subsequently foreclosed and the mortgaged premises passed at sheriff's sale to Rebecca Post in 1880, who conveyed to George Addy by deed dated May 10, 1883. The conveyances cover one of the parcels afterward acquired by complainant, and the defendants claim that the reacquisition of this parcel by Addy extinguished the right of way he had granted Post. I shall deal with that question later. Addy thereafter conveyed to Charles Vermorel by three deeds dated respectively May 1, 1885, June 13, 1885, and January 30, 1888, all the land he had acquired by deed from Rebecca Post, the whole forming a plot fronting on Geering lane. No mention is made in said three deeds of a street or lane running to Ryle avenue.

Title to the second parcel of land now owned by complainant remained in Addy as acquired by him in 1866, until his deed to Joseph Taylor dated May 1, 1868, whereby he conveyed two lots, describing the first as "beginning on the northeasterly side of a small street or lane near the Passaic River * * * and running thence southeasterly along said street about 99 ft. to lands of Henry C. Post, etc.," and describing the second lot as "all the lands lying on the southwesterly side of said street between said premises and the river." This conveyance of land expressly bounding on a street or lane, covered not only the land particularly described, but carried with it Addy's implied covenant that there was a street or lane which Taylor had the right to use for access to the land. It would be absurd to think that such right of passage was limited to a way directly in front of the land, which led nowhere, so that the necessary and further implication is that the easement thus granted Taylor carried beyond the street or lane in front of his property to such connection as it bad to a way, of which it was a continuation, in order to afford Taylor access and egress by means of the whole way to and from the street front of his land and a public street. Booraen v. North Hudson Co. R. R. Co., 40 N. J. Eq. 557, 5 A. 106; Lennig v. Ocean City Ass'n, 41 N. J. Eq. 606, 7 A. 491, 56 Am. Rep. 16; Dodge v. Penna R. R., 43 N. J. Eq. 351, 11 A. 751, affirmed 45 N. J. Eq. 366, 19 A. 622; Dill v. Board of Education, 47 N. J. Eq. 421, 20 A. 739, 10 L. R. A. 276; White v. Tide Water Oil Co., 50 N. J. Eq. 1, 25 A. 199. The land conveyed to Taylor adjoined on the south the lands conveyed by Addy to Post and the southerly end of the street or lane mentioned in Taylor's deed was on Post's line, so that Taylor had no outlet in that direction to a public street. Addy's conveyance to Post included a right of way from Post's land to Ryle avenue, and Addy spoke in his deed of the lane over which Post's right of way extended as an existing lane running from Ryle avenue to the corner of the old Lemuel Griffin house which house, the evidence shows, stood on the Taylor lot. Evidently this was the house in which Taylor resided and it seems a fair inference that Post's right of access to Ryle avenue was by means of a lane which ran from his land through the property Addy afterward conveyed to Taylor and which, in the deed to Taylor, Addy called a street or lane and that by necessary implication the use given Taylor of the street in front of his land extended beyond Taylor's land and over the same lane which served as an outlet for the Post property.

It is a fact, disclosed by the record, that Taylor claimed the right to use and did use the lane leading to Ryle avenue as appurtenant to the land conveyed to him by Addy and that Addy conceded such right. The record consists of the pleadings, order, and decree in a cause in this court wherein Taylor was complainant and Addy was defendant. In his bill filed November 3, 1875, Taylor alleged that his deed from Addy conveyed a tract of land which fronted on and adjoined a street or lane running from Water street, on which he resided, and that said street or lane afforded the only means of access to and from his (Taylor's) lands and Water street and he charged that Addy was digging a trench therein and prayed that Addy be enjoined from obstructing his use of the street or lane. An order was issued on Addy to show Clause why an injunction should not issue against him and restraining him in the mean time from obstructing the lane. Addy filed a verified answer wherein he admitted the existence of the lane and did not deny Taylor's claim of right to use it and said that upon his (Addy's) agreeing to give Taylor a better and more convenient way from Water street to his (Taylor's) house, Taylor had consented that he (Addy) might erect a mill building on a portion of said lane and had it not been for Taylor's consent he would not have commenced the erection of his mill. The cause came on for hearing by consent on the pleadings, whereupon by decree dated November 30, 1875, it was decreed that the restraining order be continued until such time as Addy should assure Taylor, by appropriate conveyance, a better and more convenient way from Water street to Taylor's house than the way mentioned in the bill of complaint, and that upon such conveyance being made, the bill be dismissed. The decree reserved to the parties the right to apply for direction as to whether the new way and the title proposed to be made were sufficient, but the case shows no record of such application and no conveyance of a new right of way was made.

The bill in the chancery suit set out Taylor's claim to the right of way from his property to Ryle avenue, as based on grant under Addy's deed to him and Addy's answer was an admission of Taylor's claim. Such admission is competent evidence against the defendants, who derive their title through Addy. Mason v. Ross, 75 N. J. Eq. 136, 71 A. 141, reversed on other grounds 77 N. J. Eq. 527, 77 A. 44; Cox v. Tomlin, 19 N. J. Law, 76; Horner v. Stillwell, 35 N. J. Law, 307; Miller v. Feenane, 50 N. J. Law, 32, 11 A. 136. Not only does the decree establish that the right of way existed, but by adjudging Taylor's right to its continued use, the decree was a judicial interpretation of the meaning and scope of Addy's deed to him and a judgment that such right of way was founded on grant contained in a recorded deed and was appurtenant to Taylor's land. The decree, of course, bound Addy and it is also binding on the defendants because they stand in privity with him. City of Paterson v. Baker, 51 N, J. Eq. 49, 26 A. 324; Manning v. Port Reading R. R., 54 N. J. Eq. 46, 33 A. 802; In re Walsh's Estate, 80 N. J. Eq. 565, 74 A. 563; N. J. Zinc Co. v. Fancher, 96 N. J. Eq. 65, 125 A. 9, affirmed 97 N. J. Eq. 508, 128 A. 172; W. D. Cashin & Co. v. Alamac Hotel Co., 93 N. J. Eq. 432, 131 A. 117; McMichael v. Horay, 90 N. J. Law 142, 100 A. 205; Perth Amboy Dry Dock Co....