Nat'l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n v. City of Dall.

Decision Date16 October 2012
Docket NumberCivil Action No. 3:11–cv–3200–O.
PartiesNATIONAL SOLID WASTES MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION, et al., Plaintiffs, v. The CITY OF DALLAS, et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Northern District of Texas

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

James B. Harris, Brian Walters Stoltz, Stephen F. Fink, Thompson & Knight LLP, Bryan D. Pollard, E. Stratton Horres, Jr., Wilson Elser Moskowitz Edelman & Dicker LLP, Charles L. Babcock, Patrick R. Cowlishaw, Jackson Walker LLP, Ryan Bangert, Baker Botts LLP, Dallas, TX, Aaron M. Streett, Baker Botts LLP, Houston, TX, for Plaintiffs.

Peter B. Haskel, Christopher J. Caso, Dallas City Attorney's Office, Daniel L. Geyser, Robert C. Walters, Gibson Dunn & Crutcher LLP, James Britton McGuire, City of Dallas, Dallas, TX, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

REED O'CONNOR, District Judge.

Plaintiffs 1 filed this suit against The City of Dallas (the City), Mayor Mike Rawlings, and City Council members Pauline Medrano, Tennell Atkins, Dwaine Caraway, Monica Alonzo, Carolyn Davis, Jerry Allen, Linda Koop, and Angela Hunt. The amended complaint alleges that Defendants violated Plaintiffs' state and federal constitutional rights, as well as the City Charter, when Defendants passed City Ordinance No. 28427 (hereinafter referred to as the Flow Control Ordinance).2 Plaintiffs seek to permanently enjoin the City from enacting the Flow Control Ordinance.

The parties agreed to submit this case for trial based on written submissions because the underlying facts are largely undisputed.3See Joint Status Report 4, ECF No. 55. Therefore, the Court sets out its findings of fact based on a preponderance of evidence and conclusions of law pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a). The following findings of fact and conclusions of law are based upon the pleadings, testimony, evidence, and exhibits admitted on the record. The Court provides a clear understanding of its decision in accordance with the level of detail required in this Circuit. See Century Marine Inc. v. United States, 153 F.3d 225, 231 (5th Cir.1998). Any finding of fact that should be construed as a conclusion of law is hereby adopted as such. Any conclusion of law that should be construed as a finding of fact is hereby adopted as such. For the reasons explained below, the Court grants Plaintiffs' request for an injunction.

I. FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In 2007, five franchisees (hereinafter the “Franchisees”) entered into franchise agreements (the “Franchise Agreements”) with the City. See Pls.' Ex. 10–14 (Franchise Agreements). The Franchise Agreements permitted the Franchisees to, among other things, collect, transport, and dispose of solid waste from locations within the City for twenty years. As explained in the Court's Preliminary Injunction Order, the Franchise Agreements granted the Franchisees the right to dispose of the solid waste it collected at any authorized landfill. Preliminary Injunction Order, Jan. 31, 2012, ECF No. 53.

In December 2011, the Dallas City Council passed the Flow Control Ordinance. It was to take effect January 2, 2012. See id. (providing a background of the Flow Control Ordinance). Among other things, the Flow Control Ordinance mandated that all waste collected within the City had to be disposed of at a City landfill.4

Plaintiffs filed this suit to permanently enjoin the City from enforcing the Flow Control Ordinance. In the interim, Plaintiffs sought to preliminarily enjoin the City from enforcing it until its claims were finally resolved. After a hearing on Plaintiffs' request for a preliminary injunction, this Court preliminarily enjoined the City from enforcing the Flow Control Ordinance and concluded that: (1) Plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their Contract Clause claim against the City; (2) Plaintiffs would suffer irreparable harm if the Flow Control Ordinance took effect; (3) the balance of equities favored Plaintiffs; and (4) a preliminary injunction was in the public interest. See generally Preliminary Injunction Order, Jan. 31, 2012, ECF No. 53.5

Instead of immediately appealing the preliminary injunction order, the City agreed that it would be more efficient to have the case fully resolved first. See Joint Report 4, ECF No. 55. The parties agreed to submit their case on written submissions. Id. Having considered the pleadings, the evidence, and the applicable law, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have satisfied their burden for obtaining a permanent injunction.

II. STANDINGA. Franchisee Plaintiffs

Before addressing the merits, the Court must first resolve Defendants' standing objections. Defendants argue that certain of the Franchisees lack standing because their names in the complaint do not match how they are identified in the Franchise Agreements. See Defs.' Resp. Opp'n Perm. Inj. 8, 14, ECF No. 73. Defendants also contend that all the Franchisees have failed to demonstrate a specific and immediate injury. Id. at 15, 19.

Standing “addresses the question of who may properly bring suit in federal court.” Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc. v. Tex. Dept. of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs, No. 3–08–CV–0546–D, 2008 WL 5191935, at *2 (N.D.Tex. Dec. 11, 2008). Under the standing doctrine, a plaintiff must establish that it has suffered an “injury in fact,” the injury is “fairly traceable” to the defendant's action, and it is “likely” that the injury will be “redressed by a favorable decision.” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992). An “injury in fact” must be “concrete and ... actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” Id. at 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130. In the context of injunctions, the plaintiff must further show that it is likely to suffer future injury as a result of a defendant's conduct, and that the relief requested will prevent that future injury. See Soc'y of Separationists, Inc. v. Herman, 959 F.2d 1283, 1285 (5th Cir.1992). However, a court may find standing if the injury is accompanied by any continuing, present adverse effects. Id.

Defendants first argue that three of the five Franchisees—Bluebonnet Waste Control, Inc., Waste Management of Texas, Inc., and Allied Waste System, Inc.—cannot prove an injury because, while they allege they are Plaintiffs, they are not the Franchisees identified in the pertinent Franchise Agreements. See Defs.' Resp. Opp'n Perm. Inj. 8, 14, ECF No. 73. A variance in a party's pleading and its proof may be fatal to recovery. See Dougherty v. Robb, 5 S.W.2d 582, 583 (Tex.Civ.App.-San Antonio 1928, writ dism'd). Courts generally find a variance fatal when there is a difference in pleading and proof as to the names of the parties to a contract. See W. Tex. Utils. Co. v. Pirtle, 444 S.W.2d 202, 204 (Tex.Civ.App.-Eastland 1969, no writ). However, if the difference neither surprises nor misleads the party sought to be charged, it is immaterial. See Cahoon v. Thomas, 258 S.W. 499, 500 (Tex.Civ.App.-San Antonio 1924, writ dism'd w.o.j.).

Here, the variance between the identity of the Franchisees in the Franchise Agreements and their names as identified in the lawsuit is nonfatal. The City points out that this lawsuit names Bluebonnet Waste Control, Inc. as a party, but its Franchise Agreement references, in various parts, Blue Bonnet Waste, Inc. See Defs.' Resp. Opp'n Perm. Inj. 8, 14, ECF No. 73; compare Pls.' Am. Compl. 1, ECF No. 36 with Pls.' Ex. 10 (Bluebonnet Franchise Agreement), at App. 81. The City also points out that this action lists Allied Waste System, Inc. as a plaintiff while the Franchise Agreement identifies Allied Waste Services, Inc. as a contracting party. See Defs.' Resp. Opp'n Perm. Inj. 8, 14, ECF No. 73; compare Pls.' Am. Compl. 1, ECF No. 36, with Pls.' Ex. 13 (Allied Franchise Agreement), Exhibit B. Finally, the City alleges that Waste Management of Texas, Inc. (“WMTI”) has no standing because its Franchise Agreement names “Waste Management Inc. See Defs.' Resp. Opp'n Perm. Inj. 8, 14, ECF No. 73; compare Pls.' Am. Compl. 1, ECF No. 36, with Pls.' Ex. 14 (WMTI Franchise Agreement), Exhibit B.

The Court finds Defendants' arguments unavailing. First, the City has enforced the Bluebonnet Franchise Agreement against Bluebonnet Waste Control, Inc. (“Bluebonnet”), the Allied Franchise Agreement against Allied Waste System, Inc. (“Allied”), and the WMTI Franchise Agreement against WMTI for the last five years. See City Ry. Co. v. Citizens' St. R.R. Co., 166 U.S. 557, 558, 17 S.Ct. 653, 41 L.Ed. 1114 (1897) (finding a party's conduct constitutes acceptance of a franchise agreement).

In addition, the Bluebonnet Franchise Agreement and WMTI Franchise Agreement identify these Franchisees by both names throughout the document. On the acceptance page of Bluebonnet's Franchise Agreement, Bluebonnet Waste Control, Inc. signed the agreement even though Blue Bonnet Waste, Inc. is the entity identified in the opening paragraph of the document. See Pls.' Ex. 10 (Bluebonnet Franchise Agreement), at App. 44, 81. Similarly, the WMTI Franchise Agreement lists Waste Management, Inc. in the signature block, but Waste Management of Texas Inc. is the entity that signed it. See Pls.' Ex. 14 (WMTI Franchise Agreement), Exhibit B. The Allied Franchise Agreement only identifies Allied Waste Services, Inc. See Pls.' Ex. 13 (Allied Franchise Agreement). However, the evidence indisputably shows it is known in the industry as both “Allied Waste Services, Inc. and “Allied Waste System, Inc. See Pls. Ex. 34 (Stefkovich Decl.), ¶ 5. For these reasons, there is little risk that the City is surprised that the named Plaintiffs are the Franchisees seeking judicial resolution to enforce the Franchise Agreements against the City. See Cahoon, 258 S.W. at 500;see also City Ry. Co., 166 U.S. at 558, 17 S.Ct. 653. Accordingly, the Court finds that Waste Management of Texas, Inc., Bluebonnet Waste Control, Inc., and Allied Waste System, Inc. are the parties referenced in their...

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