Nat'l Tr. Ins. Co. v. Taylor & Sons, Inc.

• Decision Date: 08 June 2021
• Docket Number: CV 319-067
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Georgia
• Parties: NATIONAL TRUST INSURANCE COMPANY and MONROE GUARANTY INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiffs, v. TAYLOR & SONS, INC., BRIAN LLOYD, BEVERLY LLOYD, JOE WOJTANIK, and MADELYN POLLACK, Defendants.

NATIONAL TRUST INSURANCE COMPANY and MONROE GUARANTY INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiffs, v. TAYLOR & SONS, INC., BRIAN LLOYD, BEVERLY LLOYD,JOE WOJTANIK, and MADELYN POLLACK, Defendants.

CV 319-067

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA DUBLIN DIVISION

June 8, 2021

ORDER

Before the Court is Plaintiffs National Trust Insurance Company ("National Trust") and Monroe Guaranty Insurance Company's ("Monroe") motion for summary judgment. (Doc. No. 30.) The Clerk has given Defendants notice of the summary judgment motion and the summary judgment rules, of the right to file affidavits or other materials in opposition, and the consequences of default. Therefore, the notice requirements of Griffith v. Wainwright, 772 F.2d 822, 825 (11th Cir. 1985) (per curiam), have been satisfied. The motion has been fully briefed and is ripe for decision. For the following reasons, the motion is denied in part and denied without prejudice in part.

I. BACKGROUND

This case stems from a suit in the Superior Court of Laurens County (the "Superior Court case"), which in turn is based on a motorcycle accident that allegedly occurred on or about November 5, 2017. (See Superior Ct. Am. Compl., Doc. No. 30-2, ¶¶ 8-19.) Defendants Brian and Beverly Lloyd, plaintiffs in the Superior Court case, allege that Brian Lloyd was riding his motorcycle on Highway 26 in Laurens County when it collided with a loose trailer which had uncoupled from the pick-up truck towing it. (Id.) The truck and trailer were allegedly owned by Defendant Taylor & Sons, Inc. ("Taylor"), entrusted to Defendant Joe Wojtanik, and driven by Defendant Madelyn Pollack. (Id.) The Lloyds sued Wojtanik, Pollack, and Taylor in the Superior Court case, alleging that Pollack was negligent in her driving. (Id. ¶ 18.) The Lloyds also allege that Pollack and Wojtanik were negligent in securing the load on the vehicle and that Taylor was negligent in hiring Wojtanik as well as negligent in entrusting the company vehicle to Wojtanik. (Id. ¶¶ 21-30.) Wojtanik was eventually "dropped" from the initial Superior Court case.¹ (See Doc. No. 30-4.)

Plaintiffs in this case, National Trust and Monroe, are not parties to the Superior Court case. Both companies issued insurance policies to Taylor. (Doc. Nos. 1-3; 1-4; 1-5.) Monroe issued a Commercial Auto Policy ("Monroe Policy") to Taylor for a policy period including the incident. (Monroe Policy, Doc. No. 1-3, at 11.)² National Trust issued a Commercial General Liability Policy and an Umbrella Policy to Taylor for a policy period including the incident. (CGL Policy, Doc. No. 1-5, at 5; Umbrella Policy, Doc. No. 1-4, at 6.)

Plaintiffs instituted this action seeking a declaratory judgment that they have no obligation to indemnify, defend, or pay any sum on behalf of Wojtanik and Pollack in connection with the Superior Court case or the Lloyds' claims. (See Compl., Doc. No. 1.) Defendants previously moved to dismiss, urging the Court to exercise its discretion and decline jurisdiction, but the motion was denied. (See Doc. Nos. 17; 26.) Now, Plaintiffs move for summary judgment, arguing that neither Pollack nor Wojtanik are covered persons under any of the insurance policies.

A. The Alleged Incident and the Parties Involved

Scott Donaldson is the sole owner, President, and CEO of Taylor, which is a Georgia corporation that does "complete sitework service[,]" preparing construction sites, laying foundations, and more. (Donaldson Dep., Doc. No. 30-5, at 11-12, 17.) At the relevant time, Wojtanik worked as a surveyor for Taylor, and reported directly to Donaldson. (Wojtanik Dep., Doc. No. 30-7, at 16, 100.) Pollack was Wojtanik's companion and mother of Wojtanik's children, but not a Taylor employee. (Id. at 13; Donaldson Dep. at 111.)

Taylor owned the truck and trailer involved in the incident. (Donaldson Dep. at 110.) Taylor assigned the truck to Wojtanik, who kept the truck - and on occasion, a trailer owned by Taylor - at his house. (Wojtanik Dep. at 28-34.) Wojtanik driver's license was suspended in May of 2017 but he was permitted to keep the truck and trailer at his house. (Id. at 55-56.) Taylor contends that it revoked Wojtanik's permission to drive any Taylor-owned vehicles following the loss of his license, and Wojtanik did not have permission to loan the truck to anyone else.³ (Id. at 55-57; Donaldson Dep. at 46, 109-11 ("[Q]: Joe Wojtanik did not have permission to drive that truck? A: Correct, he did not. Q: For any reason? A: No reason.")) According to Donaldson, Pollack never had permission to drive the truck. (Donaldson Dep. at 111.)

Donaldson acknowledged that he was aware of employees using Taylor vehicles on personal time and for personal reasons. (Id. at71; Letter to Employees, Doc. No. 37-17.) He began a letter he sent to his employees after the incident by stating, "I must stop turning a blind eye for convenience," referencing the use of Taylor vehicles outside of company duties and work-related travel. (Letter to Employees.)

Despite Donaldson's testimony, Pollack understood that she had permission to drive the truck and another Taylor utility vehicle. (Pollack Dep., Doc. No. 30-8, at 27, 43, 56-58.) Her understanding was that Wojtanik had asked Donaldson's permission for her to drive the truck. (Id. at 43.) However, Pollack was not aware of whether Wojtanik had actually obtained permission on her behalf, and she never directly received permission from someone at Taylor - except for one occasion when she drove Wojtanik home from Donaldson's house after Wojtanik had been drinking. (Id. at 43-44, 55-58.) Wojtanik also acknowledged that Pollack did not have express permission to use the truck to haul a trampoline, but that he assumed based on past permission that it would be okay. (Wojtanik Dep. at 108, 110-12.) Wojtanik also testified to the contrary, stating that Donaldson had given Pollack permission to use Taylor-owned vehicles on several occasions. (Id. at 67-68.) For example, Pollack used Taylor vehicles to go to the dump and drive Wojtanik to job sites, in addition to the occasion when she drove Wojtanik home from Donaldson's house with Donaldson's knowledge. (Id. at 68-72.) Wojtanik also stated that Donaldson had been "alright with" Pollackusing the truck on prior occasions and that Pollack had in fact been given permission to drive a Taylor vehicle at some point in time. (Id. at 108, 121-22.) All in all, Wojtanik recalls Pollack using a Taylor vehicle "a handful of times in several years." (Id. at 72.)

On November 5, 2017 - the day of the incident - Pollack was using the truck and trailer to haul her daughter's trampoline to their new home. (Pollack Dep. at 42-44; Wojtanik Dep. at 109.) With the help of some "neighborhood kids," Pollack loaded the trampoline onto the trailer. (Pollack Dep. at 45.) The trailer had already been attached to the truck by either Wojtanik or another Taylor employee. (Wojtanik Dep. at 75-76.) Interestingly, Pollack did not notice when the trailer became detached. By the time Pollack arrived at her new home, she realized the trailer was missing. (Pollack Dep. at 31, 46.) When the trailer separated from the truck, it allegedly struck Defendant Brian Lloyd on his motorcycle. (Superior Ct. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 8-19; Accident Report, Doc. No. 37-9.) After realizing that the trailer was missing, Pollack retraced her route in her personal car and found the trailer with the trampoline still partially attached. (Pollack Dep. at 47.) The Accident Report states that the trailer's safety chains were not attached to the truck. (Accident Report at 8.)

B. The Insurance Policies

The relevant portions describing coverage of the three policies are given below.

1. The Monroe Policy

The Monroe policy defines "insureds" as "a. You for any covered auto," ("You," meaning the named insured, or in this case Taylor), "b. Anyone else while using with [Taylor's] permission a covered 'auto'⁴ you own, hire or borrow," and "c. Anyone liable for the conduct of an "insured" described above but only to the extent of that liability." (Monroe Policy at 57-58.)

2. The National Trust CGL Policy

Defendants concede that the CGL Policy is inapplicable in this case. (Defs.' Resp. to Mot. for Summ. J., Doc. No. 37, at 3 n.8.)

3. The National Trust Umbrella Policy

With respect to liability arising out of the use of covered autos, the Umbrella Policy covers Taylor as the named insured, as well as same three scenarios covered in the Monroe Policy. (Compare Monroe Policy at 57-58 with Umbrella Policy at 24.) "Covered auto" is defined as "those 'autos' to which 'underlying insurance' applies." (Umbrella Policy at 28.) "Underlying insurance" in turn refers to the Monroe Policy. (Id. at 13.)

II. JURISDICTION

Diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 exists in this case. Plaintiffs are corporations organized under the laws of Indiana with principal places of business in Florida, while Defendants are all Georgia citizens. The amount in controversy threshold is satisfied because the damages alleged in the Superior Court Case total more than $480,000. (Superior Ct. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 32-39.) This suit may determine whether Plaintiffs are liable for any such damages in the Superior Court Case.

Discussion of discretionary jurisdiction under the Declaratory Judgment Act can be found infra at Section IV.A.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate when "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). A "material" fact is one that could "affect the outcome of the suit under the governing [substantive] law," Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986), while a dispute is genuine "if the nonmoving party has produced evidence such that a reasonable factfinder could return a verdict in its favor." Waddell v. Valley Forge Dental Assocs., Inc., 276 F.3d 1275, 1279 (11th Cir. 2001). Any inferences drawn from the facts must be in the light most...