Nat'l Truck Equip. Ass'n v. Nat'l Highway Traffic Safety Admin.

Decision Date28 March 2013
Docket NumberNo. 09–3812.,09–3812.
Citation711 F.3d 662
PartiesNATIONAL TRUCK EQUIPMENT ASSOCIATION, Petitioner, v. NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION, Respondent.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

ARGUED:Bruce E. Alexander, Weiner, Brodsky, Sidman & Kider, PC, Washington, D.C., for Petitioner. H. Thomas Byron III, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Respondent. ON BRIEF:Bruce E. Alexander, Weiner, Brodsky, Sidman & Kider, PC, Washington, D.C., for Petitioner. H. Thomas Byron III, Michael P. Abate, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.

Before: DAUGHTREY, COLE, and GIBBONS, Circuit Judges.

OPINION

COLE, Circuit Judge.

This case arises from a longstanding dispute between the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) and the National Truck Equipment Association (NTEA). NHTSA is a federal agency within the Department of Transportation that writes and enforces safety standards for motor vehicles. NTEA is a trade organization representing more than one thousand manufacturers who customize bodies for special-purpose commercial vehicles. In 2005, NHTSA initiated a rulemaking proceeding at Congress's behest to upgrade the safety standard establishing strength requirements for passenger compartment roofs in certain vehicles. NHTSA proposed, among other things, extending the scope of the safety standard to include a previously unregulated class of vehicles, many of which are produced by NTEA's members. NTEA resisted this proposal throughout the process, but to no avail. In 2009, NHTSA promulgated Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) No. 216a, which NTEA now challenges on several grounds. For the reasons that follow, we deny the petition for review.

I.
A.

Congress passed the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 (Safety Act) with the express purpose of “reduc[ing] traffic accidents and deaths and injuries to persons resulting from traffic accidents.” Pub. L. No. 89–563, 80 Stat. 718 (codified at 49 U.S.C. §§ 30101–30183 (2010)). Toward this end, Congress directed the Secretary of Transportation to prescribe safety standards for motor vehicles, see49 U.S.C. § 30111(a), a statutory duty the Secretary has delegated to NHTSA since 1980, see49 C.F.R. § 501.2 (2010). NHTSA's standards serve as mandatory performance benchmarks for motor vehicles and their constituent parts. See49 U.S.C. § 30112(a)(1). As such, manufacturers must certify that the vehicles they produce comply with each standard that applies. See id. § 30115.

While most of NHTSA's standards are aimed at single-stage manufacturers of non-commercial vehicles—the kind most of us drive everyday—this group is not the only one subject to regulation. The Safety Act also applies to final-stage manufacturers—who complete vehicles assembled in two or more stages—and alterers—who make modifications to already-completed vehicles prior to sale. See id. § 30115(b). NTEA challenges FMVSS No. 216a only as it relates to the latter two groups.

A little background is in order here. Final-stage manufacturers are for the most part small companies that supply a market for custom-made work trucks driven by end-users with specialized needs, like contractors and utility companies. See generally Nat'l Truck Equip. Ass'n v. Nat'l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 919 F.2d 1148, 1150–51 (6th Cir.1990) (describing the market for multi-stage vehicles in considerable detail). A final-stage manufacturer filling an order usually begins with a truck chassis produced by a major manufacturer such as Ford or General Motors (GM). Oftentimes the chassis will consist, in its entirety, of an engine, transmission, axles, wheels, and a completed passenger compartment with bare frame rails in the rear (where the bed would be on a non-commercial truck). This form of chassis is known as a “chassis-cab,” see49 C.F.R. § 567.3, and it is functionally a work-in-progress. A final-stage manufacturer then attaches a service body or other specialized equipment to complete the vehicle and meet the end-user's specific needs. One familiar example might be adding a flat bed and a winch to complete a tow truck.

Like other manufacturers, final-stage manufacturers are required to certify that the vehicles they complete are in compliance with all applicable safety standards. 49 U.S.C. § 30115(a)(b). The Safety Act provides two avenues to do this. The most straightforward avenue is to independently certify compliance. See id. § 30115(b)(2). Taking this route generally entails conducting whatever test is specified in the relevant standard—e.g., crashing a vehicle into a wall. Because the cost of conducting such tests is almost always insurmountable for small companies, this is not a popular option among final-stage manufacturers. Thankfully Congress anticipated this problem and included a second avenue for final-stage manufacturers to certify compliance that amounts to piggy-backing. See id. § 30115(b)(1). Final-stage manufacturers may rely on an initial manufacturer's certification statement that the incomplete vehicle it delivered conforms to applicable standards—in other words, they are allowed to “pass through” the initial certification rather than certifying independently. Id. Both the initial manufacturer and the final-stage manufacturer of a vehicle have some responsibility in this scenario.

Pass-through certification is at the heart of the dispute between NTEA and NHTSA. This avenue is made possible because initial manufacturers of chassis-cabs are required to deliver their products with an incomplete vehicle document (IVD) that lists the applicable safety standards “in effect at the time of manufacture.” 49 C.F.R. § 568.4(a)(7). For each standard, initial manufacturers must supply one of three kinds of statements regarding an incomplete vehicle's compliance. Id. A “Type 1” statement certifies “that the vehicle when completed will conform to the standard if no alterations are made in identified components of the incomplete vehicle.” Id. § 568.4(a)(7)(i). A “Type 2” statement provides “specific conditions of final manufacture under which the manufacturer specifies that the completed vehicle will conform to the standard.” Id. § 568.4(a)(7)(ii). Finally, a “Type 3” statement simply notes that “conformity with the [applicable] standard cannot be determined based upon the components supplied on the incomplete vehicle, and that the incomplete vehicle manufacturer makes no representation as to conformity with the standard.” Id. § 568.4(a)(7)(iii). These statements specify the restrictions and conditions that an initial manufacturer places on the certification of a completed vehicle built on its chassis. A final-stage manufacturer need only certify “that it has complied with the specifications set forth” in an IVD to satisfy its duty under the Safety Act. 49 U.S.C. § 30115(b)(1); see also49 C.F.R. § 567.5(d)(1) (noting that final-stage manufacturers are in the clear if they “complete the vehicle in accordance with the prior manufacturers' IVD”).

The Safety Act—and the attendant duty to certify—also applies to alterers. They are generally small companies that make aftermarket modifications to single-stage vehicles before those vehicles are first sold to end-users. See49 C.F.R. § 567.3. Alterers are distinct from final-stage manufacturers insofar as vehicles arrive to alterers fully built; that is, the vehicles arrive with load-bearing and other specialized equipment already attached rather than as an incomplete chassis-cab. For this reason, alterers face a different certification regime under the Safety Act, one in which pass-through certification is irrelevant. Single-stage manufacturers are required to certify that their completed vehicles are compliant with all applicable safety standards. See49 U.S.C. § 30115(a). Thus, there is no need to issue an IVD when delivering such vehicles to alterers or anyone else. Alterers do not run afoul of the Safety Act so long as they avoid making changes that take the completed vehicle out of conformity with any particular standard. See49 C.F.R. § 567.7(a)(1).

B.

The one and only safety standard relevant to this petition is FMVSS No. 216a, which establishes strength requirements—known as “roof crush resistance”—for passenger compartment roofs in certain vehicles. See id. § 571.216a. The standard regulates roof pillars and roof materials to improve occupant safety in the event of a rollover. NHTSA promulgated the first iteration of this standard in 1971 as FMVSS No. 216, see Motor Vehicle Safety Standards, 36 Fed. Reg. 23,299 (Dec. 8, 1971), and amended it in 1991, seeRoof Crush Resistance, 56 Fed. Reg. 15,510 (Apr. 17, 1991).

In 2005, Congress directed NHTSA to revisit the roof crush resistance standard once again. See49 U.S.C. § 30128(a), (d); see also Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users, Pub. L. No. 109–59, Title X, § 10301(a), (d), 119 Stat. 1144, 1939 (Aug. 10, 2005). The statute mandated new rulemaking proceedings, including one to “establish performance criteria to upgrade Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 216 relating to roof strength for driver and passenger sides.” 49 U.S.C. § 30128(d). This specific mandate came as part of a broader effort to promulgate new “rules or standards that will reduce vehicle rollover crashes and mitigate deaths and injuries associated with such crashes for motor vehicles with a gross vehicle weight rating of not more than 10,000 pounds.” Id. § 30128(a).

Less than a month later, NHTSA heeded Congress's call and issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) regarding the roof crush resistance standard. 70 Fed. Reg. 49,223 (Aug. 23, 2005). The NPRM set forth three significant changes intended to upgrade existing FMVSS No. 216, one of which raised the weight limit for vehicles subject to the standard from a Gross Vehicle Weight Rating (GVWR) of 6,000...

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