Nat'l Union Fire Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa. v. Toland
| Decision Date | 16 February 2016 |
| Docket Number | Case No: 15–CV–0010–J |
| Citation | 164 F.Supp.3d 1330 |
| Parties | National Union Fire Company of Pittsburgh, PA., as subrogee of Greentree Transportation Co., Plaintiff, v. Jeffery Toland, individually, and W.R. Drinkwalter and Sons Inc., and James Cunningham, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Wyoming |
Donald G. Moore, Deisch Marion & Klaus, Denver, CO, Ryan L. Woody, Matthiesen Wickert Lehrer SC, Hartford, WI, for Plaintiff.
Brian J. Marvel, Scott E. Ortiz, Erica Rachel Day, Williams Porter Day & Neville P.C., Casper, WY, for Defendant.
ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, Doc. 28, Defendants' opposition thereto, Doc. 36, and the parties' oral arguments heard on September 15, 2015. Having considered the pleadings, the applicable law, the parties' written submissions, oral arguments and materials offered in support of their respective positions, the Court finds and orders as follows.
Defendant Cunningham was an owner-operator and worked under dispatch for Greentree Transportation Co. (Greentree) driving a truck. At all times relevant to this case, Cunningham was an “insured person” under a group Truckers Occupational Accident Insurance policy (the Policy) issued by Plaintiff. The Policy states that “[t]his Policy is governed by the laws of the state in which it is delivered.” Doc. 24, Ex. B at 1. Plaintiff states in its Amended Complaint that the Policy was issued and delivered in the state of Pennsylvania. See, ECF Doc. No. 16, ¶ 1.
The Policy contains the following relevant provisions:
On December 17, 2010, while under dispatch for Greentree, Cunningham was driving on I–90 in Johnson County, Wyoming. Defendant Jeffery Toland rear-ended Cunningham's tractor-trailer. At the time of the accident, Jeffery Toland was in the course and scope of his employment with W.R. Drinkwalter and Sons, Inc. (Drinkwalter). Cunningham suffered injuries from the accident, which resulted in medical bills and lost wages. He submitted his medical claims and lost wage claims under the Policy for medical and indemnity benefits. Plaintiff paid $50,660.33 in medical benefits and $33,008.55 in temporary total disability benefits to and on behalf of Cunningham. At an unknown time, but assumedly sometime in 2011, Cunningham brought a personal injury lawsuit against Toland and Drinkwalter.
On April 13, 2011, Plaintiff received notice of this lawsuit from Cunningham's personal injury attorney via a letter of representation. On August 2, 2011, Plaintiff notified Great West Casualty Company, the liability carrier for Toland and Drinkwalter, and Cunningham's personal injury attorney, of Plaintiff s subrogation rights and lien on recovery by Cunningham. Between March 15, 2012 and December 10, 2013, Plaintiff sent subrogation lien updates to Cunningham's personal injury attorney and attempted to contact him by phone. On June 27, 2013, Plaintiff's personal injury attorney sent Plaintiff a letter requesting an itemized payment summary of the medical and indemnity benefits that National paid to and on behalf of Cunningham.
In June 2014, Great West settled the liability claim, on behalf of Toland and Drinkwalter, with Cunningham for $300,000. Plaintiff alleges and Defendants dispute that this amount included the economic damages (lost wages and medical benefits) that Plaintiff paid to Cunningham. Plaintiff learned of the settlement in November 2014 after calling Great West. Although on notice of Plaintiff s subrogation rights and lien, neither Cunningham nor Great West requested or received Plaintiff's consent to settle the subrogation claims. Cunningham and his attorney have refused to honor the terms of the Policy and reimburse Plaintiff from the settlement proceeds for the benefits National paid because of the accident.
Plaintiff filed this claim in state court on December 14, 2014 seeking to recover $83,750.66 for amounts it allegedly paid to and on behalf of Cunningham because of the accident. Defendants removed this action to the United States District Court for the District of Wyoming on January 16, 2015. The Court ordered the action removed on January 27, 2015. Doc. 6. Subsequently, Cunningham filed an Action for Declaratory Judgment in the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County, Pennsylvania on May 13, 2015.
Plaintiff brings claims of subrogation based on a negligence theory, reimbursement based on a contract theory, and declaratory relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2201. Plaintiff filed the instant motion for summary judgment arguing that National has a valid subrogation right against Defendants Toland and Drinkwalter for benefits paid to Cunningham pursuant to Wyoming law. In the alternative, Plaintiff argues that it is entitled to a declaratory judgment that Cunningham must reimburse National the amount of occupational accident benefit paid pursuant to the terms of the policy. Thus, Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment is actually a Partial Motion for Summary Judgment, as it will not resolve all claims in the case.
In response, Defendants contend that Pennsylvania law controls the interpretation of the policy and that pursuant to Pennsylvania law a right to subrogation and reimbursement does not exist under the policy. The Court held oral argument on Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment on September 15, 2015. The Court finds that these matters are fully briefed and are ripe for disposition.
In this order, the Court will outline the standard of review. Then the Court will discuss the conflict of law rules before turning to their application to the issues in this case. Finally, the Court will discuss the issue of whether National is entitled to bring a tort claim against Toland and Drinkwalter. A brief conclusion follows.
Summary judgment is appropriate where “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A dispute of fact is genuine if a reasonable juror could resolve the disputed fact in favor of either side. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A dispute of fact is material if under the substantive law it is essential to the proper disposition of the claim. Adler v. Wal–Mart Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 664, 670 (10th Cir.1998). When the Court considers the evidence presented by the parties, “[t]he evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in the non-movant's favor.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505.
The party moving for summary judgment has the burden of establishing the nonexistence of a genuine dispute of material fact. Lynch v. Barrett, 703 F.3d 1153, 1158 (10th Cir.2013). The moving party can satisfy this burden by either (1) offering affirmative evidence that negates an essential element of the nonmoving party's claim, or (2) demonstrating that the nonmoving party's evidence is insufficient to establish an essential element of the nonmoving party's claim. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1)(A)-(B).
Once the moving party satisfies this initial burden, the nonmoving party must support its contention that a genuine dispute of material fact exists either by (1) citing to particular materials in the record, or (2) showing that the materials cited by the moving party do not establish the absence of a genuine dispute. See id. The nonmoving party must “do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). Rather, to survive a summary judgment motion, the nonmoving party must “make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of [every] element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Further, when opposing summary judgment, the nonmoving party cannot rest on allegations or denials in the pleadings but must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine dispute of material fact for trial. See Travis v. Park City Mun. Corp., 565 F.3d 1252, 1258 (10th Cir.2009).
When considering a motion for summary judgment, the court's role is not to weigh the evidence and decide the truth of the matter, but rather to determine whether a genuine dispute of material fact exists for trial. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505. Credibility determinations are the province of the fact-finder, not the court. Id. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505.
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