Natalie Anthracite Coal Co. v. Ryon

• Decision Date: 17 October 1898
• Docket Number: 355
• Parties: The Natalie Anthracite Coal Company, Appellant, v. James Ryon and George K. Fagely, Sheriff of Northumberland County
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

41 A. 462

188 Pa. 138

The Natalie Anthracite Coal Company, Appellant, v. James Ryon and George K. Fagely, Sheriff of Northumberland County

No. 355

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

October 17, 1898

Argued May 23, 1898

Appeal, No. 355, Jan. T., 1897, by plaintiff, from decree of C.P. Northumberland Co., No. 210, in equity, on bill in equity. Reversed.

Bill in equity for an injunction.

The court dissolved a preliminary injunction which had been previously granted.

The facts appear by the opinion of the Supreme Court.

Error assigned was decree dissolving preliminary injunction.

Both specifications are sustained. The decree dissolving the preliminary injunction is reversed and set aside at defendant's costs, injunction reinstated and the record is remitted for further proceedings.

Lyman D. Gilbert, with him S. P. Wolverton, John H. Weiss and C. M Clement, for appellant. -- The court had jurisdiction Winch's App., 61 Pa. 424; Taylor's App., 93 Pa. 21; Davis v. Michener, 106 Pa. 395; Artman v. Giles, 155 Pa. 409.

The following authorities are conclusive of the sufficiency of the Ryon judgment against the Penn Anthracite Coal Company to divest the holder of its title, and are also conclusive that the subsequent proceedings to obtain a judgment against Taylor did not in any wise better the title made under the mortgage, but simply preclude Taylor from bringing the action of ejectment; yet Ryon's present judgment is against the terre-tenant, and not against Taylor: Colborn v. Trimpey, 36 Pa. 463; Blythe v. McClintic, 7 S. & R. 344; Himes v. Jacobs, 1 P. & W. 152; Hulett v. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 114 Pa. 146; Hunsicker v. Richardson, 13 Pa. C.C.R. 524; Broomell v. Anderson, 8 A. 76.

It is a well-established principle of law that any one sharing in the proceeds of the sale of property is estopped from denying the title under it: Cowles v. Bacon, 56 Am. Dec. 371; Omwake v. Harbaugh, 148 Pa. 278; Work v. Darby, 13 Pa. C.C.R. 269.

W. W. Ryon, for appellee. -- The bill against the appellee and the sheriff is a fatal misjoinder of parties: Artman v. Giles, 155 Pa. 409.

It is only where the creditor is clearly and undeniably proceeding against right and justice to abuse the process of the law to the injury of another that equity intervenes to stay his hand: Taylor's App., 93 Pa. 21.

Before STERRETT, C.J., GREEN, McCOLLUM, MITCHELL and FELL, JJ.

OPINION

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE STERRETT:

This proceeding may be regarded as exceptional. Ordinarily a bill in equity will not lie to restrain an execution creditor from proceeding in due course to sell, in satisfaction of his claim, real estate alleged to belong to his debtor. Ejectment is generally the exclusive remedy in cases of disputed title. But where the process of the law is being used, against right and justice, to the injury of another, the right of the latter to invoke the intervention of a court of equity cannot be doubted: Winch's Appeal, 61 Pa. 424; Taylor's Appeal, 93 Pa. 21; Davis v. Michener, 106 Pa. 395.

The objection that the sheriff was improperly joined as a defendant is well taken. But the record may be considered as amended, nunc pro tunc, by striking his name therefrom. The case will then stand against the only party whose acts are claimed to have given the court jurisdiction.

A brief reference to the salient facts will suffice to show that the preliminary injunction should not have been dissolved. On November 30, 1889, Nathaniel Taylor purchased from E. A. Packer a tract of 2,700 acres of land in Northumberland county, on which was situated a coal mining plant. Taylor gave a purchase money mortgage to Packer, individually and as trustee for the defendant, James Ryon, and others, and afterwards organized the Penn Anthracite Coal Company for the purpose of developing these lands. Default having been made in payment of the mortgage debt, the defendant Ryon, in his capacity of attorney at law, as well as in his own right, issued a scire facias on the mortgage and obtained judgment thereon against the Penn Anthracite Coal Company as terretenant of the mortgaged premises. On December 21, 1894, an agreement was entered into between trustees of certain beneficial owners of said mortgage, and James Ryon, the defendant in this case, in which the following statements of fact, stipulations, etc., inter alia, appear: "Said parties state that they have no interest in or claim to the sum of eight thousand one hundred and forty-three dollars and seventy-one cents ($8,143.71) paid into court on account of said mortgage except that said sum is a payment on account of said mortgage debt, and they make no objection to the application of Ryon to take said money out of court owing to and as part of his interest in said mortgage.

"Said parties further agree that, after the sale on execution of the mortgaged property -- which sale they will press as speedily as possible -- they will pay to the said Ryon the further sum of one thousand six hundred and seventy-eight dollars ($1,678) which he claims is due him under said mortgage, in addition to the aforesaid sum. On completion of said sale of the mortgaged property they will further pay to said Ryon the sum of five hundred dollars ($500) for himself and the further sum of two hundred and fifty dollars ($250) for George W. Ryon, in full for all professional services in any way rendered for or about or in any way...