Natalie Tankships Corp. v. PANAMA CANAL COM'N, Civ. No. 79-0354-B.
Decision Date | 18 December 1980 |
Docket Number | Civ. No. 79-0354-B. |
Parties | NATALIE TANKSHIPS CORPORATION, as Owner of the S/T OVERSEAS NATALIE, Plaintiff, v. PANAMA CANAL COMMISSION, Defendant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Panama Canal Zone |
Roy V. Phillipps, Republic of Panama, for plaintiff.
Raymond J. Burke, Jr., and Lenore E. McQuilling, Burke & Parsons, New York City, for plaintiff.
William H. Beatty, Asst. U. S. Atty., Miami, for defendant.
The present cause of action under 2 C.Z.C. § 2911 arose out of damages sustained as a result of the S/T OVERSEAS NATALIE striking the side wall of Miraflores Locks on April 9, 1979. Eliminating those damages as a result of the vessel's detention by the Board of Local Inspector's (B.L.I.), the parties have previously stipulated to the liability and quantum of damages levied against the Panama Canal Commission (P.C.C.). The sole issue presented to this Court on a stipulated record is whether Natalie Tankships Corporation (Owner) has a right to be reimbursed for losses resulting from the B.L.I. detention occasioned by the occurrence within the locks for which the P.C.C. has admitted complete liability.
In resolving this issue of first impression, this Court weighs anchor and begins its transit through the applicable sections and regulations of the Canal Zone Code (C.Z.C.)2 and is kept on course by sailing ranges of Fifth Circuit case law and legislative history of the applicable provisions.
It begins — and, as we view it, ends — with the statute 2 C.Z.C. § 293. This section enumerates the types of losses to be considered in determining an award of damages as well as those for which recovery will be denied.
And for the vessel to successfully assert a valid claim for the satisfaction of these admitted losses the vessel owner had to report the occurrence and submit to a B.L.I. investigation and hearing under 2 C.Z.C. § 297.4
B.L.I. detention losses are certainly not specifically excluded in the last unnumbered 5b paragraph of 2 C.Z.C. § 293. Indeed, as we develop, detention losses causally related to the in-lock injuries are expressly included in the reach of § 5b. And certainly if causally related and not within § 5b excluded expenses which are "... incidental ... or any items which are indefinite, indeterminable, speculative or conjectural ..." they more than meet the catch-all provision in § (4) as "... other expenses which are definitely and accurately shown to have been incurred necessarily and by reason of the accident or injuries."
In the starkest reality, the loss during detention would not have been incurred but for the accident for which P.C.C. acknowledged its full liability and the accident in turn created the necessity for the B.L.I. detention.
What then produces the problem?
Presumably to carry out the § 297 investigation (and to effectuate the sweeping powers over navigation within the Canal) 35 C.F.R. § 103.7 provides:
The concluding sentence sets the stage for our narrow controversy — whether this regulation can override the § 293 liability for this type of detention.
At the outset the Court does not question the general validity of this and other regulations covering the operation of the Canal.5 And it adheres to the general principle that the particular construction and interpretation of a statute by the enforcing agency is entitled to deference by the courts, see, e. g., NLRB v. Hearst Publications, 322 U.S. 111, 131, 64 S.Ct. 851, 860, 88 L.Ed. 1170, 1185 (1943); Unemployment Commission v. Aragon, 329 U.S. 143, 153-54, 67 S.Ct. 245, 250, 91 L.Ed. 136, 144-45, the courts are the final authority of statutory construction. See, e. g., FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Company, 380 U.S. 374, 385, 85 S.Ct. 1035, 1042, 13 L.Ed.2d 904, 914 (1965). At the same time courts are not required to "stand aside and rubber stamp their affirmance of administrative decisions that they deem inconsistent with a statutory mandate or that frustrate the congressional policy underlying a statute." Volkswagenwerk Aktlengesellschaft v. Federal Maritime Commission, 390 U.S. 261, 272, 88 S.Ct. 929, 935, 19 L.Ed.2d 1090, 1098, (1968), quoting NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278, 291, 85 S.Ct. 980, 988, 13 L.Ed.2d 839, 849 (1965).
In this quest a proper decision calls for close inquiry into an application of Gulfspray I and especially Gulfspray III. Each case traces in detail the development and changes in the structure of the Canal Zone, both political and industrial, and the congressional purpose to concentrate all of the industrial-economic operations in the Canal Company with the expectation that in such operations the Company would have substantially all the legal liability of a private person with a consequent broad relinquishment of nearly all traces of sovereign immunity.
Based in large part on congressional purpose in enacting the Public Vessels Act, 46 U.S.C.A. § 781 et seq., and the Suits in Admiralty Act, 46 U.S.C.A. § 741 et seq., which allows the Government to be held as fully liable as a private shipowner, the Court asked and then answered the rhetorical question: "In divorcing the industrial-business activity from the political government of the area, what more logical thing was there to do than provide a system by which the government was held accountable for consequences of its business activities on a substantial parity with that already established for the mainland or on the high seas"? Gulfspray III, 481 F.2d at 569. The Fifth Circuit concluded that Congress must have intended, except in very few situations, "a recovery of damages substantially parallel to that accorded by general maritime law, and certainly that of England and the United States." Id. This invoked the time honored maritime principle of restitutio in integrum. Ove Skou v. United States, 478 F.2d 343 (5th Cir. 1973), 1973 A.M.C. 1482 (1973). Broadly interpreted and applied, this principle seeks to make good the total losses suffered by the shipowner for the casualty inflicted by the fault of another including the loss of the use of the vessel.
As general maritime principles are to be used in interpretation and application of § 293, there can be no doubt that in ancient precedent of the Fifth Circuit "it is well settled that the loss of profits or of the use of a vessel, pending repairs or other detentions, arising from a collision is a proper element of damages." EL MONTE, 252 F. 59, 64 (5th Cir. 1918). And three quarters of a century ago the Supreme Court declared:
That the loss of profits or of the use of a vessel pending repairs or other detention, arising from a...
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East River S.S. Corp. v. Delaval Turbine, Inc.
...of the use of a vessel. They cite, inter alia, to the principle of "restitutio in integrum," see Natalie Tankships Corp. v. Panama Canal Commission, 506 F.Supp. 281, 285 (D.Canal Zone 1980), and to Justice Story's opinion in The Apollon, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 362, 6 L.Ed. 111 (1824), and argue......