Natalie v. Town of Waldoboro

Decision Date22 November 2010
Docket NumberNo. 2:10–cv–1–GZS.,2:10–cv–1–GZS.
Citation751 F.Supp.2d 263
PartiesNatalie and Millard JACKSON, Plaintiffs,v.TOWN OF WALDOBORO, et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Maine

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Natalie Jackson, Whitefield, ME, pro se.Millard Jackson, Whitefield, ME, pro se.Bruce M. Merrill, Portland, ME, Leonard I. Sharon, Law Office of Leonard, Auburn, ME, for Plaintiffs.Edward R. Benjamin, Jr., Thompson & Bowie, LLP, Portland, ME, for Defendants.

ORDER ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

GEORGE Z. SINGAL, District Judge.

Before the Court is the unopposed Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket # 21) by Defendants Town of Waldoboro, Zachary Curtis, William Labombarde and William Post (collectively Defendants). As explained herein, the Court GRANTS Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment.

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On September 23, 2009, Plaintiffs Natalie and Millard Jackson filed a five count complaint in Maine Superior Court alleging violations of the Maine Civil Rights Act, the Maine Tort Claims Act, the Maine Wrongful Death Act, and certain federal and state constitutional rights, arising from the death of their son, Gregori Jackson, who was fatally shot by a Town of Waldoboro Police Officer exactly two years earlier on September 23, 2007. (Compl. (Docket # 2–2).) Following the Plaintiffs' mid-December filing of an amended complaint in state court (Am. Compl. (Docket # 2–1)), Defendants removed the case to federal court on January 4, 2010. (Notice of Removal (Docket # 1).) On March 28, 2010, Magistrate Judge Rich granted an ex parte motion filed by counsel for Plaintiffs seeking permission to withdraw from the case. (Order on Mot. to Withdraw (Docket # 14); see also Mot. to Withdraw (Docket # 6).) Plaintiffs have yet to secure alternative counsel. ( See Rep. of Hr'g & Order re: Status (Docket # 16); Rep. of Hr'g & Order re: Status (Docket # 20).)

Defendants filed for summary judgment on August 27, 2010. (Mot. for Summ. J. (Docket # 21).) In accordance with Local Rule 56(b), Defendants also filed a Statement of Material Facts, supported by affidavit and other record citation. ( See Defs.' Statement of Material Facts (“SMF”) (Docket # 22); Post Aff. (Docket # 23); Mitchell Aff. (Docket # 24); Curtis Aff. (Docket # 25).) Plaintiffs have failed to respond to this motion. See D. Me. Loc. R. 7(b) (requiring a written response within twenty-one days).

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Generally, a party is entitled to summary judgment if, on the record before the Court, it appears “that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(2). An issue is “genuine” if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (citation omitted). A “material fact” is one that has “the potential to affect the outcome of the suit under the applicable law.” Nereida–Gonzalez v. Tirado–Delgado, 990 F.2d 701, 703 (1st Cir.1993). The party moving for summary judgment must demonstrate an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). In determining whether this burden is met, the Court must view the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and give that party the benefit of all reasonable inferences in its favor. Santoni v. Potter, 369 F.3d 594, 598 (1st Cir.2004).

Plaintiffs, now appearing pro se, did not file any objection to the motion for summary judgment. However, the failure of the non-moving party to respond does not automatically entitle the movant to summary judgment. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)(2) (“If the opposing party does not so respond, summary judgment should, if appropriate, be entered against that party.”) (emphasis supplied); Torres–Rosado v. Rotger–Sabat, 335 F.3d 1, 8–9 (1st Cir.2003). In these circumstances, the Court still is obligated to “inquire whether the moving party has met its burden to demonstrate undisputed facts entitling it to summary judgment as a matter of law.” Cordero–Soto v. Island Fin., Inc., 418 F.3d 114, 118 (1st Cir.2005) (citation omitted).

III. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 1

At the heart of this case is the tragic death of Gregori Jackson on September 23, 2007. It is undisputed that Mr. Jackson, who was then eighteen years old, was shot to death that day by Defendant Zachary Curtis, who was on patrol as a member of the Waldoboro Police Department (the Police Department).

Officer Curtis graduated from the Reserve Law Enforcement Officers Course at the Maine Criminal Justice Academy (the “Academy”) on April 1, 2005. In February of 2006, Officer Curtis began working as a part-time reserve officer with the Police Department. As of September 23, 2007, Officer Curtis was certified by the State of Maine to work as a reserve police officer, and the Academy also had expressly authorized Officer Curtis' ability to do so in a full-time position.2

When Officer Curtis began working for the Police Department, he had already completed the reserve law enforcement officer's course of training at the Academy, and also had satisfactorily completed field training required by his prior employer, the Kennebunkport Police Department.3 Despite his previous training, Officer Curtis was still required to complete the Police Department's field training program before he was allowed to patrol on his own in the Town of Waldoboro (the Town).4 Officer Curtis participated in the Police Department's required field training program from February 17, 2006 to April 6, 2006. At that time, Officer Lance Mitchell was serving in the capacity of field training officer.5

One of the primary goals of this training program was to ensure that officers fully understood arrest powers and procedures and the lawful use of both non-deadly and deadly force in connection with arrests. To teach these concepts to new police officers, Officer Mitchell utilized legal precedents, the Town's Policies and Standard Operating Procedures, and the Maine Law Enforcement Officers Manual. The field training program consisted of both formal classroom training, including written tests and examinations, as well as field training that provided hands-on experience under the supervision of Officer Mitchell. During hands-on training, officers were observed by Officer Mitchell while they, for example, initiated motor vehicle stops, conducted searches, made arrests, and used physical force to overcome resistance to being taken into custody. With regard to the use of deadly force, Officer Mitchell provided classroom instruction regarding when such force is authorized under the law, which was followed up with written quizzes or tests to evaluate the trainee's understanding of the topic. The field training program also required that Officer Curtis demonstrate knowledge of the Police Department's Policies and Procedures Manual to the satisfaction of Officer Mitchell. Under Officer Mitchell's supervision as his field training officer, Officer Curtis satisfactorily completed all parts of the Town's field training program, including training devoted to the standards governing the lawful use of force. 6

All Town police officers also receive training in the Police Department's Policies and Standard Operating Procedures, including the Use of Force Policy. When existing policies are revised, all officers receive training on the revised policy. The Police Department's Use of Force Policy, effective December 9, 2003, was in effect throughout the period of Officer Curtis' field training in 2006 and on the date of his use of deadly force against Gregori Jackson on September 23, 2007. ( See Use of Force Policy, Mitchell Aff., Ex. B (Docket # 24–2).)

Thus, as of September 23, 2007, Officer Curtis had received training on the lawful use of non-deadly and deadly force from the Academy, the Kennebunkport Police Department and the Waldoboro Police Department. In working with Officer Curtis subsequent to his completion of field training, Officer Mitchell also never observed any deficiency in Officer Curtis' understanding of the lawful use of non-deadly and deadly force, and he is not aware of any complaints ever received against Officer Curtis alleging an excessive use of force on his part.

On September 23, 2007, Officer Curtis was on routine patrol on Route 220 in Waldoboro when he observed a motor vehicle fail to stop at a stop sign. As Officer Curtis followed the vehicle, he observed erratic operation, and the vehicle crossed the center line numerous times. Based on these observations, Officer Curtis activated his cruiser's blue lights and stopped the vehicle at approximately 2:14 a.m. Officer Curtis had in his possession a firearm—a semiautomatic handgun—issued to him by the Police Department.

The vehicle stopped by Officer Curtis was being operated by a minor and was registered to the minor's parents. Officer Curtis observed a passenger in both the front and rear seats of the vehicle. As Officer Curtis spoke to the driver, he could smell an odor of alcohol, which he determined was not coming from the driver but from inside the vehicle. Officer Curtis went to the passenger's side of the vehicle and spoke to the passenger in the front seat. Officer Curtis asked for identification from the front seat passenger. The front seat passenger identified himself as Gregori Jackson, but told Officer Curtis that he could not provide him with any identification. Mr. Jackson stated that his date of birth was “13/13/99,” which made no sense to Officer Curtis. (Officer Curtis subsequently learned that Mr. Jackson was 18 years old.) Mr. Jackson's speech was slurred. Based on the foregoing, Officer Curtis asked Mr. Jackson to get out of the vehicle, and when he did so Officer Curtis again detected a strong odor of alcohol coming from Mr. Jackson's facial area. Mr. Jackson was more...

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