Natchez, C. & M.R. Co. v. Lambert

• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: MAYES, C. J.
• Citation: Natchez, C. & M.R. Co. v. Lambert, 54 So. 836, 99 Miss. 310 (Miss. 1911)
• Decision Date: 27 February 1911
• Docket Number: 14,693
• Parties: NATCHEZ, COLUMBIA & MOBILE RAILROAD COMPANY v. M. A. LAMBERT

54 So. 836

99 Miss. 310

NATCHEZ, COLUMBIA & MOBILE RAILROAD COMPANY v. M. A. LAMBERT

No. 14,693

Supreme Court of Mississippi

February 27, 1911

APPEAL from the circuit court of Lawrence county, HON. R. L BULLARD, Judge.

Suit by Mrs. M. A. Lambert against the Natchez, Columbia & Mobile Railroad Company. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals.

The appellee took passage on a train of the appellant from Topeka, Mississippi, to Norfield, Mississippi, a junction point with the Illinois Central Railroad Company; it being her intention to connect at the latter point with the Illinois Central train, due about four hours after the arrival of the appellant's train. When the appellant's train reached Norfield, it was raining, and instead of stopping at the depot, where a work train with flat cars was occupying the track, it passed the depot a distance of about two hundred and fifty yards (as was frequently done), intending later to back into the depot. After the train stopped, appellee remained in the coach a few minutes and voluntarily alighted, in the absence of the conductor, without saying anything to him, or making any request to be carried to the depot, and, leaving other passenger in the coach, walked back to the depot through the rain, where she waited in the depot about four hours for her train, and caught a severe cold. Some minutes later, the train did back into the depot, where the other passengers and freight and baggage were discharged. She brought suit, and recovered the sum of four hundred and fifty dollars punitive damages.

Reversed and remanded.

T Brady, Jr., for appellant.

Appellee lived at or near Topeka, upon appellant's line of railroad; she could reasonably expect to have to make occasional, if not frequent, trips over its road; it was her duty, then, to acquaint herself with its customs, and having ascertained them, she would have had a right to rely upon them. This custom was not contrary to any contract, and the alleged special contract was not contrary to, nor did it in any manner abrogate, the established custom. No duty to appellee, nor any contract with her, was breached by carrying her past the Illinois Central depot to the regular and customary stopping place; no special duty nor special contract was breached until appellant refused to carry her back to the Illinois Central depot. There was no obligation laid on appellant to stop at the Illinois Central depot on its way in, if it later, and in a reasonable time, safely deposited her there. It did carry her by the depot of the connecting line and it would have carried her back in a few minutes, if she had given them time. There was no refusal on the part of the appellant, by word or deed, to carry her back to the depot, no invitation was given to her to alight, and she was at all times treated kindly and courteously, as she unhesitatingly states.

But being perhaps as far as two hundred and fifty yards from the Illinois Central depot, and having only four hours in which to catch her train for McComb City, and although her fellow travelers were sitting in the coach, appellee waited for a length of time which she estimates to have been as long as five minutes, then, taking her baggage, left the coach of her own free will and accord and started back toward the Illinois Central depot, walking. As a matter of fact, the testimony shows that the passenger train pulled in past the switch-point, the work train pulled out of the siding onto the cleared main-line, yet appellee, traveling down the same track and walking, beat the work train to the trestle.

After setting out its freight cars onto the side track, the passenger train, or the passenger coach and the freight car with the transfer freight, backed down to the Illinois Central depot, as was customary, and as had been the intention of its crew all the time, in order to deposit any passengers for that point, including appellee. In the face of such facts, can appellee now successfully contend that there was "negligence," "wantonness," "wilfulness," "maliciousness," failure of duty or breach of contract on the part of appellant? It fulfilled every obligation laid upon it by law, by custom and. by contract, general or special, express or implied. Appellee's own unreasoning impatience was the sole cause of her failure to be deposited at the depot of the Illinois Central Railroad Company as "safe and sound " as when she entered appellant's train at Topeka an hour or so before. Appellant did all that it could to carry out its "contract" except to lock its doors on appellee. She says that she depended on the conductor to put her off yet she took matters into her own hands at the first opportunity and to her alone are any injurious consequences to be ascribed. Having made it impossible for appellant to carry out the terms of its contract with her, she cannot complain of its having been breached by appellant.

If it is conceded that appellant's conduct was negligent and was a breach of duty to the appellee, then appellee's own hasty and ill considered acts, and not this negligence, were the proximate cause of appellee's getting wet and her subsequent indisposition. She did not have to leave the coach in the first place, which she knew, or should have known, or could easily have ascertained. She was no ignorant unlettered, untraveled woman, nor a stranger to this vicinity. There was nothing to prevent her remaining in the car until it was backed to the Illinois Central depot, but, once she had left the coach and started back for the depot, appellee should have exercised sufficiently her eye-sight, hearing and judgment to have chosen a route that would be safest and best. The hour was about 2:30 o'clock on a summer afternoon and, though a light rain was still falling,...