Nation v. Zinke
| Decision Date | 27 March 2018 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 17–cv–1923 (CKK) |
| Citation | 302 F.Supp.3d 362 |
| Parties | The CAYUGA NATION, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Ryan ZINKE, et al., Defendants, The Cayuga Nation Council, Defendant–Intervenor. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia |
Curtis Gene Berkey, Berkey Williams LLP, Berkeley, CA, Joseph J. Heath, Pro Hac Vice, Heath Law Office, Syracuse, NY, Alexandra C. Page, Berkey Williams LLP, Washington, DC, for Plaintiffs.
Benton Gregory Peterson U.S. Attorney'S Office Washington, DC for Defendants/Defendant–Intervenor.
David W. DeBruin, Jenner & Block LLP, Washington, DC, for Intervenor Defendant.
The Cayuga Nation is a federally recognized Indian Nation. This case deals with decisions by the Bureau of Indian Affairs ("BIA") and the Assistant Secretary for Indian Affairs of the Department of the Interior ("DOI") that recognized one faction within the Cayuga Nation—now referring to itself as the "Cayuga Nation Council," though alternatively referred to in the administrative record as the "Halftown Group"—as the governing body of the Cayuga Nation for the purposes of certain contractual relationships between that Nation and the United States federal government. These decisions were the product of an adversarial process between the Cayuga Nation Council and Plaintiffs, a rival faction within the Cayuga Nation who assert that they represent the Nation's rightful government. Plaintiffs have filed this lawsuit seeking to overturn the BIA and DOI decisions.
Now before the Court is Plaintiffs' [22] Motion for Preliminary Injunction. Upon consideration of the pleadings,1 the relevant legal authorities, and the record as a whole, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs' Motion. Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that they are likely to succeed on their claims, most of which are based on speculation or can be distilled to mere disagreements with the decisions reached by the agency. Moreover, Plaintiffs' irreparable injury showing is relatively weak, and the balance of the equities and public interest favor denying preliminary injunctive relief.
This case arises from a long-standing dispute between rival factions within the Cayuga Nation. Plaintiffs allege that the Cayuga Nation has long been governed by a Council of Chiefs selected and overseen by "Clan Mothers," whom Plaintiffs purport to represent in this litigation. Compl., ECF No. 1, ¶¶ 1–2. Plaintiffs assert that "Cayuga Nation leaders are selected pursuant to the Great Law of Peace, which gives that responsibility of nomination and removal to the women who serve as Clan Mothers, based on input from the members of their clans." Id. ¶ 31. According to Plaintiffs, this is a "deliberative and consensus-based" process for selecting leaders. Id. ¶ 33. Plaintiffs allege that the United States federal government had previously recognized this form of governance for the Cayuga Nation, and rejected efforts over the years by a faction known as the "Halftown Group" to secure support for the use of a mail-in survey2 to reconfigure the Cayuga Nation's government. Id. ¶¶ 34–36.
However, in June 2016, Defendant Bruce W. Maytubby, the Eastern Regional Director of the BIA, revealed to Plaintiffs that the Halftown Group intended to conduct a mail-in survey in order to create a new government for the Cayuga Nation, and that it was Mr. Maytubby's view that the proposed survey "would be a viable way of involving the Cayuga people in a determination of the form and membership of their government." Id. ¶¶ 37, 40. Plaintiffs contend that this determination was the result of secret meetings between the BIA and the Halftown Group, from which Plaintiffs were excluded. Id. ¶ 38. Plaintiffs objected to the proposed survey, arguing, among other things, that it violated Cayuga law. Id. ¶ 42.
On December 15, 2016, Defendant Maytubby issued a decision "(1) recognizing the Halftown Group as the government of the Cayuga Nation for purposes of entering into a contract under the ISDEAA [Indian Self–Determination and Education Assistance Act] and declining to recognize Plaintiffs for such purposes; (2) awarding an ISDEAA contract grant to the Halftown Group, on behalf of the Cayuga Nation; and (3) declining to award an ISDEAA contract to [Plaintiffs] on behalf of the Cayuga Nation." Id. ¶ 54 (emphasis added). Plaintiffs characterize this decision as a reversal of "longstanding federal policy," and challenge it on a number of substantive and procedural grounds. Id. ¶¶ 55–81.
Defendant Maytubby's December 15, 2016 decision indicated that it constituted final agency action, id. , Ex. A at 15, and was accompanied by a delegation of authority to Mr. Maytubby to take such action, id. ¶ 55. Nonetheless, Plaintiffs did not file a lawsuit challenging this decision when it was issued. Instead, Plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal with the Interior Board of Indian Appeals ("IBIA") arguing that additional administrative review was appropriate because the delegation of authority to Defendant Maytubby to take final agency action was ineffective. Id. ¶¶ 82–83. The IBIA docketed the appeal and requested briefing on the delegation issue. Id. ¶¶ 84–85. Shortly thereafter, Defendant Michael Black, the then–Acting Assistant Secretary—Indian Affairs, withdrew the contested delegation to Mr. Maytubby, and himself assumed jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' administrative appeal. Id. ¶¶ 86–87. The parties submitted briefs on the merits of the dispute to Defendant Black, who ultimately issued a decision on July 13, 2017, denying Plaintiffs' appeal of Defendant Maytubby's decision. Id. ¶¶ 93–95.
On September 20, 2017, Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit, claiming that Defendants had violated the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA") and Plaintiffs' constitutional right to due process. Id. ¶¶ 100–65. As relief, Plaintiffs ask that both Mr. Maytubby's decision and Mr. Black's decision be declared unlawful and vacated, that the Court enjoin Defendants from relying on the vacated decisions for any action by the DOI, that the individuals involved in rendering these decisions be enjoined from further adjudicating the questions in this case, that this matter be remanded to the BIA "for government to government consultation and, as appropriate, decision by a neutral decision-maker on recognition and the Plaintiffs' ISDEAA application," and that they be granted costs and attorneys' fees. Id. at 26–27.
Preliminary injunctive relief is "an extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief." Sherley v. Sebelius , 644 F.3d 388, 392 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (quoting Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. , 555 U.S. 7, 22, 129 S.Ct. 365, 172 L.Ed.2d 249 (2008) ). A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction "must establish [1] that he is likely to succeed on the merits, [2] that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, [3] that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and [4] that an injunction is in the public interest." Aamer v. Obama , 742 F.3d 1023, 1038 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (quoting Sherley , 644 F.3d at 392 (quoting Winter , 555 U.S. at 20, 129 S.Ct. 365 ) (alteration in original; quotation marks omitted) ). When seeking such relief, " ‘the movant has the burden to show that all four factors, taken together, weigh in favor of the injunction.’ " Abdullah v. Obama , 753 F.3d 193, 197 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (quoting Davis v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. , 571 F.3d 1288, 1292 (D.C. Cir. 2009) ). "The four factors have typically been evaluated on a ‘sliding scale.’ " Davis , 571 F.3d at 1291 (citation omitted). Under this sliding-scale framework, "[i]f the movant makes an unusually strong showing on one of the factors, then it does not necessarily have to make as strong a showing on another factor." Id. at 1291–92.3
A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary form of relief, not to be granted regularly in APA cases whenever a party is aggrieved by the decision of a government agency. This case does not present the exceptional circumstances that would warrant such an injunction. Most importantly, Plaintiffs have not demonstrated a likelihood of success on their substantive claims. The Court has reviewed the record and concludes, at least at this preliminary stage, that Plaintiffs' claims are primarily based on speculation, assignations of nefarious intent and mere disagreements with the determinations reached by agency decisionmakers. Moreover, Plaintiffs' attempt to demonstrate that they will suffer irreparable injury in the absence of an emergency injunction is similarly based on speculation. It is also belied by Plaintiffs' considerable delay in seeking such relief—not while exhausting their administrative remedies, but after final agency action was taken. Finally, neither the public interest nor the equities favor granting Plaintiffs' motion.
First and foremost, the Court is not persuaded that Plaintiffs are likely to prevail on the merits of their claims. The Court cautions that this does not represent a final adjudication of Plaintiffs' claims. Despite the Court's admonition that pursuing a preliminary injunction motion in this APA case was not an efficient use of the parties' or the Court's time and resources, Plaintiffs have insisted on litigating this motion before moving on to a full and final briefing on the merits of their claims. There is a troubling trend in APA cases whereby plaintiffs are routinely filing preliminary injunction motions simply to "jump the queue" and have the Court consider the merits of their claims immediately. There are certainly instances where such motions are necessary and appropriate to prevent an impending injury, but increasingly these "emergency" motions are being filed simply because the plaintiff is aggrieved by an agency decision and wants the Court to focus its attention on its claims...
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