National Advertising Co. v. City of Miami

• Decision Date: 21 March 2005
• Docket Number: No. 03-15516.,03-15516.
• Citation: 402 F.3d 1335
• Parties: NATIONAL ADVERTISING CO., a Delaware corporation, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CITY OF MIAMI, a Florida municipality, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

402 F.3d 1335

NATIONAL ADVERTISING CO., a Delaware corporation, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CITY OF MIAMI, a Florida municipality, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 03-15516.

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

March 21, 2005.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Thomas R. Julin, Dorothy Patricia Wallace, Eduardo S. Lombard, Hunton & Williams, LLP, Miami, FL, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Carol A. Licko, Parker D. Thomson, Lori L. Piechura, Stephanie Leigh Carman, Hogan & Hartson, L.L.P., Miami, FL, for Defendant-Appellee.

William David Brinton, Christine M. Russell, Rogers, Towers, PA, Jacksonville, FL, for Amici Curiae.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida.

Before EDMONDSON, Chief Judge, WILSON, Circuit Judge, and RESTANI^*, Judge.

PER CURIAM:

In this case, we decide whether a billboard company's challenge to a City's sign permitting procedure is ripe for judicial review. Plaintiff-Appellant, National Advertising Company ("National") appeals the district court's order granting final summary judgment in favor of Defendant-Appellee, the City of Miami. National, claiming that the City's refusal to grant National six permits to construct new billboards violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, brought suit against the City. Because National never obtained an official rejection of its permit applications, we find that it failed to present the district court with a ripe case. We therefore affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment with instructions to dismiss the case without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

National is a Delaware corporation and a wholly-owned subsidiary of Viacom Outdoor Inc., a corporation formerly known as Infinity Outdoor, Inc. National, a leader in the outdoor advertising industry, specializing in the leasing of billboards, has operated in the City of Miami for approximately forty years. National normally constructs its billboards on either leased or purchased property and then rents space on the billboards to advertisers. National operates more than forty outdoor advertising signs in various locations throughout the City of Miami. Most of National's billboards display commercial messages, however a few of them display non-commercial, public interest messages.

In December of 2001, against the backdrop of on-going litigation between National and the City,¹ National sought permits to erect seven new billboards on private property located in the City of Miami. Under the City's comprehensive zoning plan, six of the seven proposed billboards were to have been located in an area zoned "C-1, commercial zone." City zoning clerks did not issue permits to National because the billboards it sought to construct exceeded the zoning ordinance's height limits for signs. In addition, the clerk orally informed National's agents that billboards were not permitted in the C-1 zone.

On February 19, 2002, National filed this action alleging that the City denied their applications because the City's "Sign Code"² prohibited offsite signs in the City's C-1 commercial zone, in violation of the First Amendment. National further alleged that the City's "Sign Code" was constitutionally suspect because it failed to contain adequate procedural guidelines and vested excessive discretion in the hands of City officials to either approve or deny applications to construct signs.

After both parties conducted discovery, they filed cross summary judgment motions in March of 2003. The district court heard arguments for both cases in August of 2003. On September 25, 2003, the district court entered summary judgment for the City in National I and found that the City's Zoning Ordinance was constitutional in all respects.³ The following day, the district court granted the City's motion for summary judgment in this action. The district court held that National's claims were not ripe pursuant to our holding in Digital Props., Inc. v. City of Plantation, 121 F.3d 586 (11th Cir.1997), because National had failed to obtain a written denial of its permit application. National appeals.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review the district court's order granting a motion for summary judgment de novo. We construe all facts and make all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Kesinger ex rel. Estate of Kesinger v. Herrington, 381 F.3d 1243, 1247 (11th Cir.2004). Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56, summary judgment is proper if the pleadings, depositions, and affidavits "show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."

DISCUSSION

The jurisdiction of federal courts is limited. The constitution dictates that the power of the federal courts is constrained by the requirement that they consider only "cases" and "controversies." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; see, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559-60, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 2136, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992); Granite State Outdoor Adver., Inc. v. City of Clearwater, 351 F.3d 1112, 1116 (11th Cir.2003). "This case-or-controversy doctrine fundamentally limits the power of federal courts in our system of government, and helps to `identify those disputes which are appropriately resolved through judicial process.'" Ga. State Conference of NAACP Branches v. Cox, 183 F.3d 1259, 1262 (11th Cir.1999) (quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155, 110 S.Ct. 1717, 1722 109 L.Ed.2d 135 (1990)). In addition to the textual constitutional constraints on the power of federal courts to decide cases, we also recognize important prudential limitations. Granite State, 351 F.3d at 1116 (citing Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 162, 117 S.Ct. 1154, 1161, 137 L.Ed.2d 281 (1997) and Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130). While the constitutional aspect of our inquiry focuses on whether the Article III requirements of an actual "case or controversy" are met, the prudential aspect asks whether it is appropriate for this case to be litigated in a federal court by these parties at this time. Hallandale Prof'l Fire Fighters Local 2238 v. City of Hallandale, 922 F.2d 756, 759-60 (11th Cir.1991).

When determining if a claim is ripe for judicial review, we consider both constitutional and prudential concerns. In some circumstances, although a claim may satisfy constitutional requirements, prudential concerns "counsel judicial restraint." See Digital, 121 F.3d at 589 (quoting Action Alliance of Senior Citizens v. Heckler, 789 F.2d 931, 940 n. 12 (D.C.Cir.1986)). Our inquiry focuses on whether the claim presented is "of sufficient concreteness to evidence a ripeness for review." Id. Strict application of the ripeness doctrine prevents federal courts from rendering impermissible advisory opinions and wasting resources through review of potential or abstract disputes. See id.

Our ripeness inquiry requires a two part "determination of (1) the fitness of the issues for judicial decision and (2) the hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration." Id. (citing Abbott Lab. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148-49, 87 S.Ct. 1507, 1515-16, 18 L.Ed.2d 681 (1967); Cheffer v. Reno, 55 F.3d 1517, 1524 (11th Cir.1995)). When a plaintiff is challenging a governmental act, the issues are ripe for judicial review if "a plaintiff... show[s] he has sustained, or is in immediate danger of sustaining, a direct injury as the result of that act." Hallandale, 922 F.2d at 760. As the district court correctly noted, while it is true that our review of a suit's ripeness is at its most permissive in cases concerning putative violations of the First Amendment, id., that requirement may not be ignored.

We have also recognized that the ripeness doctrine not only protects courts from abusing their role within the government and engaging in speculative decision-making, but that it also protects the other branches from judicial meddling. One of the "basic rationale[s]" for the ripeness doctrine is "to protect the [administrative] agencies from judicial interference until an administrative decision has been formalized and its effects felt in a concrete way by the challenging parties." Digital, 121 F.3d at 590 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). When a court is asked to review decisions of administrative agencies, it is hornbook law that courts must exercise patience and permit the administrative agency the proper time and deference for those agencies to consider the case fully.

Turning to the facts in this case, it is clear that National never properly pursued its claim through the administrative process that the City's zoning ordinance made available to them. National's claim is not ripe because it failed to obtain a final denial of its applications. Although National's initial request for a permit was not granted by the clerks in Miami's zoning department, National never received a final, written denial of their applications. Our reasoning in Digital is directly on point. As we held there, "[a] challenge to the application of a city ordinance does not automatically mature at the zoning counter." Digital, 121 F.3d at 590.

In Digital, we upheld the district courts dismissal of Digital's First Amendment challenge to the constitutionality of the City of Plantation's zoning ordinance because Digital failed to present a ripe case or controversy. In that case, Digital sought to establish an adult book and video store in Plantation. Digital assumed that Plantation's zoning scheme unconstitutionally barred adult businesses from operating anywhere within the city. However, Digital applied for a building permit to remodel a pre-existing structure for the purpose of opening an adult business....