NATIONAL ASS'N FOR ADV. OF COLORED PEOPLE v. Gallion
| Decision Date | 11 August 1960 |
| Docket Number | Civ. A. No. 1622-N. |
| Citation | 190 F. Supp. 583 |
| Parties | NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR the ADVANCEMENT OF COLORED PEOPLE, a Corporation, Plaintiff, v. MacDonald GALLION, Attorney General of Alabama; Mrs. Bettye Frink, Secretary of State, State of Alabama, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama |
Fred D. Gray, Montgomery, Ala., Arthur D. Shores, Birmingham, Ala., and Robert L. Carter, New York City, for plaintiff.
MacDonald Gallion, Atty. Gen., Willard W. Livingston, Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., Gordon Madison and Nicholas S. Hare, Asst. Attys. Gen., State of Alabama, for defendants.
This is an action by the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, a Corporation, seeking to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court on the ground that plaintiff-corporation has a right in this Court to redress the deprivation, under color of the law of the State of Alabama, or custom, or usage by the officials of the State of Alabama, of a right, privilege or immunity secured to said corporation and/or its members by the Constitution of the United States and/or Acts of Congress providing for equal rights of citizens. Plaintiff-corporation further says it is entitled to equal rights and protection under the law under the Civil Rights Act,1 and that this Court has jurisdiction to redress such deprivation.2
This action was filed on June 23, 1960, and jointly therewith plaintiff sought of this Court a temporary restraining order, restraining the defendant MacDonald Gallion, as Attorney General for the State of Alabama, and his agents, etc., and restraining Mrs. Bettye Frink, as Secretary of State for the State of Alabama and her agents, etc., from refusing to register the plaintiff-corporation, said refusal action being pursuant to the temporary restraining order and injunction that was issued on or about June 1, 1956, by one of the circuit judges of the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit for the State of Alabama; said injunction enjoining plaintiff and its members from engaging in any activities in the State of Alabama. Plaintiff's motion for a temporary restraining order was denied by this Court on June 24, 1960. The motion of the plaintiff for a preliminary injunction filed contemporaneously with the complaint and the amended motion of the defendants, seeking to have this Court dismiss this action, are pending and are now submitted upon the pleadings, together with the exhibits attached thereto, the briefs and the arguments of counsel.
The history of this action as recited by the complaint reflects that on June 1, 1956, the then Attorney General for the State of Alabama secured a temporary restraining order from one of the circuit judges of the Montgomery County Circuit Court. Prior to the time there was any hearing on the motions in that case, the plaintiff-corporation was adjudged guilty of contempt of court for failure to comply with one of that court's production orders. Plaintiff says that because of the substantive law of the State of Alabama—which plaintiff claims is itself a denial of due process—no action could be taken on the motions in that case until plaintiff had purged itself of contempt of court. Plaintiff sought certiorari to the Supreme Court of the State of Alabama,3 but without obtaining relief, and appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States,4 which reversed the action of the State court insofar as the contempt proceedings were concerned, the Supreme Court of the United States saying, in effect, that freedom to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable aspect of the "liberty" assured by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and that for the State court to compel production (of its list of members) would likely constitute an effective restraint on its members' freedom of association. The case was remanded to the Supreme Court of the State of Alabama. The Supreme Court of Alabama reinstated the contempt judgment and fine on the ground that plaintiff had failed to comply with the order of the circuit court in certain respects not considered by the Supreme Court of the United States.5 A second review by the Supreme Court of the United States6 resulted in the Alabama court again being reversed and the case again being remanded, with the Supreme Court of the United States denying the plaintiff-corporation's petition for mandamus to the Alabama Supreme Court. In remanding this case the second time, the Supreme Court said 360 U.S. 240, 79 S.Ct. 1004:
"We assume that the State Supreme Court, thus advised, will not fail to proceed promptly with the disposition of the matters left open under our mandate for further proceedings, 357 U.S. at 466-467 78 S.Ct. at pages 1173-1174, and, therefore, deny petitioner's application in No. 674, Misc., for a writ of mandamus." (Emphasis supplied.)
The plaintiff-corporation now says to this Court that it has filed several motions to remand this case to the Circuit Court of Montgomery County so that it may be heard on the motions in that case and that the last mandate from the Supreme Court of the United States was mailed to the Alabama Supreme Court on July 14, 1959. Plaintiff-corporation says, further, no action has been taken and that since it cannot obtain a hearing on the motions in that case, the plaintiff-corporation is effectively deprived of rights, privileges and immunities under the Constitution and laws of the United States and such a denial is a deprivation of due process of law. The amended motion to dismiss, together with the exhibit thereto, reflects that the Supreme Court for the State of Alabama on July 11, 1960 (two days before the present submission) remanded the case to the Circuit Court, Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Montgomery County, Alabama, "with directions to undertake such proceedings as may be deemed proper."
Contrary to the position taken by the defendants in this case, there is no serious question as to the jurisdiction of this Court to entertain this suit. The United States district courts have the jurisdiction to entertain all suits brought by citizens to redress deprivation of rights, privileges or immunities granted to them under the...
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