National Association For Advancement of Colored People v. Button, No. 5

CourtUnited States Supreme Court
Writing for the CourtBRENNAN
Citation9 L.Ed.2d 405,83 S.Ct. 328,371 U.S. 415
Decision Date14 January 1963
Docket NumberNo. 5
PartiesNATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR the ADVANCEMENT OF COLORED PEOPLE, etc., Petitioner, v. Robert Y. BUTTON, Attorney General of Virginia, et al. Re

371 U.S. 415
83 S.Ct. 328
9 L.Ed.2d 405
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR the ADVANCEMENT OF COLORED PEOPLE, etc., Petitioner,

v.

Robert Y. BUTTON, Attorney General of Virginia, et al.

No. 5.
Reargued Oct. 9, 1962.
Decided Jan. 14, 1963.

[Syllabus from pages 415-417 intentionally omitted]

Page 417

Robert L. Carter, New York City, for petitioner.

Henry T. Wickham, Richmond, Va., for respondents.

Mr. Justice BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case originated in companion suits by the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, Inc. (NAACP), and the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc. (Defense Fund), brought in 1957 in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. The suits sought to restrain the enforcement of Chapters 31, 32, 33, 35 and 36 of the Virginia Acts of Assembly, 1956 Extra Session, on the ground that the

Page 418

statutes, as applied to the activities of the plaintiffs, violated the Fourteenth Amendment. A three-judge court convened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2281, 28 U.S.C.A. § 2281, after hearing evidence and making fact-findings, struck down Chapters 31, 32 and 35 but abstained from passing upon the validity of Chapters 33 and 36 pending an authoritative interpretation of these statutes by the Virginia courts.1 The complainants thereupon petitioned in the Circuit Court of the City of Richmond to declare Chapters 33 and 36 inapplicable to their activities, or, if applicable, unconstitutional. The record in the Circuit Court was that made before the three-judge court supplemented by additional evidence. The Circuit Court held the chapters to be both applicable and constitutional. The holding was sustained by the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals as to Chapter 33, but reversed as to Chapter 36, which was held unconstitutional under both state and federal law.2 Thereupon the Defense Fund returned to the Federal District Court, where its case is presently pending, while the NAACP filed the instant petition. We granted certiorari. 365 U.S. 842, 81 S.Ct. 803, 5 L.Ed.2d 807.3 We heard argument in the 1961 Term

Page 419

and ordered reargument this Term. 369 U.S. 833, 82 S.Ct. 863, 7 L.Ed.2d 841. Since no cross-petition was filed to review the Supreme Court of Appeals' disposition of Chapter 36, the only issue before us is the constitutionality of Chapter 33 as applied to the activities of the NAACP.

There is no substantial dispute as to the facts; the dispute centers about the constitutionality under the Fourteenth Amendment of Chapter 33, as construed and applied by the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals to include NAACP's activities within the statute's ban against 'the improper solicitation of any legal or professional business.'

The NAACP was formed in 1909 and incorporated under New York law as a nonprofit membership corporation in 1911. It maintains its headquarters in New York and presently has some 1,000 active unincorporated branches throughout the Nation. The corporation is licensed to do business in Virginia, and has 89 branches there. The Virginia branches are organized into the Virginia State Conference of NAACP Branches (the Conference), an unincorporated association, which in 1957 had some 13,500 members. The activities of the Conference are financed jointly by the national organization and the local branches from contributions and membership dues. NAACP policy, binding upon local branches and conferences, is set by the annual national convention.

The basic aims and purposes of NAACP are to secure the elimination of all racial barriers which deprive Negro citizens of the privileges and burdens of equal citizenship rights in the United States. To this end the Association engages in extensive educational and lobbying activities. It also devotes much of its funds and energies to an exten-

Page 420

sive program of assisting certain kinds of litigation on behalf of its declared purposes. For more than 10 years, the Virginia Conference has concentrated upon financing litigation aimed at ending racial segregation in the public schools of the Commonwealth.

The Conference ordinarily will finance only cases in which the assisted litigant retains an NAACP staff lawyer to represent him.4 The Conference maintains a legal staff of 15 attorneys, all of whom are Negroes and members of the NAACP. The staff is elected at the Conference's annual convention. Each legal staff member must agree to abide by the policies of the NAACP, which, insofar as they pertain to professional services, limit the kinds of litigation which the NAACP will assist. Thus the NAACP will not underwrite ordinary damages actions, criminal actions in which the defendant raises no question of possible racial discrimination, or suits in which the plaintiff seeks separate but equal rather than fully desegregated public school facilities. The staff decides whether a litigant, who may or may not be an NAACP member, is entitled to NAACP assistance. The Conference defrays all expenses of litigation in an assisted case, and usually, although not always, pays each lawyer on the case a per diem fee not to exceed $60, plus out-of-pocket expenses. The assisted litigant receives no money from the Conference or the staff lawyers. The staff member may not accept, from the litigant or any other source, any other compensation for his services in an NAACP-assisted case. None of the staff receives a salary or retainer from the NAACP; the per diem fee is paid only for professional services in a particular case. This per diem payment is

Page 421

smaller than the compensation ordinarily received for equivalent private professional work. The actual conduct of assisted litigation is under the control of the attorney, although the NAACP continues to be concerned that the outcome of the lawsuit should be consistent with NAACP's policies already described. A client is free at any time to withdraw from an action.

The members of the legal staff of the Virginia Conference and other NAACP or Defense Fund lawyers called in by the staff to assist are drawn into litigation in various ways. One is for an aggrieved Negro to apply directly to the Conference or the legal staff for assistance. His application is referred to the Chairman of the legal staff. The Chairman, with the concurrence of the President of the Conference, is authorized to agree to give legal assistance in an appropriate case. In litigation involving public school segregation, the procedure tends to be different. Typically, a local NAACP branch will invite a member of the legal staff to explain to a meeting of parents and children the legal steps necessary to achieve desegregation. The staff member will bring printed forms to the meeting authorizing him, and other NAACP or Defense Fund attorneys of his designation, to represent the signers in legal proceedings to achieve desegregation. On occasion, blank forms have been signed by litigants, upon the understanding that a member or members of the legal staff, with or without assistance from other NAACP lawyers, or from the Defense Fund, would handle the case. It is usual, after obtaining authorizations, for the staff lawyer to bring into the case the other staff members in the area where suit is to be brought, and sometimes to bring in lawyers from the national organization or the Defense Fund.5 In effect, then, the prospec-

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tive litigant retains not so much a particular attorney as the 'firm' of NAACP and Defense Fund lawyers, which has a corporate reputation for expertness in presenting and arguing the difficult questions of law that frequently arise in civil rights litigation.

These meetings are sometimes prompted by letters and bulletins from the Conference urging active steps to fight segregation. The Conference has on occasion distributed to the local branches petitions for desegregation to be signed by parents and filed with local school boards, and advised branch officials to obtain, as petitioners, persons willing to 'go all the way' in any possible litigation that may ensue. While the Conference in these ways encourages the bringing of lawsuits, the plaintiffs in particular actions, so far as appears, make their own decisions to become such.6

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Statutory regulation of unethical and nonprofessional conduct by attorneys has been in force in Virginia since 1849. These provisions outlaw, inter alia, solicitation of legal business in the form of 'running' or 'capping.' Prior to 1956, however, no attempt was made to proscribe under such regulations the activities of the NAACP, which had been carried on openly for many years in substantially the manner described. In 1956, however, the legislature amended, by the addition of Chapter 33, the provisions of the Virginia Code forbidding solicitation of legal business by a 'runner' or 'capper' to include, in the definition of 'runner' or 'capper,' an agent for an individual or organization which retains a lawyer in connection with an action to which it is not a party and in which it has no pecuniary right or liability.7

Page 424

The Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals held that the chapter's purpose 'was to strengthen the existing statutes to further control the evils of solicitation of legal business * * *.' 202 Va., at 154, 116 S.E.2d, at 65. The

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court held that the activities of NAACP, the Virginia Conference, the Defense Fund, and the lawyers furnished by them, fell within, and could constitutionally be proscribed by, the chapter's expanded definition of improper solicitation of legal business, and also violated Canons 35 and 47 of the American Bar Association's Canons of Professional Ethics, which the court had

Page 426

adopted in 1938.8 Specifically the court held that, under the expanded definition, such activities on the part of NAACP, the Virginia Conference, and the Defense Fund constituted 'fomenting and soliciting legal business in which they are not parties...

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2191 practice notes
  • Citizens for Equal Protection, Inc. v. Bruning, No. 4:03CV3155.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 8th Circuit. United States District Court of Nebraska
    • May 12, 2005
    ...468 U.S. at 618, 104 S.Ct. 3244. The right to expressive association protects the vigorous advocacy of lawful ends. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 429, 83 S.Ct. 328, 9 L.Ed.2d 405 (1963) (finding that litigation is a form of political expression — "a means for achieving the lawful objective......
  • Mancuso v. Taft, Civ. A. No. 4751.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 1st Circuit. United States District Courts. 1st Circuit. District of Rhode Island
    • April 17, 1972
    ...that `precision of regulation must be the touchstone in an area so closely touching our most precious freedoms.' NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 83 S.Ct. 328, 340, 9 L.Ed.2d 405 (1963); see Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 512-513 84 S.Ct. 1659, 1667, 12 L.Ed.2d 992; Shelton......
  • Mancuso v. Taft, No. 72-1180.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit
    • March 20, 1973
    ...effective. See Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 at 41-42, 89 S.Ct. 5, 21 L.Ed.2d 24 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring); cf. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 429-431, 83 S.Ct. 328, 9 L.Ed.2d 405 (1963). Party access to the ballot becomes less meaningful if some of those selected by party machinery......
  • Buckley v. Valeo, No. 75-1061
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (District of Columbia)
    • August 29, 1975
    ...and statutory overbreadth are constitutional vices often related and sometimes functionally inseparable. See, e. g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 423-433, 83 S.Ct. 328, 9 L.Ed.2d 405 (1963). For " where a vague statute 'abut(s) upon sensitive areas of basic First Amendment freedoms' it 'o......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
2184 cases
  • Citizens for Equal Protection, Inc. v. Bruning, No. 4:03CV3155.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 8th Circuit. United States District Court of Nebraska
    • May 12, 2005
    ...468 U.S. at 618, 104 S.Ct. 3244. The right to expressive association protects the vigorous advocacy of lawful ends. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 429, 83 S.Ct. 328, 9 L.Ed.2d 405 (1963) (finding that litigation is a form of political expression — "a means for achieving the lawful objective......
  • Mancuso v. Taft, Civ. A. No. 4751.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 1st Circuit. United States District Courts. 1st Circuit. District of Rhode Island
    • April 17, 1972
    ...that `precision of regulation must be the touchstone in an area so closely touching our most precious freedoms.' NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 83 S.Ct. 328, 340, 9 L.Ed.2d 405 (1963); see Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 512-513 84 S.Ct. 1659, 1667, 12 L.Ed.2d 992; Shelton......
  • Mancuso v. Taft, No. 72-1180.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit
    • March 20, 1973
    ...effective. See Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 at 41-42, 89 S.Ct. 5, 21 L.Ed.2d 24 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring); cf. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 429-431, 83 S.Ct. 328, 9 L.Ed.2d 405 (1963). Party access to the ballot becomes less meaningful if some of those selected by party machinery......
  • Buckley v. Valeo, No. 75-1061
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (District of Columbia)
    • August 29, 1975
    ...and statutory overbreadth are constitutional vices often related and sometimes functionally inseparable. See, e. g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 423-433, 83 S.Ct. 328, 9 L.Ed.2d 405 (1963). For " where a vague statute 'abut(s) upon sensitive areas of basic First Amendment freedoms' it 'o......
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    • United States
    • LexBlog United States
    • May 26, 2022
    ...with legal needs. This narrow reading is ultimately too narrow, in that it reads the classic association rights cases, NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963) and In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978), as turning on the associational interests of the lawyers qua lawyers. This is rather peculiar, g......
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    ...clarity andprecise guidance have never been required even of regulations that restrict expressive activity.”) withNAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963) (“First Amendment freedoms need breathing space tosurvive,” so “government may regulate in the area only with narrow specif‌icity.”).11......
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    • January 1, 2022
    ...239, at 1092. (269.) See Lynd, supra note 31, at 1422-35. (270.) In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 438 n.32 (1978) (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 430 (271.) Id. (quoting NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958)). (272.) 433 U.S. 119, 132-33 (1977). (273.) For the lang......
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    ...particularly where a group espouses dissident beliefs.”). 162. E.g ., National Ass’n for the Advancement of Colored People v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 428-29, 437-38 (1963) (discussed infra Part IV.D.); Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia, 377 U.S. 1, 8 (1964). 54 CONSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONME......
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