National Corp. for Housing Partnership, Meadowood Townhouse, Inc. v. Keller

• Decision Date: 01 September 1997
• Docket Number: No. 765,765
• Citation: 705 A.2d 142,119 Md.App. 566
• Parties: NATIONAL CORPORATION FOR HOUSING PARTNERSHIP, MEADOWOOD TOWNHOUSE, INC., et al. v. Shirley Jean KELLER. ,
• Court: Court of Special Appeals of Maryland

Page 566

119 Md.App. 566

705 A.2d 142

NATIONAL CORPORATION FOR HOUSING PARTNERSHIP, MEADOWOOD TOWNHOUSE, INC., et al. v. Shirley Jean KELLER.

No. 765, Sept. Term, 1997.

Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.

Feb. 3, 1998.

James A. Haynes (Thomas J. Michels, on the brief), Towson, for Appellants

Robert Taylor, Jr. (Ingerman & Horowitz, on the brief), Baltimore, for Appellee.

Argued before DAVIS, HOLLANDER and EYLER, JJ.

HOLLANDER, Judge.

This case calls upon us to construe the term "surviving dependents" with respect to permanent partial disability benefits awarded posthumously for an injured worker who died from a cause unrelated to her workplace injury. In particular, we focus on whether Maryland Code (1991 Repl.Vol.), § 9-632(c) of the Labor and Employment Article ("L.E."), requires a determination of dependency as of the time of the worker's injury or the worker's death. Neither party refers us to any Maryland case that clearly establishes when dependency is to be determined in the event that a worker dies before receipt of all permanent partial disability benefits. Nevertheless, appellants urge us to establish dependency as of the time of the worker's injury, while appellee argues that it should be established as of the worker's death. The outcome of the dispute will determine whether the deceased worker's son is entitled to collect his late mother's disability benefits.

FACTUAL SUMMARY

On February 19, 1990, Shirley Jean Keller ("claimant" or "worker"), appellee, ¹ who was then 54 years old, was seriously injured while working for the National Corporation for Housing Partnership, Meadowood Townhouse, Inc. ("Employer" or "Meadowood"), appellant. ² As a result of the accident, Kenneth Keller ("Keller"), the worker's adult son, left his residence in California and relocated to Maryland to care for his ailing mother. During this time, Keller became financially dependent upon his mother.

Because of her accident, Ms. Keller filed a workers' compensation claim and received temporary total disability benefits. On February 1, 1994, prior to the resolution of Ms. Keller's permanency claim by the Workers' Compensation Commission (the "Commission"), she died of sudden cardiac arrest. It is undisputed that the cause of Ms. Keller's death was not related to her workplace injury. For purposes of this appeal, the parties also agree that Keller was financially dependent upon his mother when she died, but he was not dependent upon her when the injury first occurred.

In February 1995, approximately one year after Ms. Keller's death, the Commission found that Ms. Keller had "sustained a permanent partial disability ... amounting to 75% industrial loss of use of the body as a result of the injury to the neck and right shoulder." Thereafter, on May 2, 1995, the Commission held a hearing to determine whether Keller was a surviving dependent of the claimant.

By order dated July 21, 1995, the Commission found that Keller qualified as a surviving dependent, and awarded his mother's unpaid disability benefits to him, pursuant to L.E. § 9-632(c). The Commission thus ordered appellants to pay Keller the claimant's permanent partial disability compensation, which was set at a rate of $180.00 per week, beginning February 1, 1994, for a period of five hundred weeks. The payment was subject to a credit for the temporary total disability payments that the worker had received before she died.

Thereafter, appellants sought judicial review of the Commission's decision in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County. At the hearing on February 19, 1997, the circuit court affirmed the Commission, stating:

Section 9-632 [of the Labor and Employment Article] specifically deals with the situation of survival of benefits where the death was not caused by the injuries sustained in the accident and Subsection (e), which is not applicable to this particular factual situation, but does indicate:

"If there are no surviving dependents of the covered employee and, on the date of death, the covered employee did not have a legal obligation to support a surviving spouse, the right to compensation survives only to the surviving minor children of the covered employee."

I cite that because I think it's significant [that the] Legislature in Subsection (e) did look at the date of death as opposed to the date of injury. The applicable section is 9-632(c), which states:

"If there are surviving dependents of the covered employee, the right to compensation survives to the surviving dependents as the Commission may determine."

So, it seems to me that the Legislature is making a distinction as to whether or not there are, in fact, surviving dependents. In coupling that with Subsection (e) where the Legislature refers to date of death, it seems to the Court that the Legislature intended for the Court to look to see if there was [sic], in fact, surviving dependents on the date of death and it's uncontradicted and, indeed, conceded that Mr. Keller was a surviving dependent on the date of his mother's death.

So for those reasons, the Court believes that these benefits do survive to Mr. Keller and [this court] will affirm the decision of the Commission.

Thereafter, appellants timely lodged the instant appeal.

ISSUE

Appellants present two questions for our review, which we have combined and rephrased:

In a Workers' Compensation action, when a claimant dies from a cause unrelated to the permanent partial disability claim, is surviving dependency, pursuant to L.E. § 9-632(c), established as of the time of the claimant's injury or as of the time of the claimant's death?

In our view, L.E. § 9-632(c) vests the Commission with discretion to determine surviving dependency either at the time of the claimant's injury or at the time of the claimant's death. Accordingly, we shall affirm.

DISCUSSION

The Maryland Workers' Compensation Act ("the Act"), codified in Code, Title 9 of the Labor and Employment Article, ³ "entitles covered employees to compensation for accidental personal injuries that arise 'out of and in the course of employment[.]' " Barnes v. Children's Hosp., 109 Md.App. 543, 553, 675 A.2d 558 (1996) (quoting L.E. §§ 9-101(b), 9-501(a)). It is well settled that the provisions of the Act are liberally construed in favor of the employee, in order to accomplish the Act's benevolent purpose. Bethlehem-Sparrows "Sparrows Point Shipyard, Inc. v. Hempfield, 206 Md. 589, 594, 112 A.2d 488 (1955); see also Lovellette v. Mayor of Baltimore, 297 Md. 271, 282, 465 A.2d 1141 (1983); Barnes, 109 Md.App. at 553, 675 A.2d 558; Ewing v. Koppers Co., Inc., 69 Md.App. 722, 731, 519 A.2d 790 (1987). Similarly, any ambiguity in the law must be resolved in favor of the employee. Mayor of Baltimore v. Cassidy, 338 Md. 88, 97, 656 A.2d 757 (1995); Barnes, 109 Md.App. at 554, 675 A.2d 558. Nevertheless, we may not extend coverage beyond that authorized by statute. Tortuga, Inc. v. Wolfensberger, 97 Md.App. 79, 83, 627 A.2d 56, cert. denied, 332 Md. 703, 632 A.2d 1209 (1993); see Montgomery County v. McDonald, 317 Md. 466, 472-73, 564 A.2d 797 (1989).

L.E. § 9-632(c), which governs the survival of permanent partial disability compensation, is at issue here. It mandates that, under certain circumstances, when the claimant dies from a non-compensable cause, any unpaid permanent partial disability compensation "survives" to the claimant's "surviving dependents." The provision is silent concerning the determination of dependency status, however. The section states, in part:

Survival of compensation.

* * * (b) In general.--If a covered employee dies from a cause that is not compensable under this title, the right to compensation that is payable under this Part IV of this subtitle and unpaid on the date of death survives in accordance with this section.

(c) Surviving dependents.--If there are surviving dependents of the covered employee, the right to compensation survives to the surviving dependents as the Commission may determine.

(d) No surviving dependents; obligation to support surviving spouse.--If there are no surviving dependents of the covered employee and, on the date of death, the covered employee had a legal obligation to support a surviving spouse, the right to compensation survives jointly to:

(1) the surviving spouse of the covered employee; and

(2) the surviving minor children of the covered employee.

(e) No surviving dependents or obligation to support surviving spouse.-If there are no surviving dependents and, on the date of death, the covered employee did not have a legal obligation to support a surviving spouse, the right to compensation survives only to the surviving minor children of the covered employee.

(Italics in original; boldface added). ⁴

Because L.E. § 9-632(c) does not contain any statutory language concerning the determination of dependency status, appellants urge us to rely on L.E. § 9-679. That provision governs a dependent's entitlement to compensation for the death of a covered employee when the worker's death is the result of an accidental personal injury or occupational disease. L.E. § 9-679 states:

Determination of dependency.

Except as otherwise provided in this subtitle, the Commission shall determine all questions of partial or total dependency in accordance with the facts of each case that existed:

(1) at the time of the occurrence of the accidental personal injury that caused the death of the covered employee; or

(2) on the date of disablement from the occupational disease that caused the death of the covered employee.

(Boldface added).

It is apparent that, in contrast to L.E. § 9-632(c), which is silent with respect to determining dependency, L.E. § 9-679 addresses the time or event that determines dependency status. It provides that, in death benefit cases, dependency is determined "at the time of the occurrence of the accidental personal injury" or "on the date of disablement." Appellants posit that the Legislature's failure...