National Council of the Junior Order of United American Mechanics of the United States of North America v. State Council of Virginia, Junior Order of United American Mechanics of the State of Virginia

• Decision Date: 19 November 1906
• Docket Number: No. 89,89
• Parties: NATIONAL COUNCIL OF THE JUNIOR ORDER OF UNITED AMERICAN MECHANICS OF THE UNITED STATES OF NORTH AMERICA et al., Plffs. in Err., v. STATE COUNCIL OF VIRGINIA, JUNIOR ORDER OF UNITED AMERICAN MECHANICS OF THE STATE OF VIRGINIA
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

203 U.S. 151

27 S.Ct. 46

51 L.Ed. 132

NATIONAL COUNCIL OF THE JUNIOR ORDER OF UNITED AMERICAN MECHANICS OF THE UNITED STATES OF NORTH AMERICA et al., Plffs. in Err.,

v STATE COUNCIL OF VIRGINIA, JUNIOR ORDER OF UNITED AMERICAN MECHANICS OF THE STATE OF VIRGINIA.

No. 89.

Argued November 7 and 8, 1906.

Decided November 19, 1906.

Messrs. C. V. Meredith, Ellis G. Kinkead, and Smith W. Bennett for plaintiffs in error.

[Argument of Counsel from pages 151-157 intentionally omitted] Messrs. Frank W. Christian and Samuel A. Anderson for defendant in error.

[Argument of Counsel intentionally omitted] Mr. Justice Holmes delivered the opinion of the court:

This is a writ of error to reverse a decree in favor of the defendant in error, the original plaintiff, and hereinafter called the plaintiff. 104 Va. 197, 51 S. E. 166. The plaintiffs in error will be called the defendants. The plaintiff is a Virginia corporation. The principal defendant is a Pennsylvania corporation. The other defendants are alleged to be officers of a voluntary association, calling itself by the plaintiff's name, and are acting under a charter from the Pennsylvania corporation. The latter was incorporated in 1893, the articles of association reciting that the associates comprise the national council, the supreme head of the order in the United States (where it previously had existed as a voluntary association). Its objects were to promote the interests of Americans and shield them from foreign competition, to assist them in obtaining employment, to encourage them in business, to establish a sick and funeral fund, and to maintain the public school system, prevent sectarian interference with the same, and uphold the reading of the Holy Bible in the schools. As the result of internal dissensions the Virginia corporation was chartered in 1900, with closely similar objects, omitting those relating to the public schools. It seems to have consisted of the dominant portion of a former voluntary state council of the same name, from which a charter issued by the Pennsylvania corporation had been withdrawn. The act of incorporation declared that the new body 'shall be the supreme head of the Junior Order of the United American Mechanics in the state of Virginia,' and provides that it 'shall have full and exclusive authority to grant charters to subordinate councils, Junior Order United American Mechanics, in the state of Virginia, with power to revoke the same for cause.' The plaintiff and the voluntary organization of the defendants both have granted and intend to grant charters to subordinate councils in Virginia, and are obtaining members and fees which each would obtain but for the other, and are holding themselves out as the only true and lawful state council of the Virginia Junior Order of United American Mechanics.

The plaintiff sued for an injunction, and the defendants, in their answer, asked cross relief. The plaintiff obtained a decree enjoining the defendant corporation and the other defendants (declared to be shown by their answers to be its agents and representatives) as officers of the Virginia voluntary association, from continuing within the state the use of the plaintiff's name or any other name likely to be taken for it; from using the plaintiff's seal; from carrying out under such name the objects for which the plaintiff and the Virginia voluntary association were organized; from granting charters to subordinate councils in the state as the head of the order in the state; from interfering in any way with the pursuit of its objects by the plaintiff within the state; and from designating their officers within the state by applications set forth as used by the plaintiff. On appeal the decree was affirmed, with a modification, merely by way of caution, providing that nothing therein contained should, in anywise, interfere with any personal or property rights that might have accrued before the date of the Virginia charter. The defendants had set up in their answer and insisted that the charter impaired the obligation of the contract existing between the plaintiff and the principal defendant, contrary to article 1, § 10, of the Constitution, and also violated § 1 of the 14th Amendment, and they took a writ of error from this court.

The bill and answer state the two sides of the difference which led to the split, at length. But those details have no bearing that needs to be considered here. The only question before us is the constitutionality of the act of the Virginia legislature granting the charter. The elements of that question are the appropriation of the name of the previously existing voluntary society and the exclusive right of granting subcharters in Virginia conferred by the words that we have quoted. Whether the persons who were using that name when they got themselves incorporated were using it rightly or wrongly does not matter if the legislature had the right to grant the name to them in either case. On the other hand, we do not consider the question stated to be disposed of by the limitation put upon the decree by the supreme court of appeals. Unless the saving of personal and property rights existing at the date of the charter be read as a construction of the charter, it does not affect the scope or validity of the act. And if so read, still it cannot be taken to empty the specific prohibitions in the decree of all definite meaning and to leave only an indeterminate injunction to obey the law at the defendants' peril. That injunction remains and imports what the words of the charter import, that the plaintiff has been granted certain defined exclusive rights which the court will enforce.

The decree, however, goes beyond the rights which we have mentioned as given by the charter. In that respect the discussion here must be limited again. Whether the plaintiff is using paraphernalia, or a ritual, or a seal, which it should not be allowed to use, is not before us here. The charter says nothing about them, and its validity is not affected by any abuse of rights of property or of confidence...