National Elec. Service Corp. v. District 50, United Mine Workers of America

• Citation: 279 S.W.2d 808,36 L.R.R.M. 2184
• Parties: NATIONAL ELECTRIC SERVICE CORPORATION, Appellant, v. DISTRICT 50, UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA, et al., Appellees.
• Decision Date: 20 May 1955
• Court: United States State Supreme Court (Kentucky)

Page 808

279 S.W.2d 808

NATIONAL ELECTRIC SERVICE CORPORATION, Appellant, v. DISTRICT 50, UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA, et al.,

Appellees.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

May 20, 1955.

James S. Greene, Jr., Harlan, for appellant.

Lay & Knuckles, Pineville, for appellees.

MOREMEN, Judge.

This appeal concerns the right of a trial court to set aside a judgment granting a permanent injunction, upon motion, after almost a year had elapsed since its entry.

On December 29, 1952, National Electric Service Corporation filed its petition seeking temporary and permanent injunctions against appellees, District 50 United Mine Workers of America and others, enjoining them from picketing the plant of appellant and from interfering with appellant's business by means of threat and intimidation, and from attempting to coerce its employees to designate appellee as their bargaining representative contrary to the provisions of KRS 336.130.

Appellees filed a pleading styled 'Special Demurrer and Plea to Jurisdiction' in which they questioned the court's authority to try the case upon the grounds that the petition presented a case of unfair labor practice denounced by the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C.A. Secs. 141-197, and as such was within exclusive jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board. Upon submission this plea was overruled. Thereafter, upon hearing, the court granted a temporary injunction which appellees moved to dissolve in this court. We overruled the motion.

Upon return to the trial court and after evidence had been presented, the court entered judgment on April 28, 1953, which made the temporary injunction permanent.

On December 14, 1953, the Supreme Court of the United States handed down a decision in Garner v. Teamsters, Chauffeurs & Helpers Local Union, 346 U.S. 485, 74 S.Ct. 161, 167, 98 L.Ed. 228, which held that a state may not enjoin, under its own labor statute, conduct which had been made an 'unfair labor practice' under the federal statutes and this opinion supported appellees' original contention that the National Labor Relations Board had exclusive jurisdiction of an action such as was brought by appellant in this case.

Both parties in their briefs conceded that under the law of the Garner case the trial court and this court had been in error in holding that the state court had jurisdiction of the subject matter of appellant's complaint.

On April 8, 1954, appellees, under CR 60.02(4), moved to set aside the judgment granting permanent injunction on the ground that the judgment was void. The trial court sustained this motion and entered a new judgment by which the injunction was denied.

Appellee has interpreted the Garner case as being conclusive of the question of whether the original judgment in this case was void, and appellant has conceded 'the trial court was in error in holding that it had jurisdiction of the subject matter of appellant's complaint.'

In the Garner case a lower equity court of the State of Pennsylvania had issued an injunction to prohibit picketing by a union in order to coerce petitioners into compelling or influencing their employees to join a union. A decision of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania deprived petitioners of the injunction which decision was affirmed by the Supreme Court of the United States on the ground that petitioner's grievance was within the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board to prevent unfair labor practices under the Labor Management Relations Act and was not subject to relief by injunction in the state court. However, in the opinion it was indicated that the court did not intend to deprive the state courts of jurisdiction in every case where there was a dispute between employers and employees who were engaged in interstate commerce because there it was said:

'This is not an instance of injurious conduct which the National Labor Relations Board is without express power to prevent and which therefore either is 'governable by the state or it is entirely ungoverned.' In such cases we have declined to find an implied exclusion of state powers. International Union v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 336 U.S. 245, 254, 69 S.Ct. 516, 521, 93 L.Ed. 651. Nor is this a case of mass picketing, threatening of employees, obstructing streets and highways, or picketing homes. We have held that the state still may exercise 'its historic powers over such traditionally local matters as public safety and order and the use of streets and highways.' Allen-Bradley Local v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 315 U.S. 740, 749, 62 S.Ct. 820, 825, 86 L.Ed. 1154.'

In the more recent cases: Association of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 1955, 348 U.S. 437, 75 S.Ct. 488, 99 L.Ed. ----; Weber v Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 1955, 348 U.S. 468, 75 S.Ct. 480, 99 L.Ed. ----; and Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America v. Righman Bros., 1955, 348 U.S. 511, 75 S.Ct. 452, the Supreme Court again directed its attention to determining the extent the labor relations of those involved in interstate commerce are still subject to regulatory powers of the states.

In the Westinghouse case the question was whether, under section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act--which provides that suits for violation of contracts between employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting interstate commerce, may be brought in any federal district court without respect to the amount in controversy or diversity of citizenship--the district court had jurisdiction over an action brought by the union on behalf of the employees for wages which the employer refused to pay in violation of a collective bargaining agreement. Six members of the court held that section 301 did not confer jurisdiction over such a suit in the federal courts. They did not agree upon an opinion in support of the decision. We gather from the symposium that, as a matter of simple statutory construction, section 301 was not intended to authorize a union to enforce in federal court an employee's right to compensation because the complaint set up no violation of a collective labor contract, but only a violation of individual employment contracts.

In the Weber case, the employer filed a charge of unfair labor practice against the union under the Labor Management Relations Act. The National Labor Relations Board held that the terms of the act had not been violated. Afterwards in employer obtained a permanent injunction in a Missouri state court which was affirmed by the Missouri Supreme Court on the ground that the union's conduct constituted a violation of the state's Restraint of Trade statute. The U. S. Supreme Court held that the state court's jurisdiction to enjoin the union's conduct was preempted by the authority vested in a federal board by the Labor Management Relations Act. In the course of the opinion by Justice Frankfurter, this statement was made [348 U.S. 468, 75 S.Ct. 487]:

'But as the opinion in that case recalled, the Labor Management Relations Act 'leves much to the states, though Congress has refrained from telling us how much.' 346 U.S., at page 488, 74 S.Ct. at page 164 . This penumbral area can be rendered progressively clear only by the course of litigation.'

In the Richman Brothers Case, an employer engaged in interstate commerce filed suit in a state court for injunctions against a labor union responsible for peaceful picketing, presumably to compel its employees to join the union. After the state court had denied the union's motion to dismiss on the ground that the National Labor Relations Board had exclusive jurisdiction of the matter, the union sought an injunction in the federal district court requiring the employer to withdraw the suit commenced in the state court. In fulfillment of the promise to make progressively clear the application of the law of the Garner case, it was held in the majority opinion that the district court was without power to issue the injunction. The import of the opinion is that even if on final appeal of the whole case from the state court, the United States Supreme Court should be compelled to reverse the judgment of the state court, still the federal courts are powerless to interfere until that time arrives. This fact was pointed out by Justice Douglas in a dissenting opinion by these words [348 U.S. 511, 75 S.Ct. 460]:

'Under the present decision, an employer can move in the state courts for an...