National Federation of Blind v. Target Corp., C 06-1802 MHP.

Decision Date02 October 2007
Docket NumberNo. C 06-1802 MHP.,C 06-1802 MHP.
Citation582 F.Supp.2d 1185
PartiesNATIONAL FEDERATION OF the BLIND, the National Federation of the Blind of California, on behalf of their members, and Bruce F. Sexton, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. TARGET CORPORATION, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — Northern District of California

Rachel Elizabeth Brill, Joshua Geoffrey Konecky, Todd Michael Schneider, Schneider & Wallace, San Francisco, CA, Roger Norton Heller, Disability Rights Advocates, Oakland, CA, Daniel F. Goldstein, Mehgan Sidhu Capek, Brown Goldstein & Levy, LLP, Baltimore, MD, Laurence Wayne Paradis, Disability Rights Advocates, Berkeley, CA, Peter Blanck, Crouse-Hinds Hall, Syracuse, NY, for Plaintiffs.

Matthew Ian Kreeger, Harold J. McElhinny, Kristina Michelle Paszek, Attorney

at Law, Mary F. Hansbury Stuart Christopher Plunkett, Morrison & Foerster LLP, San Francisco, CA, Robert Allen Naeve, Morrison & Foerster LLP, Irvine, CA, David Frank McDowell, Michael James Bostrom, Morrison & Foerster LLP, Los Angeles, CA, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

Re: Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification and Motion to Bifurcate; Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment

MARILYN HALL PATEL, United States District Judge.

Plaintiffs National Federation of the Blind ("NFB"), National Federation of the Blind of California ("NFB-CA"), Bruce Sexton, and all those similarly situated, filed this action against Target Corporation ("Target"), seeking declaratory, injunctive and monetary relief. Plaintiffs claim that Target.com is inaccessible to the blind, and thereby violates federal and state laws prohibiting discrimination against the disabled. Now before the court is plaintiffs' motion for class certification and motion for bifurcation; defendant's motion for summary judgment and the parties' supplemental briefing on the state law claims. Having considered the parties' arguments and submissions, and for the reasons set forth below, the court enters the following memorandum and order.

BACKGROUND1
I. Parties

Plaintiffs NFB and NFB-CA are nonprofit organizations. NFB is a nationwide organization with a 50,000 strong membership, composed primarily of blind individuals. NFB-CA is the California affiliate of NFB. The purpose of NFB is to promote the general welfare of the blind by (1) assisting the blind in their efforts to integrate themselves into society on terms of equality and (2) removing barriers and changing social attitudes, stereotypes and mistaken beliefs that sighted and blind persons hold concerning the limitations created by blindness and that result in the denial of opportunity to blind persons in virtually every sphere of life. These organizations have brought suit on their own behalf and on behalf of their members.

Plaintiff Sexton is a member of the NFB and the NFB of California. He is legally blind and uses JAWS screen reading software to access the internet. Sexton Apr. 12, 2006 Dec. ¶¶ 2, 13. Sexton relies on the internet for a variety of functions and frequently uses the internet in order to "research products, compare prices, and make decisions about purchasing goods in the stores' physical locations." Id. ¶ 16. He has attempted to use Target.com with his screen reader on "numerous occasions" but has been unable to access certain features of the website. Id. at ¶ 32.

Defendant Target operates approximately 1,400 retail stores nationwide, including 205 stores in California. Target.com is a website owned and operated by Target. By visiting Target.com, customers can purchase many of the items available in Target stores. Target.com also allows a customer to perform functions related to Target stores. For example, through Target.com, a customer can access information on store locations and hours, refill a prescription or order photo prints for pick-up at a store, and print coupons to redeem at a store.

II. Background

Plaintiffs allege that Target.com is not accessible to blind individuals. According to plaintiffs, designing a website to be accessible to the blind is technologically simple and not economically prohibitive. Protocols for designing an accessible internet site rely heavily on "alternative text": invisible code embedded beneath graphics. A blind individual can use screen reader software, which vocalizes the alternative text and describes the content of the webpage. Similarly, if the screen reader can read the navigation links, then a blind individual can navigate the site with a keyboard instead of a mouse. Plaintiffs allege that Target.com lacks these features that would enable the blind to use Target.com. Since the blind cannot use Target.com, they are denied full and equal access to Target stores, according to plaintiffs.

III. Procedural History

On February 7, 2006 plaintiffs filed this action in Superior Court of California for the County of Alameda. On March 9, 2006 defendant removed the case to federal court and subsequently filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim. In its motion, defendant claimed that each of the anti-discrimination laws protecting the disabled—the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. section 12182, ("ADA"), Unruh Civil Rights Act, Cal. Civ.Code section 51 ("Unruh Act"), and the Disabled Persons Act, Cal. Civ. Code section 54.1 ("DPA")—cover access to physical spaces only. Since Target.com is not a physical space, defendant asserted that the complaint does not state a claim under these laws. On September 5, 2006 the court granted in part and denied in part defendant's motion to dismiss. The court reasoned that the inaccessibility of Target.com impeded full and equal enjoyment of goods and services offered in Target stores pursuant to the ADA. Thus, the court dismissed plaintiffs' claims to the extent that they are based on Target.com features that are unconnected to the stores. The court also denied the motion to dismiss plaintiffs' state law claims. At the same time, the court denied plaintiffs' request for a preliminary injunction as premature.

Plaintiffs filed the instant motion for class certification on February 1, 2007. On March 8, 2007 defendant filed a motion for summary judgment on the grounds that plaintiff Sexton has not suffered a cognizable injury under the ADA. The court held an initial hearing on these matters on April 12, 2007. At the hearing, the court requested supplemental briefing on the reach of the relevant state statutes before ruling on the class certification motion as it related to the California subclass. Following the hearing, the court issued an order on the motion for class certification on April 25, 2007. In its order, the court narrowed the proposed class definition for the nationwide class to include the nexus requirement from its earlier order. Accordingly, the nationwide class consists of all legally blind individuals in the United States who have attempted to access Target.com and as a result have been denied access to the enjoyment of goods and services offered in Target stores. Subsequently, the parties submitted supplemental briefing on whether the DPA and the Unruh Act apply to websites. Plaintiffs also submitted supplemental declarations of class members in accordance with the court's April 25, 2007 order. Both parties submitted additional briefing on the class certification issues.

IV. Recent Modifications to Target.com

After the filing of the present complaint, Target undertook certain modifications of its website to make it more accessible to the blind. In response to this litigation, Target began drafting Online Assistive Technology Guidelines based on plaintiffs' expert report. Nemoir Dep. at 21:18-22:5.

LEGAL STANDARD
I. Motion for Class Certification

A party seeking to certify a class must satisfy the four prerequisites enumerated in Rule 23(a), as well as at least one of the requirements of Rule 23(b). Under Rule 23(a), the party seeking class certification must establish: (1) that the class is so large that joinder of all members is impracticable (i.e., numerosity); (2) that there are one or more questions of law or fact common to the class (i.e., commonality); (3) that the named parties' claims are typical of the class (i.e., typicality); and (4) that the class representatives will fairly and adequately protect the interests of other members of the class (i.e., adequacy of representation). Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a). In addition to satisfying these prerequisites, parties seeking class certification must show that the action is maintainable under Rule 23(b)(1), (2) or (3). See Rule 23(b); Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 614, 117 S.Ct. 2231, 138 L.Ed.2d 689 (1997). Rule 23(b)(2) permits class actions for declaratory or injunctive relief where the party opposing the class "has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class." Rule 23(b)(2).

The party seeking class certification bears the burden of establishing that the requirements of Rules 23(a) and 23(b) have been met. See Zinser v. Accufix Research Inst., Inc., 253 F.3d 1180, 1188 (9th Cir. 2001), amended by 273 F.3d 1266 (9th Cir.2001); Hanon v. Dataproducts Corp., 976 F.2d 497, 508 (9th Cir.1992). However, in adjudicating a motion for class certification, the court accepts the allegations in the complaint as true so long as those allegations are sufficiently specific to permit an informed assessment as to whether the requirements of Rule 23 have been satisfied. See Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 901 n. 17 (9th Cir.1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 816, 97 S.Ct. 57, 50 L.Ed.2d 75 (1976). The merits of the class members' substantive claims are generally irrelevant to this inquiry. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 177-78, 94 S.Ct. 2140, 40 L.Ed.2d 732 (1974); Moore v. Hughes Helicopters, Inc., 708 F.2d 475, 480 (9th Cir.1983).

II. Motion for Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is proper when the pleadings, discovery and affidavits show...

To continue reading

Request your trial
27 cases
  • Villalpando v. Exel Direct Inc., Case No. 12-cv-04137-JCS
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of California
    • September 3, 2015
    ...appropriate representatives with live claims. See Kremens v. Bartley, 431 U.S. 119, 135 (1977); Nat'l Fed'n of Blind v. Target Corp., 582 F. Supp. 2d 1185, 1201 (N.D. Cal. 2007). Exel does not challenge the adequacy of these individuals to act as class representatives. Nor does it dispute t......
  • Wilkins–Jones v. Cnty. of Alameda
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California
    • March 14, 2012
    ...cannot state a CDPA claim merely because her Title II claim is dismissed, such an argument fails. See Nat'l Fed. of Blind v. Target Corp., 582 F.Supp.2d 1185, 1207 (N.D.Cal.2007) (rejecting the claim that “because Sexton has not suffered an injury under the ADA and has provided no evidence ......
  • Andrews v. Blick Art Materials, LLC
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York
    • July 31, 2017
    ...present[ed] two types of alleged access problems: diverted purchases and in-store barriers." Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind v. Target Corp., 582 F.Supp.2d 1185, 1194 (N.D. Cal. 2007).The "diverted purchases" claim in Target was based on class members being "deterred from going to Target stores af......
  • Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind of Cal. v. Uber Techs., Inc.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of California
    • April 17, 2015
    ...511, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975). Therefore, an association need not prove injury to itself. Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind v. Target Corp.,582 F.Supp.2d 1185, 1191–92 (N.D.Cal.2007). NFBC has associational standing, so does not need to demonstrate standing to sue in its own right.2. Hin......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
1 books & journal articles
  • Business torts and actions
    • United States
    • James Publishing Practical Law Books California Causes of Action
    • March 31, 2022
    ...was to prohibit intentional discrimination in access to public accommodations.” National Federation of Blind v. Target Corporation , 582 F. Supp. 2d 1185 (N.D. Cal. 2007). The term “business establishments” is used in the “broadest sense reasonably possible” so as to include businesses of “......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT