National Football League Players Association v. National Football League, 101217 FED5, 17-40936

Court:United States Courts of Appeals, Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
Judge Panel:Before PRADO, ELROD, and GRAVES, Circuit Judges. JAMES E. GRAVES, JR., Circuit Judge, dissenting:
Opinion Judge:PER CURIAM:
Party Name:NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE PLAYERS ASSOCIATION, agent of on its own behalf and on behalf of Ezekiel Elliott, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE; NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE MANAGEMENT COUNCIL, Defendants - Appellants.
Case Date:October 12, 2017
Docket Nº:17-40936
 
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NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE PLAYERS ASSOCIATION, agent of on its own behalf and on behalf of Ezekiel Elliott, Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE; NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE MANAGEMENT COUNCIL, Defendants - Appellants.

No. 17-40936

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit

October 12, 2017

         Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas USDC No. 4:17-CV-615

          Before PRADO, ELROD, and GRAVES, Circuit Judges.

          PER CURIAM: [*]

         On August 31, 2017, the National Football League Players Association (NFLPA) filed a complaint in the District Court for the Eastern District of Texas on behalf of Ezekiel Elliott, a running back for the Dallas Cowboys, seeking a preliminary injunction preventing enforcement of a forthcoming six-game suspension by the National Football League (NFL) and the National Football League Management Council. Elliott and the NFL had been engaged in the arbitration process following an investigation resulting from domestic violence allegations against Elliott. After reviewing the investigation report and underlying evidence, Rodger Goodell, the Commissioner of the NFL, determined the domestic violence allegations were substantiated and that Elliott should be suspended for six games. Under the collective bargaining agreement between the NFLPA and the NFL, a player has the right to contest before an arbitrator a player discipline determination by the league. Elliott invoked that right and Harold Henderson, a former NFL executive, presided over the August 29-31, 2017 arbitration hearing. When the NFLPA filed this lawsuit and moved for a preliminary injunction on August 31, 2017, Henderson had indicated a decision was forthcoming, but had not yet issued the decision.

         On September 5, 2017, the district court held a preliminary injunction hearing. That same day, the arbitrator issued his decision upholding the NFL's six-game suspension of Elliott. On September 8, 2017, the district court enjoined the NFL from enforcing Elliott's six-game suspension. The NFL moved this court for a stay of the district court's injunction on September 15, 2017. We VACATE the district court's preliminary injunction and REMAND to the district court with instructions to dismiss the case.

         The NFL contends the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction under the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), 29 U.S.C. § 185, to issue the preliminary injunction.1 While preliminary injunctions are generally reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard, de novo review is appropriate where "a district court's ruling rests solely on a premise as to the applicable rule of law" and the applicable facts are established or of no controlling relevance. United Offshore Co. v. S. Deepwater Pipeline Co., 899 F.2d 405, 407 (5th Cir. 1990). On appeal, a court may also examine the basis for jurisdiction sua sponte. Simon v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 193 F.3d 848, 850 (5th Cir. 1999). When courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over a case, they lack the power to adjudicate the case. Home Builders Ass'n of Miss., Inc. v. City of Madison, 143 F.3d 1006, 1010 (5th Cir. 1998). Thus, we must examine jurisdiction whenever subject matter jurisdiction appears "fairly in doubt." See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 671 (2009). Questions of subject matter jurisdiction cannot be forfeited or waived and are reviewed de novo. Hous. Refining, L.P. v. United Steel, Paper & Forestry, Rubber, Mfg., 765 F.3d 396, 400 (5th Cir. 2014).2"[T]he jurisdiction of the court depends upon the state of things at the time of the action brought." Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas Glob. Grp. L.P., 541 U.S. 567, 570 (2004).

         Under the LMRA, a lawsuit for violations between an employer and a labor organization must satisfy the following three elements: "(1) a claim of violation of (2) a contract (3) between an employer and a labor organization." Carpenters Local Union No. 1846 of United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am., AFL-CIO v. Pratt-Farnsworth, 690 F.2d 489, 500 (5th Cir. 1982); 29 U.S.C. § 185(a). The NFLPA argues that because Elliott has stated a claim that satisfies these three elements, the district court was vested with jurisdiction over this case. In response, the NFL argues that jurisdiction only vests under the LMRA if Elliott exhausts his contractual remedies and that the lack of a final arbitral decision at the time of filing the complaint is a fatal jurisdictional defect.3

         It has long been established that "federal labor policy requires that individual employees wishing to assert contract grievances must attempt use of the contract grievance procedure agreed upon by employer and union as the mode of redress." Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 652 (1965). "If a grievance procedure cannot be made exclusive, it loses much of its desirability as a method of settlement." Id. at 653. The "grievance and arbitration procedures are part and parcel of the ongoing process of collective bargaining." United Paperworkers Int'l Union, AFL-CIO v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 38 (1987).

         Outside of limited circumstances, the failure to "fully exhaust[]" contracted for "grievance procedures" places an employee's claim for breach of a collective bargaining agreement beyond "judicial review." Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 184-85 (1967) (discussing situations where an "employee may obtain judicial review of his breach-of-contract claim despite his failure to secure relief through the contractual remedial procedures"). While courts have jurisdiction to enforce collective bargaining contracts, "where the contract provides grievance and arbitration procedures, those procedures must first be exhausted and courts must order resort to the private settlement mechanisms without dealing with the merits of the dispute." Misco, 484 U.S. at 37. Our circuit holds that federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction "to decide cases alleging violations of a collective bargaining agreement . . . by an employee against his employer unless the employee has exhausted contractual procedures for redress." Meredith v. La. Fed'n of Teachers, 209 F.3d 398, 402 (5th Cir. 2000).

         The NFLPA argues, following the Supreme Court's decision in Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 510-11 (2006), that Meredith is no longer good law and exhaustion should not be considered as an issue of subject matter jurisdiction. Arbaugh addressed when the term "jurisdiction" is properly utilized. 546 U.S. at 510. The Court stated at times the term had been applied to procedural requirements that "are not properly typed 'jurisdictional.'" Id. Particularly in the "subject-matter jurisdiction/ingredient-of-claim-for-relief dichotomy, " the Court stated that it, among other courts, "ha[d] been less than meticulous" in the use of the label. Id. At issue in Arbaugh was whether the threshold number of employees for the application of Title VII to an employee's claim was an element of a claim for relief or a jurisdictional issue. Id. at 516. The Court held that because Congress had not ranked the statutory limitation on coverage in Title VII as jurisdictional, "courts should treat the restriction as nonjurisdictional." Id. The Court further clarified in Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428, 435 (2011), "that a rule should not be referred to as jurisdictional unless it governs a court's adjudicatory capacity, that is, its subject-matter or personal jurisdiction." Claims-processing rules, which are rules "requiring that a party take certain procedural steps at certain specified times, " are not jurisdictional-even if mandatory-unless Congress clearly indicated the rule was "jurisdictional." Id. at 435-46. However, the Court held there were no "magic words" Congress needed to invoke and if there was "a long line of this Court's decisions left undisturbed by Congress" treating a requirement as jurisdictional, the Court would "presume that Congress intended to follow that course." Id. at 436.

         As discussed above, the Supreme Court has long treated the exhaustion of grievance procedures provided for in collective bargaining agreements as jurisdictional. See Vaca, 386 U.S. at 184-85 (discussing when judicial review is available if grievance procedures have not been exhausted); Misco, 484 U.S. at 37 (holding jurisdiction to enforce a collective bargaining agreement only vests once grievance and arbitration procedures are exhausted). Moreover, exhaustion is not a claims-processing rule that goes to the timing of filing a lawsuit. Instead, it is a rule reflecting the forum in which an employee's remedy lies, which is the grievance procedures to settle disputes under the LMRA. See Maddox, 379 U.S. at 653 ("Congress has expressly approved contract grievance procedures as a preferred method for settling disputes . . . ."); 29 U.S.C. § 173(a). Further, following Arbaugh, this court has not overruled its decision in Meredith.4 Given that Congress has left undisturbed the Supreme...

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