National General Corp. v. Dutch Inns of America, Inc.

• Decision Date: 11 November 1974
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 74-C-46-D.
• Citation: 386 F. Supp. 844
• Parties: NATIONAL GENERAL CORPORATION, Plaintiff, v. DUTCH INNS OF AMERICA, INC., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Virginia

386 F. Supp. 844

NATIONAL GENERAL CORPORATION, Plaintiff, v. DUTCH INNS OF AMERICA, INC., Defendant.

Civ. A. No. 74-C-46-D.

United States District Court, W. D. Virginia, Danville Division.

November 11, 1974.

Philip G. Gardner, Frith & Gardner, Martinsville, Va., for plaintiff.

John M. Oakey, Jr., McGuire, Woods & Battle, Richmond, Va., for defendant.

OPINION AND JUDGMENT

DALTON, District Judge.

National General Corporation, plaintiff, a Delaware Corporation, brings this action against Dutch Inns of America, Inc., defendant, a Florida corporation, to enforce a foreign judgment from the State of California. This action was originally filed in the Henry County Circuit Court in Martinsville, Virginia, on June 6, 1974, but was removed on July 2, 1974, to this Federal District Court on a petition filed by defendant Dutch Inns. The petition was filed in accordance with the requisites of 28 U. S.C. § 1446 and jurisdiction is conferred upon this court by virtue of 28 U.S.C. § 1441 as the amount of the California judgment exceeds $10,000.

Plaintiff has filed a motion for summary judgment, enclosing the stipulated judgment No. 966140 of the Superior Court for the State of California for the County of Los Angeles. This original judgment dated January 4, 1974, was signed by Harold V. Boisvert, a court commissioner acting as a Judge Pro Tem for the purposes of entering a stipulated judgment. On September 20, 1974, plaintiff filed a supplemental memorandum in support of plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. At this same time plaintiff included the stipulated judgment 966140 bearing the signature of Superior Court Judge A. J. McCourtney, which was signed by the judge on September 18, 1974, and awarded plaintiff the sum of $640,291.66. The stipulated judgments were both attested to by the court clerk, Clarence E. Cabell, and bear the seal of the Los Angeles County Superior Court in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1738. Also included in plaintiff's supplemental memorandum and filed with this court was an authorization by Judge McCourtney showing that Commissioner Boisvert had the power to enter a judgment in the case entitled National General Corporation, etc. v. Dutch Inns of America, Inc., etc., et al.

Prior to plaintiff's filing of its supplemental memorandum on September 20, 1974, defendant had made a response to plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, attacking the validity of the California judgment and basing this attack upon a recent California Supreme Court decision, Rooney v. Vermont Investment Corporation, 10 Cal.3d 351, 515 P.2d 297 (Supreme Court of California, 1973). This court recognizes and follows the rule that federal courts accord to a judgment of a state court only the effect given to it by the law of the state in which it was rendered, Mutual Orange Distributors et al. v. Agricultural Prorate Commission of California et al., 30 F.Supp. 937 (S.D.Cal.1940), however, once the state court has jurisdiction over the parties and over the subject matter, its judgment is valid and cannot be impeached in the state of the forum even though it cannot be obtained there, Roche v. McDonald, 275 U.S. 449, 48 S. Ct. 142, 72 L.Ed. 365 (1928). With the above rules of law as focal points, the court now considers defendant's response to plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, and, more particularly, the bearing, if any, of Rooney, supra, upon the present action.

Rooney involved a judgment entered by a Judge Pro Tem of the same Superior Court for Los Angeles County. In voiding the judgment entered by the Judge Pro Tem, the Supreme Court of California found that the Commissioner acting as Judge Pro Tem was acting without authorization from the Superior Court Judge to do so. Furthermore, in Rooney, the parties did not stipulate that a judgment could be entered at once, but expressly conditioned any entry of judgment upon the occurrence of a default, at which time the party at fault only agreed to pay the unpaid...