National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, Inc

• Decision Date: 30 June 1976
• Docket Number: No. 75-1558,75-1558
• Citation: 96 S.Ct. 2778,49 L.Ed.2d 747,427 U.S. 639
• Parties: NATIONAL HOCKEY LEAGUE et al. v. METROPOLITAN HOCKEY CLUB, INC., et al
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

49 L.Ed.2d 747

96 S.Ct. 2778

427 U.S. 639

NATIONAL HOCKEY LEAGUE et al.

v METROPOLITAN HOCKEY CLUB, INC., et al.

No. 75-1558.

June 30, 1976.

Rehearing Denied Oct. 4, 1976.

See429 U.S. 874, 97 S.Ct. 197.

PER CURIAM.

This case arises out of the dismissal, under Fed.Rule Civ.Proc. 37, of respondents' antitrust action against petitioners for failure to timely answer written interrogatories as ordered by the District Court, 63 F.R.D. 641.The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed the judgment of dismissal, finding that the District Court had abused its discretion, 531 F.2d 1188.The question presented is whether the Court of Appeals was correct in so concluding.Rule 37 provides in pertinent part as follows:

"If a party . . . fails to obey an order to provide or permit discovery . . . the court in which the action is pending may make such orders in regard to the failure as are just, and among others the following:

(C) An order striking out pleadings or parts thereof, or staying further proceedings until the order is obeyed, or dismissing the action or pro- ceeding or any part thereof, or rendering a judgment by default against the disobedient party."

This Court held in Societe Internationale v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 212, 78 S.Ct. 1087, 1096, 2 L.Ed.2d 1255(1958), that Rule 37

"should not be construed to authorize dismissal of (a) complaint because of petitioner's noncompliance with a pretrial production order when it has been established that failure to comply has been due to inability, and not to willfulness, bad faith, or any fault of petitioner."

While there have been amendments to the Rule since the decision in Rogers, neither the parties, the District Court, nor the Court of Appeals suggested that the changes would affect the teachings of the quoted language from that decision.

The District Court, in its memorandum opinion directing that respondents' complaint be dismissed, summarized the factual history of the discovery proceeding in these words:

"After seventeen months where crucial interrogatories remained substantially unanswered despite numerous extensions granted at the eleventh hour and, in many instances, beyond the eleventh hour, and notwithstanding several admonitions by the Court and promises and commitments by the plaintiffs, the Court must and does conclude that the conduct of the plaintiffs demonstrates the callous disregard of responsibilities counsel owe to the Court and to their opponents.The practices of the plaintiffs exemplify flagrant bad faith when after being expressly directed to perform an act by a date certain, Viz., June 14, 1974, they failed to perform and compounded that noncompliance by waiting until five days afterwards before they filed any motions.

Moreover, this action was taken in the face of warnings that their failure to provide certain information could result in the imposition of sancons under Fed.R.Civ.P. 37.If the sanction of dismissal is not warranted by the circumstances of this case, then the Court can envisage no set of facts whereby that sanction should ever be applied."63 F.R.D. 641, 656(1974).

The Court of Appeals, in reversing the order of the District Court by a divided vote stated:

"After carefully reviewing the record, we conclude that there is insufficient evidence to support a finding that M-GB's failure to file supplemental answers by June 14, 1974 was in flagrant bad faith, willful or intentional."531 F.2d 1188, 1195(1976).

The Court of Appeals did not question any of the findings of historical fact which had been made by the District Court, but simply concluded that there was in the record evidence of "extenuating factors."The Court of Appeals emphasized that none of the parties had really pressed discovery until after a consent decree was entered between petitioners and all of the other original plaintiffs except the respondents approximately one year after the commencement of the litigation.It also noted that respondents' counsel took over the litigation, which previously had been managed by another attorney, after the entry of the consent decree, and that respondents' counsel encountered difficulties in obtaining some of the requested information.The Court of Appeals also referred to a colloquy during the oral argument on petitioners' motion to dismiss in which respondents' lead counsel assured the District Court that he would not knowingly and willfully disregard the final deadline.

While the Court of Appeals stated that the District Court was required to...