National Juvenile Law Center, Inc. v. Regnery

• Decision Date: 15 October 1984
• Docket Number: Nos. 83-1644,83-1985 and 83-2236,s. 83-1644
• Citation: 738 F.2d 455
• Parties: NATIONAL JUVENILE LAW CENTER, INC., et al. v. Alfred S. REGNERY, Acting Administrator, Office of Juvenile Justice, et al., Appellants.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit

Page 455

738 F.2d 455

238 U.S.App.D.C. 61

NATIONAL JUVENILE LAW CENTER, INC., et al. v. Alfred S. REGNERY, Acting Administrator, Office of Juvenile Justice, et al., Appellants.

Nos. 83-1644, 83-1985 and 83-2236.

United States Court of Appeals District of Columbia Circuit.

Argued Feb. 14, 1984.

Decided June 22, 1984.

As Modified on Rehearing sua sponte Oct. 15, 1984.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia (D.C. Civil Action No. 83-01103).

Carolyn B. Kuhl, Deputy Asst. Atty. Gen., Washington, D.C., with whom J. Paul McGrath, Asst. Atty. Gen., Stanley S. Harris, U.S. Atty., Washington, D.C., at the time the briefs were filed, and Mark H. Gallant, Atty., Dept. of Justice, Washington, D.C., were on the brief, for appellants.

Richard Laird Hart, Washington, D.C., with whom David J. Cynamon, Washington, D.C., was on the brief, for appellees.

Before WRIGHT, BORK and SCALIA, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the court PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM:

In 1978 and 1980 the federal government awarded grants to the National Juvenile Law Center (the "Law Center") which were to be used to finance litigation on behalf of juveniles aimed at improving the system of juvenile justice in this country. In the spring of 1983 the government refused to extend new grants or to continue to fund the Law Center after the last of its previous grants expired on March 31, 1983. The Law Center and two of its clients in the suits it had brought commenced this action in the District Court for the District of Columbia, alleging that the government was legally obligated to continue to provide funding until the litigation that had been started with the previous grants was completed.

The plaintiffs advanced three arguments in the District Court in support of their plea for continued funding. First, they claimed that the government was bound under principles of promissory estoppel to continue funding suits already in progress. Second, they argued that their clients' rights under the Due Process Clause of the Constitution had been infringed by the government's withdrawal of the allegedly promised future funding. Third, they alleged that what they characterize as the government's attempt to withdraw funding while the underlying suits were at critical stages was an unconstitutional attempt by the Executive Branch to control the outcome of pending suits, in violation of the doctrine of separation of powers. See United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 20 L.Ed. 519 (1872).

On May 26, 1983 the District Court granted permanent injunctive relief to the plaintiffs, ordering the government to fund the pending litigation. National Juvenile Law Center, Inc. v. Regnery, 564 F.Supp. 1320 (D.D.C.1983). The government appealed to this court. ¹ We reverse the District Court's judgment.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The Law Center is a nonprofit legal firm specializing in juvenile law. In 1978 the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP) awarded it a grant of $699,764 to conduct specified litigation on behalf of juvenile offenders from October 1, 1978 to March 31, 1980. The litigation efforts seem to have generally focused on the problems caused by incarcerating juveniles, and especially aimed at attacking the practice of confining juveniles along with adults in adult detention facilities.

In early 1980 the Law Center realized that a considerable portion of the grant remained unspent. It accordingly requested and received a six-month "no cost" extension--i.e., an extension of the time during which it could spend already granted funds. During this period the Law Center submitted a second grant application, and in November 1980 received an additional grant of $997,071 that was to cover the period from October 1, 1980 through September 30, 1982.

For aid in understanding the ensuing events, we will speak of three different kinds of funding that a grantee could claim from the government. First is what we will call "new funding," which is a grant of money that the grantee could use generally to further its activities. In the case of the Law Center, it would presumably use new funding grants to continue to litigate old suits, institute new suits, or involve itself in other activities permitted by the terms of the grant. The grants the Law Center received in 1978 and 1980--like all the grants given by OJJDP--were "new funding" grants. Second is "continuation funding," which is funding that the grantee needs at a given time to continue activities already started. For the Law Center, continuation funding would enable it to continue to litigate cases already brought. ² Third is "interim funding," which is continuation funding that would enable the grantee to continue its activities while the grantee's applications for other kinds of funding are pending before the agency. For the Law Center, interim funding would enable it to continue to litigate pending suits until OJJDP could pass on its applications for new or continuation funding. In other words, "interim funding" differs from continuation funding in that it lasts only until pending applications for funding are finally resolved.

Armed with this vocabulary, we can recount the remaining events that led to the current controversy. By early 1982 the Law Center realized that it would not spend all of its budgeted funds by the September 30, 1982 deadline given in its 1980 grant. On April 28, 1982 the Law Center accordingly requested a six-month, no-cost extension of its 1980 grant. In August it was informed by OJJDP that the request had been granted and its deadline for spending the already-budgeted funds extended to March 31, 1983.

On January 28, 1983 the Law Center applied for a renewal of its grant. By February 25, 1983 OJJDP had not yet acted on the grant request. Therefore the Law Center on that date sent a letter to OJJDP. The letter sought immediate action on the grant application, noted the Law Center's intention to pursue administrative remedies in the event of a denial, and requested interim funding for the period from the March 31 expiration of its prior grant until a final decision on its application.

The administrative remedies to which the Law Center referred evidently encompass a hearing before the agency pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Sec. 3783(b) ( 1982) ³ (unless otherwise noted, all references to Title 42 of the United States Code are to the 1982 edition) and a rehearing pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Sec. 3783(c). ⁴ Presumably, the Law Center intended also to invoke judicial review of any denial of its application for new funding, and sought the interim funding for the entire period until administrative and judicial reviews were completed. See 42 U.S.C. Secs. 3784, 3785 (judicial review available in Court of Appeals for decisions of certain Department of Justice agencies); id. Sec. 5672(a) (making Secs. 3784 and 3785 applicable to OJJDP).

By letter dated March 9, 1983 OJJDP informed the Law Center that its application for new funding would be denied. In mid-March OJJDP orally notified the Law Center that its request for interim funding had been denied. See letter from Mona Lyons and John W. Karr to OJJDP, March 29, 1983, Joint Appendix ("JA") at 19. On March 29 the Law Center appealed for reconsideration of the denials and alternatively requested a hearing. OJJDP replied on March 31 that it would arrange for a hearing, but that it would take 60-90 days to do so "with the full cooperation of all parties." See letter from OJJDP to Karr & Lyons, March 31, 1983, JA 23. Faced with the March 31 cutoff of the previous grant and fearful that a cutoff of funds would doom currently pending cases, the Law Center and two of its clients filed this suit in the District Court.

On May 26, 1983 the District Court issued the injunction here under review. The District Court believed that it had jurisdiction only over appellees' claim for interim (as opposed to continuation) funding, see 564 F.Supp. at 1325, because of the existence of the statutory review scheme culminating in Court of Appeals review outlined above. See 42 U.S.C. Secs. 3783-3785. Therefore, the court only ordered OJJDP to supply interim funding pending completion of administrative and judicial review of the application for new or continuation funding. However, the District Court's reasoning indicates that it granted the interim funding because it felt that the promissory estoppel, due process, and separation of powers arguments established that appellees were entitled to continuation funding. In what follows, we hold that the District Court was incorrect in its holding (at least as to the individual appellees) that it had jurisdiction only over their claim to interim funding. We also hold that the District Court erred in its finding that appellees were entitled to continuation funding.

II. CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS OF THE INDIVIDUAL PLAINTIFFS

A. Jurisdiction

The government alleges that the District Court lacked jurisdiction over the individual appellees' claims. It bases its argument on the administrative review procedure established in OJJDP's governing statute. In particular, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 3783(b) provides that administrative appeal is available for an "applicant or grantee" whose grant application has been "denied," or whose grant has been "discontinued, terminated or * * * been given * * * in a lesser amount that [sic ] such applicant believes appropriate." As stated above, a disappointed grantee or applicant may then petition for a rehearing pursuant to Section 3783(c), followed by judicial review of any "final action" in the Court of Appeals pursuant to Section 3785. The government argues that, because Section 3785(a) provides this special avenue of review only for "applicant[s] or recipient[s]" of grants, Congress should be understood as having intended to preclude review at the behest of indirect beneficiaries such as the individual plaintiffs here. In short, according to the government, the individual pla...