National Labor R. Board v. Cities Service Oil Co., 340.

Decision Date25 July 1941
Docket NumberNo. 340.,340.
PartiesNATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD v. CITIES SERVICE OIL CO. et al. (NATIONAL MARITIME UNION OF AMERICA, Intervener).
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit

Robert B. Watts, Gen. Counsel, Laurence A. Knapp, Associate Gen. Counsel, Ernest A. Gross, Asst. Gen. Counsel, Sylvester Garrett, and Stanley D. Metzger, all of Washington, D. C., for petitioner National Labor Relations Board.

Frueauff, Burns & Ruch and Hatch & Wolfe, all of New York City (Carver W. Wolfe and Ross W. Lynn, both of New York City, of counsel), for respondent Cities Service Oil Co. Albert E. Van Dusen, of New York City, for respondent Texas Co.

Kelly Bell, of Chicago, Ill., (Vinson, Elkins, Weems & Francis, of Houston, Tex., of counsel), for respondent Pure Oil Co.

William L. Standard, of New York City (Max Lustig and Edward J. Malament, both of New York City, on the brief), for intervener.

Before L. HAND, AUGUSTUS N. HAND, and FRANK, Circuit Judges.

AUGUSTUS N. HAND, Circuit Judge.

The National Labor Relations Board petitions this court to enforce orders that the respondents, Cities Service Oil Company, The Pure Oil Company and The Texas Company (1) cease and desist from refusing to grant passes to representatives of the National Maritime Union of America (hereafter called Union) in order that the latter may go aboard respondents' vessels and meet with the unlicensed personnel; (2) grant passes to such representatives, to be issued under such conditions and in such number as shall be determined by collective bargaining between each of the respondents and the Union.

Each of the respondents is engaged in the production, refining, marketing and transportation of petroleum and petroleum products and in the operation of a number of ocean-going oil tankers carrying petroleum and petroleum products between ports on the Gulf of Mexico and ports on the North Atlantic.

The complaints allege, and the respondents admit, that in June, 1938, and thereafter, the Union, which had been certified as the exclusive collective bargaining agent of the unlicensed personnel, sought and was refused passes for the purpose of going on board the tankers in order to investigate and negotiate concerning grievances of the seamen. The broad question is whether the refusal to grant the Union representatives access to the personnel restrained and coerced the latter in the exercise of rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.SC.A. § 157, thereby violating Section 8(1), 29 U.S.C.A. § 158(1).

After protracted hearings, the Board rendered a decision in which it summarized its conclusions as follows: "In conclusion, we find that seamen are in port for a short time with very little time ashore, and then only in small groups; that union halls are not readily accessible and shore delegates few in number with many duties; that seamen spend the few hours they have ashore in normal recreational pursuits; that grievances cannot adequately be settled by ships' committees because of the nature of the industry, the nature of the seamen, and the traditional subservience of the seamen to the masters; that grievances cannot be settled effectively ashore in the first instance owing to the impossible practical difficulties to the Union incident to such settlement; that grievance procedures which do not involve access are, in a practical sense, unworkable, and do not afford the seamen the opportunity to bargain collectively concerning their grievances; that the grievance procedure which involves access is prevalent today, and has long been in use, in the shipping industry; that access is common practice in land industries; that such procedure insures to the seamen the benefit gained from representation by expert, non-crew negotiators; that, with access, these representatives may learn the nature of, assess the value of, and properly present grievances on behalf of the seamen; that, without access, these representatives cannot effectively accomplish these important tasks; and that the grievance procedure which involves access is necessary for the protection of the right of the employees to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing as guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act. We find that all of the objections of the respondents to the granting by them of access are without merit."

We hold that the foregoing findings are supported by substantial evidence and that they, therefore, must be sustained. It may be added that the issues raised are of the sort where the exercise of administrative discretion seems the best way to solve difficulties. Indeed, except for a minor question affecting the form of the order, we can see no reason for burdening a court or the Board itself with a review of the enormous record before us. We are led to this conclusion not only by the logic of the situation, but because passes for ships have in the past been issued to representatives of labor unions without serious detriment to the employer and at times the practice has been very general.

Section 7 of the Act provides: "Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in concerted activities, for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection."

Section 8 provides:

"It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer —

"* * * To interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7 157 of this title."

The result of refusing passes is undoubtedly to prevent the most effective sort of collective action by the employees. Ships, and particularly these oil tankers, which ordinarily remain in port for a day only, afford less opportunity for investigation of labor conditions than do factories where the employees go home every afternoon and have the...

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12 cases
  • Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. v. Superior Court
    • United States
    • California Supreme Court
    • 4 Marzo 1976
    ...of property rights, may be necessary in order to safeguard the right to collective bargaining.' (National Labor R. Board v. Cities Service Oil Co. (2d Cir. 1941) 122 F.2d 149, 152.) The Board has frequently applied this principle in decisions involving varying sets of circumstances, where i......
  • Cent. States, Se. & Sw. Areas Pension Fund v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Western District of New York
    • 1 Mayo 2019
    ...based largely upon a conception of the right to collective bargaining as the solvent of all industrial ills." N.L.R.B. v. Cities Serv. Oil Co., 122 F.2d 149, 152 (2d Cir. 1941). "An employer will violate [its corresponding] statutory duty [to bargain] if it unilaterally changes a term or co......
  • Millmen Union, Local 324, AFL v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R. Co. of Tex.
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • 20 Noviembre 1952
    ...right-of-way. Appellants cite the case of N.L.R.B. v. LeTourneau Co., 324 U.S. 793, 65 S.Ct. 982, 89 L.Ed. 1372, and N.L.R.B. v. Cities Service Oil, 2 Cir., 122 F.2d 149. We have carefully read these cases and do not think they are applicable to the situation here before us and it would ser......
  • National Labor Relations Board v. Stowe Spinning Co.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit
    • 22 Diciembre 1947
    ...to exercise the right of organization and of collective bargaining. To the same effect is the decision in N. L. R. B. v. Cities Service Oil Co., 2 Cir., 122 F.2d 149, in which the court sustained the Labor Board in upholding the right of union representatives to visit seamen on board ships ......
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