National Labor R. Board v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.

• Decision Date: 27 November 1940
• Docket Number: No. 20373.,20373.
• Citation: 36 F. Supp. 413
• Parties: NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD v. GOODYEAR TIRE & RUBBER CO. et al.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Ohio

36 F. Supp. 413

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD v. GOODYEAR TIRE & RUBBER CO. et al.

No. 20373.

District Court, N. D. Ohio, Eastern Division.

November 27, 1940.

Robert B. Watts, Malcolm F. Halliday, and A. Norman Somers, all of Washington, D.C., and Drexel A. Sprecher, of Washington, D.C., for plaintiff.

Dwight Parsons, of Akron, Ohio, for defendants.

JONES, District Judge.

Upon refusal of the Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company to obey subpoenas duces tecum issued by the National Labor Relations Board, under authority of 29 U.S.C.A. § 161(1), in a hearing instituted by complaint to which the Goodyear Company had filed an answer, the Board filed an application to this court for an order requiring obedience to the subpoenas duces tecum. Section 161(2). An order to show cause was issued thereon and the Goodyear Company responded by filing an answer to the application, together with a motion to dismiss or quash proceedings in this court. The motion to dismiss, first, urged that the proceedings on the application are to be controlled by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A. following section 723c, and that unless such rules are complied with no jurisdiction over the Goodyear Company exists in this court. The second ground of the motion seems to be that the evidence subpoenaed by the Board is immaterial and irrelevant to the matters being inquired into in the hearing before the Board, it being further contended that the Board has the burden of showing not only relevancy and materiality of the evidence, but reasonable grounds for believing that relevant evidence to support the Board's charges against Goodyear Company will be found in the documentary evidence subpoenaed.

I find nothing in the statute under which the proceedings are here, or in the Rules of Civil Procedure, which supports the contention that the proceedings here are to be controlled by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. By Section 161 of Title 29, 29 U.S.C.A. § 161, the Board is given wide power to subpoena witnesses and for the production of evidence. Further, it is provided that the Board may make application to the District Court, which is given jurisdiction to issue an order of compliance upon refusal to obey the Board's subpoena. Clearly the Congress never intended to permit the controversy over reception of evidence to be removed or transferred to the District Court as an original suit merely upon the application of the Board for an order requiring compliance with its subpoena. But that would be the effect of such ruling as is contended for by the Goodyear Company.

The Board has been given power to issue subpoenas, conduct hearings, and to make findings and orders, but was given no power to enforce or execute its orders except through the courts, and it was to obtain an executing arm for the enforcement of its subpoenas that I think the application to the court by the Board was provided. The filing of an application by the Board for an enforcing order constitutes neither a review of the Board's action nor an independent suit to test the propriety of the Board's subpoenas. In my opinion, the section of the statute under consideration provides a summary and special statutory jurisdiction conferred by Congress which is not to be enlarged merely because the procedure and limits of the power were not prescribed with more particularity.

It is my considered judgment that the only question presented by the Board's application is whether the subpoenas were regularly issued and duly served in accordance with the Board's statutory power and that there has been a...