National Labor Rel. Bd. v. NORFOLK SHIPBUILD. & D. CORP.

• Decision Date: 26 January 1949
• Docket Number: No. 5826.,5826.
• Parties: NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD v. NORFOLK SHIPBUILDING & DRYDOCK CORPORATION.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

172 F.2d 813 (1949)

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD v. NORFOLK SHIPBUILDING & DRYDOCK CORPORATION.

No. 5826.

United States Court of Appeals Fourth Circuit.

January 26, 1949.

Owsley Vose, Attorney, National Labor Relations Board, of Washington, D. C. (David P. Findling, Associate General Counsel, A. Norman Somers, Asst. General Counsel, and Frederick U. Reel, Attorney, National Labor Relations Board, all of Washington, D. C., on the brief), for petitioner.

Leon T. Seawell, of Norfolk, Va., for respondent.

Before PARKER, Chief Judge, and SOPER and DOBIE, Circuit Judges.

PARKER, Chief Judge.

This is a petition to enforce an order of the National Labor Relations Board and presents another chapter in the labor controversies of the Norfolk Shipbuilding and Drydock Corporation which on two prior occasions have engaged the attention of this Court. See N. L. R. B. v. Norfolk Shipbuilding and Drydock Corporation, 4 Cir., 109 F.2d 128, and Employees Protective Ass'n v. N. L. R. B., 4 Cir., 147 F.2d 684. The order of which enforcement is here sought was entered by the Board on August 26, 1946. It finds the employer guilty of unfair labor practices in interfering with the formation and administration of an employees' association, in discharging ten employees, and in refusing to bargain with the C.I.O. union. It requires the employer to cease and desist from the unfair labor practices found, to offer reinstatement with back pay to the ten employees and upon request to bargain collectively with the union.

The order is attacked as lacking substantial support in the evidence; but we think that it is amply supported. Nothing would be gained by going again over the evidence, which is carefully summarized in the intermediate report of the trial examiner which was approved, with certain exceptions, by the Board. That it is sufficient to establish interference with the employees' right of self organization as found by the Board, see N. L. R. B. v. Norfolk Shipbuilding & Drydock Corporation, supra, 4 Cir., 109 F.2d 128, 129; Wallace Corporation v. N. L. R. B., 4 Cir., 141 F.2d 87, 90; N. L. R. B. v. Virginia Electric and Power Co., 314 U.S. 469, 62 S.Ct. 344, 86 L.Ed. 348; Id., 4 Cir., 132 F.2d 390; N. L. R. B. v. Link-Belt Co., 311 U.S. 584, 599, 61 S.Ct. 358, 85 L.Ed. 368.

While the company contends that the discharges of the ten employees were upon adequate grounds, there was ample evidence to support the findings that they arose out of hostility to the union. It was for the Board to weigh the evidence and find the facts established by it; and we cannot say that its findings lacked substantial support. N. L. R. B. v. Nebel Knitting Co., 4 Cir., 103 F.2d 594; Hartsell Mills Co. v. N. L. R. B., 4 Cir., 111 F.2d 291, 292-293. As said in the case last cited:

"It must be remembered, in this connection, that the question involved is a pure question of fact; that, in passing upon it, the Board may give consideration to circumstantial evidence as well as to that which is direct; that direct evidence of a purpose to violate the statute is rarely obtainable; and that where the finding of the Board is supported by circumstances from which the conclusion of discriminatory discharge may legitimately be drawn, it is binding upon the courts, as they are without power to find facts or to substitute their judgment for that of the Board."

There was ample evidence, also, to support the finding that the company refused to bargain with the union as contemplated by law after it had been certified by the Board as bargaining agent. The principles here applicable were laid down by this Court in Great Southern Trucking Co. v. N. L. R. B., 4 Cir., 127 F.2d 180, 185, and N. L. R. B. v. Highland Park Mfg. Co., 4 Cir., 110 F.2d 632, 637, 638.

The company has moved to dismiss the petition of the Board on the ground that the latter was guilty of inexcusable laches in delaying from August 26, 1946, the date of the entry of its order, until November 2, 1948, a period of more than two years, to ask for enforcement, although the Board was promptly notified that the company would not accept or abide by the order. The answer of the Board to this is that there is no limitation in the statute and that, if the company felt aggrieved by the delay, it had a full and complete remedy in the right to petition for a review of the order under section 10(f) of the Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 160(f), relying upon N. L. R. B. v. Nebel Knitting Co., 4 Cir., 103 F. 2d 594, 595; N. L. R. B. v. Aluminum Products Co., 7 Cir., 120 F.2d 567, 573; N. L. R. B. v. Suburban Lumber Co., 3 Cir., 121 F.2d 829, 833; N. L. R. B. v. Isthmian Steamship Co., 2 Cir., 126 F.2d 598, 600, 601; N. L. R. B. v. Central Dispensary & Emergency Hospital, 79 U.S.App. D.C. 274, 145 F.2d 852, 854; N. L. R. B. v. Sun Tent-Luebbert Co., 9 Cir., 151 F.2d 483, 488. We do not think, however, that this is a complete answer. The Board is invoking the injunctive power of equity carrying with it the power to punish for contempt; and this ought not be exercised except in accordance with equitable principles. Hecht Co. v. Bowles 321 U.S. 321, 329, 64 S.Ct. 587, 88 L.Ed. 754. It is manifest that it should not be exercised when there has been such delay in applying for enforcement that the Board's order probably will not do justice at the time enforcement is applied for. In no realm of litigation is promptness of action more important than in that of labor relationships, where the conditions upon which an...