National Labor Rel. Bd. v. United States Cold Stor. Corp.

• Citation: 203 F.2d 924
• Decision Date: 23 April 1953
• Docket Number: No. 14035.,14035.
• Parties: NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD v. UNITED STATES COLD STORAGE CORP.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

203 F.2d 924 (1953)

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD v. UNITED STATES COLD STORAGE CORP.

No. 14035.

United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit.

April 23, 1953.

Arnold Ordman, Attorney, A. Norman Somers, Asst. Gen. Counsel, David P. Findling, Assoc. Gen. Counsel, George J. Bott, General Counsel, Thomas McDermott, Attorney, National Labor Relations Board, all of Washington, D. C., for petitioner.

H. T. Bowyer and H. Bascom Thomas (of Bowyer, Gray, Thomas, Crozier & Harris), Dallas, Tex., for respondent.

Before HUTCHESON, Chief Judge, and BORAH and RIVES, Circuit Judges.

BORAH, Circuit Judge.

The National Labor Relations Board petitions for a decree of enforcement of its order of October 29, 1951, against the respondent United States Cold Storage Corp., following the usual proceedings under § 10 of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 160. Jurisdiction is conceded.

The respondent, a Delaware corporation, operates cold storage plants throughout the United States including a plant in Dallas, Texas in which it processes, packs and stores divers food products. The respondent employs an average of sixty-five employees at all times and of this number, the seven employees in the engineering department are the only ones involved in this proceeding. On December 14, 1949, following an election held in the previous month among the employees of this department a majority of the votes cast were for the Stationary Engineers, Local 707, International Union of Operating Engineers, A. F. L., and the Board certified the union as the bargaining agent of the employees in the engineering department of respondent's Dallas plant. During the period January 9, 1950, to April 3, 1950, respondent and the union engaged in bargaining negotiations and, after sixteen different meetings were held, an agreement was substantially reached on everything except wages and seniority. On April 5, 1950, the union called a strike and established a picket line at the plant from that date until June 23, 1950, when the union withdrew the pickets.

On April 6, 1950, the respondent sent a telegram to each striking employee reading as follows: "We consider the strike illegal since at no time did the company refuse to bargain. Under the circumstances we would like you to report back to your regular job within 24 hours after receiving this telegram on your regular shift time. If you do not report, we will consider that you are terminating your employment and a replacement will be hired." The striking employees refused to abandon the strike and return to work and in consequence their discharge became effective on the day following receipt of the telegram. Having thus effectively discharged the strikers respondent thereafter began to hire new employees to fill the vacant jobs and by April 12, three new employees had been hired. Thereafter, on April 24, 1950, respondent addressed a letter to each of the strikers regarding his insurance and gave each of them the right to get individual policies with the Travelers Insurance Company, which was then carrying the group insurance. This letter contained this pertinent language: "On April 6th, we notified you by telegram to return to work within 24 hours from the receipt of the message or we would terminate the employment. You did not return to work; and consequently we consider you are no longer an employee of the company."

In a letter dated May 1, 1950, the union informed respondent that it considered the discharge of the employees, as set forth in the aforementioned telegram and letter of April 24, discriminatory and in violation of Section 8(a) (3) of the Act, 29 U.S. C.A. § 158(a) (3), and advised that it had filed an unfair labor practice charge alleging such unlawful discrimination and was seeking remedy before the Board. In this communication the union notified respondent of its intention to intensify its strike activities; requested respondent to reconsider its action in refusing to bargain and in locking out the discharged employees; and said: "We stand ready to meet and bargain with you in good faith at any time, and the employees insist on being restored to employee status at once." In response to this letter respondent wrote the union on May 8, stating that there had been no discrimination against the strikers on account of any union activity and that the strikers had not been locked out but that they had voluntarily left their jobs and had refused to return to work when an unconditional offer was afforded them. In this letter respondent informed the union that it had secured replacements for some of the men and at the present time could re-employ one operating engineer and two maintenance men and that as far as the other former employees were concerned they could make application for employment and would be re-employed when vacancies occurred. In the closing paragraph of this letter respondent said: "If you desire to continue negotiations, if you will submit any proposition you have to make in writing it will be considered by the Company at any time." Several days after receipt of this letter two of the striking employees applied for the available jobs and were re-employed. The remainder of the men on strike never applied for re-employment.

Agreeable to respondent's offer to consider any proposition which the union would submit in writing, the union on May 20, 1950, submitted a proposed agreement and notified respondent that it stood ready at any time to meet with it for the purpose of negotiations. Despite the fact that the union in this proposed contract reduced its demands for wages which had been one of the major issues in the prestrike bargaining negotiations, respondent found the contract unacceptable and again ignored the union's request to meet for the purpose of negotiations; advised the union that it could not agree to the schedule of wages or to other specified provisions of the contract; and stated that if the union cared to revise the contract in line with the respondent's stated suggestions and resubmit it, respondent would be glad to consider it. On the day following the union answered again expressing a willingness to meet with respondent by "personal contact" in an effort to reach a satisfactory agreement, stating that it would be agreeable to any date designated by respondent.

On June 19, respondent specifically declined to meet with the union on the ground that the matters about which there is any substantial difference had been thoroughly discussed and it did not believe that there was any further need for discussions in person of these subjects. It again reiterated that if the union wished to revise its ideas on these issues and would submit them they would be considered. On June 20, the union for the fourth time requested a personal appointment so they could sit down and reach an agreement for the benefit of all concerned. This letter respondent ignored.

The trial examiner found that the respondent did not engage in the unfair labor practices alleged in the complaint and recommended that the complaint be dismissed. More specifically he found that this strike being economic in nature and not prompted by any prior unfair labor practices on respondent's part, respondent had a right to replace the strikers with permanent employees, if it did so before the strikers capitulated. Further, that respondent was not obliged to advise the strikers that it proposed to replace them and consequently had the right to warn them in a telegram that the jobs would be filled if they did not return to work within 24 hours. The examiner reasoned that the strikers are presumed to know the law and that the telegram in effect merely restated it for their benefit. In this connection the examiner adverted to the letter of April 24, with the comment that this letter proceeds on the theory that the strikers are no longer employees and concluded that the sending of the telegram and letter did not violate the Act.

The Board disagreed with the trial examiner, holding that respondent's telegram of April 6, did not accurately "restate" the law and did not constitute a mere statement of respondent's right to replace economic strikers but actually operated as a notice of discharge to the striking employees to be effective 24 hours after its receipt if they had not by then reported back to their regular jobs. This conclusion is amply supported by the letter of April 24, which respondent addressed to the strikers and by the testimony of respondent's Vice-President and Manager, R. P. MacKenzie, which is set forth in the margin.¹

We think the Board was correct in its application of the law to the facts of the case. By striking in support of economic demands the employees clearly engaged in a concerted activity for "mutual aid or protection" within the intendment of § 7 of the Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 157. They did not by striking in these circumstances cease to be employees and their discharge for engaging in the strike was accordingly a violation of § 8(a) (1) of the Act. N. L. R. B. v. Mackay Radio & Telegram Company, 304 U.S. 333, 347, 58 S.Ct. 904, 82 L.Ed. 1381. It is clear from the authorities that in a situation like the present the employer is free to hire replacements for the strikers at any time prior to their unconditional request for reinstatement, but on the other hand the cases uniformly hold that it is an unfair labor practice to discharge economic strikers prior, as here, to the time their jobs are filled. Carter Carburetor Corp. v. N. L. R. B., 8 Cir., 140 F.2d 714; N. L. R. B. v. Kalamazoo Stationery Company, 6 Cir., 160 F.2d 465; J. A. Bentley Lbr. Co. v. N. L. R. B., 5 Cir., 180 F.2d 641; N. L. R. B. v. Kennametal, Inc., 3 Cir., 182 F.2d 817, 19 A.L.R.2d 562; Morand Bros. Beverage Co. v. N. L. R. B., 7 Cir., 190 F.2d 576; Cusano v. N. L. R. B., 3 Cir., 190 F.2d 898; N. L. R. B. v. Globe Wireless, Ltd., 9 Cir., 193 F.2d 748.

The trial examiner further found that the evidence...