National Labor Relations Bd. v. FASHION PIECE D. WORKS

• Decision Date: 29 November 1938
• Docket Number: No. 6559.,6559.
• Citation: National Labor Relations Bd. v. FASHION PIECE D. WORKS, 100 F.2d 304 (3rd Cir. 1938)
• Parties: NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD v. FASHION PIECE DYE WORKS, Inc.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit

100 F.2d 304 (1938)

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD v. FASHION PIECE DYE WORKS, Inc.

No. 6559.

Circuit Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.

November 29, 1938.

Charles Fahy, Gen. Counsel, Robert B. Watts, Associate Gen. Counsel, and Laurence A. Knapp, Robert S. Erdahl, and Owsley Vose, Attys., National Labor Relations Board, all of Washington, D. C., and Gerhard P. VanArkel, of New Orleans, La., for petitioner.

Wm. H. Schneller, of Catasauqua, Pa., and H. P. McFadden, of Bethlehem, Pa., for respondent.

Before BIGGS, MARIS, and CLARK, Circuit Judges.

MARIS, Circuit Judge.

The National Labor Relations Board has filed its petition for the enforcement of an order issued by it against the respondent, Fashion Piece Dye Works, Inc., pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act (Act of July 5, 1935, c. 372, 49 Stat. 449, 29 U.S.C.A. § 151 et seq.). Enforcement is opposed by the respondent upon the ground that the order was invalid. The facts are these.

On October 31, 1935, the Federation of Silk and Rayon Dyers and Finishers of America (now the Federation of Dyers, Finishers, Printers and Bleachers of America), filed with the Regional Director of the Board a charge that the respondent was engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of sections 8(1) and 8(3) of the Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 158(1, 3). The respondent was served with a copy of the complaint and notice of a hearing before a Trial Examiner designated by the Board. At the hearing on December 23, 1935, the respondent offered no evidence, relying upon the defense that the Act was unconstitutional. After the ruling by the Supreme Court on April 12, 1937, that the Act was constitutional (National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation, 301 U.S. 1, 57 S.Ct. 615, 81 L.Ed. 893, 108 A.L.R. 1352), the respondent was granted leave by this court to adduce additional evidence and did so on November 18, 1937.

The Board issued a supplemental decision on March 30, 1938, based upon the record as made upon the two hearings. It found that the respondent is a New Jersey corporation operating a plant in Pennsylvania for the dyeing and finishing of rayon and acetate goods belonging to its customers; that fifty to ninety per cent. of the goods to be processed by the respondent are received from points outside of Pennsylvania and transported to the Easton, Pennsylvania, plant in a truck owned and operated by the respondent; that ninety per cent. of the finished goods are delivered directly to the respondent's customers in New York City by the respondent in its own truck; that the respondent discharged four of its employees because of their union activities and a fifth because he was a brother of one of the discharged men.

The Board ordered the respondent to cease and desist from interfering with, restraining, or coercing its employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7 of the Act and from discouraging membership in the Federation of Dyers, Finishers, Printers, and Bleachers of America, or any other labor organization of its employees, by discriminating against any of its employees in regard to hire or tenure or any term or condition of employment. In addition it directed the respondent to offer immediate and full reinstatement to each of the five discharged employees with back pay equal to that which he would normally have earned as wages less the amount which he earned during the period of unemployment and to post appropriate notices in the plant.

The respondent contends that it is not subject to the provisions of the National Labor Relations Act; that the Board's findings of fact as to the cause of the discharge of the five employees are not supported by the evidence; and that the order to reinstate with back pay is premature because the amount of back wages has not been determined.

The respondent argues that since it is not engaged in interstate commerce and its business does not affect the flow of interstate commerce it is not subject to the provisions of the Act. We cannot accept the respondent's premise that it does not engage in interstate commerce. True, it does not buy, sell or exchange any of the goods dyed and finished at its plant in interstate commerce. It does,...