National Labor Relations Board v. Taitel

• Decision Date: 22 December 1958
• Docket Number: No. 12335.,12335.
• Citation: 261 F.2d 1
• Parties: NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, Petitioner, v. Irving TAITEL, Ruth Taitel and Jerome Taitel d/b/a I. Taitel and Son, a Partnership, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

261 F.2d 1 (1958)

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, Petitioner, v.Irving TAITEL, Ruth Taitel and Jerome Taitel d/b/a I. Taitel and Son, a Partnership, Respondent.

No. 12335.

United States Court of Appeals Seventh Circuit.

October 30, 1958.

Rehearing Denied December 22, 1958.

Thomas J. McDermott, Associate Gen. Counsel, Washington, D. C., Sheldon M. Charone, Atty., Chicago, Ill., Jerome D. Fenton, Gen. Counsel, Marcel Mallet-Prevost, Asst. Gen. Counsel, Fannie M. Boyls, Robert J. Wilson, Attys., N.L.R. B., Washington, D. C., for petitioner.

George Rose, Indianapolis, Ind., for respondent.

Before DUFFY, Chief Judge, HASTINGS, Circuit Judge, and WHAM, District Judge.

HASTINGS, Circuit Judge.

This case comes before us upon the petition of the National Labor Relations Board pursuant to Section 10(e) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended(61 Stat. 136,29 U.S.C.A. § 151 et seq.) for enforcement of its order¹ issued against respondent² on December 14, 1957, following the usual proceedings under Section 10 of the Act.

In substance, the Board found that respondent interfered with, restrained and coerced its employees in the exercise of their rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by threats to employees that it would close its plant if the union³ succeeded in organizing its employees; by offering a supervisory job to an employee if he abandoned his union activities; by unlawful interrogation of employees and solicitation of their assistance to combat the union's efforts to organize the plant; and by the solicitation of employees to abandon a strike, called by the union after respondent had refused to bargain.The Board further determined that the union represented a majority of respondent's employees in the unit found to be appropriate at the time of the alleged violations, and that, in denying the union's request for recognition and insisting upon a Board ordered election, respondent was not motivated by any good faith doubt as to the union's majority status, but was moved by a desire to gain time in which to undermine the union and dissipate its strength, thereby violating Section 8(a)(5) of the Act.

To remedy the foregoing, the Board ordered respondent to cease and desist from the unfair labor practices found and from, in any other manner, interfering with its employees' rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act.It affirmatively ordered respondent to bargain collectively with the union upon request to do so and to post the appropriate notices.

The contested issue is whether there is substantial evidence in the record as a whole to support the several findings of the Board as above set out.

Since respondent's contentions are predicated solely upon the question of the sufficiency of the evidence on the record as a whole to support the Board's findings, we seem required again to state "that the Act vests in the Board, and not in the courts of review, the duty of appraising conflicting evidence, drawing inferences from established facts and circumstances, and resolving issues of fact," and that our function "is limited to determining whether there was substantial evidence to support the Board's findings of fact," and that if there was then "these findings cannot be disturbed on review."National Labor Relations Board v. Aintree Corporation, 7 Cir., 1942, 132 F.2d 469, 472.We are not, however, to take lightly the warning of Judge Major in his dissenting opinion in that case(at page 473), that, in following such a rule, courts of appeal are not to be mere rubber stamps, there still remaining the necessity for a solid foundation of proof to be found in the record.As Judge Lindley stated in National Labor Relations Board v. Wagner Iron Works, etc., 7 Cir., 220 F.2d 126, 133, certiorari denied, 1955, 350 U.S. 981, 76 S.Ct. 466, 100 L.Ed. 850: "Ultimately, whether enforcement is to be decreed depends primarily on whether the findings are supported by substantial evidence `when viewed in the light that the record in its entirety furnishes,'" citing Universal Camera Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 340 U.S. 474, 488, 71 S.Ct. 456, 95 L.Ed. 456.

The record fairly and adequately establishes that, during the interval between the union's request for recognition and the first meeting between respondent and the union, and during the progress of the strike following nonrecognition, respondent engaged in the tactics above found by the Board to constitute interference with and restraint and coercion of its employees in their exercise of the rights guaranteed them under Section 7 of the Act.We see no point in burdening this opinion by reciting the testimony which gives rise to our conclusion as to its sufficiency.

This court has held rather decisively that such conduct on the part of an employer is in violation of Section 8 (a)(1) of the Act.Threats to close a plant if the union succeeds, National Labor Relations Board v. Aintree Corporation, supra; threats of reprisal and promise of benefits for repudiating union, National Labor Relations Board v. Popeil Brothers, 7 Cir., 1954, 216 F.2d 66, 67-68; coercive interrogation of employees as to their union activities and membership, National Labor Relations Board v. Wagner Iron Works, etc., supra;Indiana Metal Products Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 7 Cir., 1953, 202 F.2d 613, 619-620; solicitation of employees to combat the union and to break a strike called for unfair labor practices, National Labor Relations Board v. Bradley Washfountain Co., 7 Cir., 1951, 192 F.2d 144, 152-153, have all been held to be in violation of Section 8(a)(1).

The record shows that on the critical date there were 96 employees in the unit for which recognition was sought, making 49 employees a majority.It further shows that employees in the unit executed authorization cards which were identified and introduced in evidence at the hearing.Respondent refused to check the signatures on these cards when requested to do so at its first meeting with the union, and at the hearing it did not contest their genuineness.Respondent did, however, contend that the signed cards reflected a coerced majority because the union waived initiation fees for all employees who joined while...