National Labor Relations Board v. Caroline Mills, Inc., 12179.

• Citation: 167 F.2d 212
• Decision Date: 18 March 1948
• Docket Number: No. 12179.,12179.
• Parties: NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD v. CAROLINE MILLS, Inc.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (5th Circuit)

167 F.2d 212 (1948)

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD v. CAROLINE MILLS, Inc.

No. 12179.

Circuit Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

March 18, 1948.

David P. Findling and Ruth Weyand, both of Washington, D.C., and Sidney J. Barba, of Baltimore, Md., for petitioner.

Shirley C. Boykin, of Carrollton, Ga., and John Wesley Weeks, of Decatur, Ga., for respondent.

Before HUTCHESON, HOLMES, and McCORD, Circuit Judges.

HUTCHESON, Circuit Judge.

This is another of those dreary reviews of Board proceedings presenting the question not whether the findings of fact made by the Board, as trier of the facts, on evidence presented by the Board, as prosecutor, in support of charges filed by the Board, as complainant, have been fairly, impartially, and justly arrived at, but whether they are "supported by substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole". It presents the usual picture of supporting findings arrived at by a process of quite uniformly "crediting" testimony favorable to the charges and as uniformly "discrediting" testimony opposed.

The respondent insists that the provisions¹ of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C.A. § 141 et seq., have outmoded, if not outlawed, this method of selectively supporting a desired, if not predetermined, decision. It urges upon us that the Board's findings are not supported by "the preponderance of the testimony taken by the Board", or "by substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole". It urges upon us, too, that the evidence establishes beyond question that Mize and Jacobs were discharged for cause, Mize for disability and Jacobs for refusal to do the work assigned him, and "having been discharged for cause", the order of the Board, requiring reinstatement and back pay, was in the teeth of the statute.

We are in no doubt that the invoked provisions of the Labor Management Act were directed at these abuses of administrative expertise so-called, which the prevailing climate of Washington opinion, both Board and Court wise, has done so much to foster and encourage. Neither are we in any doubt that their total purpose has been, their effect will be, not only to proscribe bad, while prescribing good, practices for the Board, but to give the courts more latitude on review. They do not, however, provide for a hearing de novo, and we cannot on this record say that the fact findings complained of, that respondent has been guilty of unfair labor practices and that it discriminatorily discharged Mize and Jacobs, were clearly erroneous.

As to Mize, however, we think it clear that the Board's order requiring his reinstatement may not stand, for it is established on the undisputed evidence that Mize was not only reinstated but was given a better job than the one he had when he was discharged, and that after being reinstated he voluntarily left the employment of the company. The order then will be modified by striking out the provision for reinstatement as to Mize, and, as modified, will be ordered enforced.

Respondent, in its answer to the petition for enforcement, alleges: that it has gone out of business; that its plant is in process of being dismantled; that its most desirable and essential machines have already been sold; that all of its employees have been dismissed because of this...