National Labor Relations Board v. Eclipse Lumber Co., 13212.
Decision Date | 12 November 1952 |
Docket Number | No. 13212.,13212. |
Parties | NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD v. ECLIPSE LUMBER CO., Inc., et al. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit |
George J. Bott, Gen. Counsel, David P. Findling, Associate Gen. Counsel, A. Norman Somers, Asst. Gen. Counsel, Fannie M. Boyls and William J. Avrutis, Attys., N.L. R.B., Washington, D. C., for petitioner.
Patterson, Maxwell & Jones, Seattle, Wash., for respondent Eclipse Lumber Co.
Walthew, Gershon, Oseran & Warner, Seattle, Wash., for respondent International Woodworkers of America.
Before DENMAN, Chief Judge, and HEALY and POPE, Circuit Judges.
This is a petition by the National Labor Relations Board to enforce certain orders of the Board against respondent company and respondent union.
This order is based on a claimed violation of Section 8(a) (3) (B) of the Labor Management Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 158(a) (3) (B), hereafter called the Act, which provides "That no employer shall justify any discrimination against an employee for nonmembership in a labor organization * * * (B) if he has reasonable grounds for believing that membership was denied or terminated for reasons other than the failure of the employee to tender the periodic dues and the initiation fees uniformly required as a condition of acquiring or retaining membership".
That is to say, that when a union shop agreement is entered into under Section 8(a) (3) of the Act, the Company could not discharge a member of the Union on the Union's demand if it had reasonable grounds for believing that the Union's demand for his discharge was on grounds other than for non-payment of periodic dues and required initiation fees. The Company does not question that the "periodic dues" are those due the Union, subsequent to the making of the union-shop contract. N.L.R.B. v. International Union, etc., 7 Cir., 194 F.2d 698, 701. Colonie Fibre Co. v. N.L.R.B., 2 Cir., 163 F.2d 65.
The facts, in brief, are: In 1944, one Marl, then working for the Company, refused to pay a Union political assessment and thereupon left the Union and paid no more dues. Under the Union rules he remained a member until he was "dropped" by some affirmative act of the Union which was not taken. He remained a "suspended" member of the Union.
In 1948, he returned to work with the Company and was working there when on April 25, 1950, the Union entered into a union-shop contract providing that:
The Union had a constitutional provision to the effect that a delinquent member could be reinstated upon payment of the regular new member initiation fee of $10. and six months' back dues of $2.50 a month, and one month's dues at the increased rate of $2.75, totaling $27.75. On inquiry of the Union Marl was told the amount he had to pay was the sum of $85.25, consisting of $70.50 past dues, $10. initiation fee, one month's advance dues of $2.75 and a $2. fine for non-picketing in a prior strike.
When Marl protested, he was told by the Union treasurer that if he did not pay "* * * at the end of 30 days you know what happens." After thirty days had expired the Union notified the Company to dismiss Marl, which the Company did.
On or about May 16, Marl told one Carpenter, a supervising employee of the Company, that the Union was demanding $85.25, including a fine, for his reinstatement in the Union. Carpenter stated to Marl, "If you don't pay it, we will have to let you go." The discharge followed on May 29th.
There is no direct evidence that Carpenter knew that the $83.25 demanded as dues covered a period prior to April 25, 1950, when the Union-shop contract was made; but it is obvious that if the amount had accumulated in the three weeks to May 16, when Carpenter was told of the sum of $83.25, that the annual Union dues would amount to upwards of $1,550., an absurd sum. He also was told that the amount included a fine, the payment of which in no event could be a condition of his right to employment. We agree with the finding of both the Board and trial examiner, that Carpenter knew that the Union's demand for Marl's discharge was for Union obligations other than current dues or initiation fees.
We are of the opinion that the evidence supports the Board's finding that Carpenter, who told Marl, "We will have to let you go," was a supervisory employee of a rank to charge the Company with knowledge that Marl's discharge was in violation of ...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Radio Officers Union of Commercial Telegraphers Union v. National Labor Relations Board National Labor Relations Board v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs Warehousemen Helpers of America Gaynor News Co v. National Labor Relations Board
...6 et seq.; H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 27—28; H.Conf.Rep.No.510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 41. 44 See National Labor Relations Board v. Eclipse Lumber Co., 9 Cir., 199 F.2d 684; Union Starch & Refining Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 7 Cir., 186 F.2d 1008, 27 A.L.R.2d 45 Associated ......
-
National Labor Relations Board v. General Motors Corporation, 404
...Co., 217 F.2d 197 (C.A.5th Cir.); Labor Board v. Philadelphia Iron Works, 211 F.2d 937 (C.A.3d Cir.); Labor Board v. Eclipse Lumber Co., 199 F.2d 684 (C.A.9th Cir.); Utley Company, 108 N.L.R.B. 295, enforced, 217 F.2d 885 (C.A.6th Cir.); Washington Waterfront Employers, 98 N.L.R.B. 284, enf......
-
City of LA. v. Santa Monica Baykeeper
...error. In fact, the only case law from this circuit addressing this issue supports a contrary conclusion. See NLRB v. Eclipse Lumber Co. , 199 F.2d 684, 686 (9th Cir. 1952) ("The Company claims that it is a denial of due process not to give a mandatory right to file a reply brief. We know o......
-
NLRB v. Spector Freight System, Inc.
...Cir., 196 F.2d 500, certiorari denied, 344 U.S. 823, 73 S.Ct. 23, 97 L.Ed. 641 (failure to attend meetings); N. L. R. B. v. Eclipse Lumber Co., 9 Cir., 199 F.2d 684, 36 A.L.R.2d 625 (refusal to picket); The Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 110 N.L.R.B. 918 (dues delinquency); Union Starch ......