National Labor Relations Board v. Electric Vacuum Cleaner Co

Decision Date30 March 1942
Docket NumberNo. 588,588
Citation86 L.Ed. 1120,315 U.S. 685,62 S.Ct. 846
PartiesNATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD v. ELECTRIC VACUUM CLEANER CO., Inc., et al
CourtU.S. Supreme Court

See 316 U.S. 708, 62 S.Ct. 1038, 86 L.Ed. —-.

Messrs. Francis Biddle, Atty. Gen., and Robert B. Watts, of Washington, D.C., for petitioner.

Mr. Lawrence C. Spieth, of Cleveland, Ohio, for respondent Electric Vacuum Cleaner Co., Inc.

Mr. Herbert S. Thatcher, of Washington, D.C., for respondents International Molders' Union, &c., et al.

[Argument of Counsel from page 686 intentionally omitted] Mr. Justice REED delivered the opinion of the Court.

The basic question for determination by this review is the right of the respondent employer, the Electric Vacuum Cleaner Company, Inc., to cooperate with unions, representing an uncoerced majority of its employees, to secure new members. The right is challenged because exercised prior to a closed shop agreement.

The other respondents are various unions, all affiliated with the American Federation of Labor, which we shall call the Affiliates. Since June 22, 1935, these unions have been recognized by the employer as the duly chosen agents of the employees for collective bargaining. On that date the Affiliates and the employer entered into a written contract covering hours and working conditions for the period ending June 23, 1936. A similar contract extended the arrangements to June 23, 1937. In making the latter contract the Affiliates satisfied the employer of their right to represent the workers by exhibiting authorization cards totaling 771 out of the 809 employees affected. These cards gave the Affiliates 'full power and authority' to conclude for the signer 'all agreements as to hours of labor, wages and other employment conditions.' They were to 'remain in full force and effect for one year from date and thereafter, subject to thirty (30) days written notice of my desire to withdraw such power and authority to act for me in the matters referred to herein.' We assume that the cancellation clause is ineffective prior to twelve months from the date of the card and that all cards were dated just prior to the termination of the first or 1935 contract.

In March, 1937, when the contract and the individual powers of attorney still had several months to run, the United Electrical and Radio Workers of America (hereafter called United) affiliated with the Committee for Industrial Organization, began an effort to organize the plant. The Board on adequate evidence found that about sixty employees immediately signed United cards, that on March 19th a meeting of United was held at the Post Office building in East Cleveland, attended by a 'large number of employees,' and that on March 28th another United meeting was held 'by a large number of persons, for the purpose of securing formal resignations from the A.F. of L. Affiliates.' It is undisputed that a United charter was issued to the interested employees for a Local 720, and that on April 2nd the Local notified the employer by letter that a majority of its employees had resigned their memberships in the Affiliates and had 'affiliated' themselves with United. Local 720 claimed in the letter the right to negotiate grievances 'under the existing contract,' i.e., that expiring June 23, 1937. This letter was not received by the employer until April 5th.

Prior to the receipt of this letter and during a shutdown of the plant by the employer, which had begun on Monday, March 22, 1937, pursuant to a request of the Affiliates, dated March 20th, the employer and the Affiliates had entered into an oral arrangement on Saturday, April 3rd, pursuant to which the employer notified its employees it was reopening its plant Monday, April 5th, under the contract expiring the subsequent June 23rd and added 'but only those employees who are members of the crafts under contract with us will be employed.' Eventually a closed shop clause appeared in a bilateral written contract, superseding the one expiring June 23rd, executed as of May 20, 1937, in the following form:

Article III (d) 'The Employer agrees to employ only members of the Unions in good standing in their respective Unions, and should the Employer require more employees than those now employed, the Employer will secure such employees through the Unions, if however, the Unions are unable to furnish such employees, the Employer may secure them elsewhere, it being understood, however, that such employees so secured shall become members of the Union.'

On the reopening of the plant no one was permitted to return to work who did not present a clearance card from the Affiliates. The refusal of the company to reemploy certain members of United Local 720 gave rise to charges of unfair labor practices, which were sustained by the National Labor Relations Board. 18 N.L.R.B. 591. The employer was ordered to cease and desist from discouraging membership in United and encouraging membership in the Affiliates; from giving any effect at any time to paragraph (d) of Article III of the May 20, 1937, agreement, quoted above, requiring a closed shop; from giving any effect to the remainder of the May 20, 1937, agreement upon certification of any other labor organization than the Affiliates as exclusive collective bargaining representative, and from in any manner interfering with its employees' rights to self-organization. The order required affirmative action by the employer for certain employees to the extent of reinstatement and back pay with the usual provisions for posting notices of compliance and notification of the Board. Some other charges and a petition for investigation and certification of bargaining representatives were dismissed without prejudice.1

The respondents successfully contested an enforcement petition. The Circuit Court of Appeals set aside the order, 6 Cir, 120 F.2d 611, on the ground that the refusal to permit members of the United to resume their work was justified because at the time a valid closed shop contract in favor of the Affiliates under § 8(3) of the statute, set out below, was in effect.2 Deeming the issues important in the administration of the Act, we granted certiorari. 314 U.S. 600, 62 S.Ct. 131, 86 L.Ed. -.

In addition to the facts just stated, the Board found there was an oral provision pertaining to a closed shop included in the 1935 and 1936 contracts. This was to the effect, the Board concluded, that all employees hired after the date of the first contract (referred to as new employees) should be required after a work-probation period of two weeks to become members of the appropriate Affiliate union. Respondents contend the oral addition was somewhat different, and that under it not only were new employees compelled to join the Affiliates but old employees (those employed before the first contract) who were or who became members of the Affiliates were required to maintain their membership unimpaired. Respondents' position was upheld by the Circuit Court of Appeals for this and other reasons. The freedom of old employees, under the earlier contracts, to join or not, as they wished, is acknowledged by all.

The Court relied heavily upon the authorizations to bargain3 furnished the Affiliates by the old employees, as indicating the old employees who were members must maintain that status until the year was up. Assuming that every old employee furnished a power of representation for collective bargaining not revocable during the year, it need not be inferred the employee also was bound thereby not to switch his union allegiance. If the employee were forced to await the expiration of the year before changing membership, the first bargaining representative might have a contract for the ensuing year executed before a new representative could be organized and empowered to act. There is nothing in this record to compel such interpretation of the authorizations. With respect to the contract between the employer and the Affiliates, the Board cites the evidence of several, including a letter from the employer's president, written before any controversy arose, to the effect that the oral provision was that new employees must join the Affiliates. From this evidence, the Board was fully justified in reaching its determination that nothing more was agreed. National Labor Relations Board v. Automotive Maintenance Mach. Co., 315 U.S. 282, 62 S.Ct. 608, 86 L.Ed. —-; National Labor Relations Board v. Falk Corp., 308 U.S. 453, 461, 60 S.Ct. 307, 311, 84 L.Ed. 396; National Labor Relations Bd. v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, 303 U.S. 261, 271, 58 S.Ct. 571, 576, 82 L.Ed. 831, 115 A.L.R. 307. There is a difference between being bound to retain the same bargaining representative for a specified period, and being bound not to become a member of a different union during the term of the contract. The first situation, not the second, arose from the earlier contracts.

The commencement of the United campaign for membership in March brought cooperative action between the employer and the Affiliates to strengthen the latter's position. Under the oral contract, as defined by the ruling of the Board, now approved here, new employees could properly be required to become members of the Affiliates but old employees could neither be required to become members nor to maintain their membership. The Board found that to forestall defections of old employees from the Affiliates to the United the employer 'summoned old employees to the office and there sought to, and in many instances was able to, coerce them into joining the A.F. of L. Affiliates.' In the office were representatives of the Affiliates as well as the employer. A number of old men were called before this group. It is not clear from the record which ones had been members of the Affiliates and lost their standing, or which ones had never been members. There were instances of each type. Vitosky had been a member. Ramsey had...

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