National Labor Relations Board v. General Shoe Corp.

• Decision Date: 26 November 1951
• Docket Number: No. 11331.,11331.
• Citation: 192 F.2d 504
• Parties: NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD v. GENERAL SHOE CORP.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

192 F.2d 504 (1951)

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD v. GENERAL SHOE CORP.

No. 11331.

United States Court of Appeals Sixth Circuit.

November 26, 1951.

Samuel M. Singer, Washington, D. C. (George J. Bott, David P. Findling, A. Norman Somers, Samuel M. Singer, all of Washington, D. C., and Leonard S. Kimmell, Cincinnati, Ohio, on the brief), for petitioner.

Cecil Sims, Nashville, Tenn. (Cecil Sims, Nashville, Tenn., on the brief), for respondent.

Before HICKS, Chief Judge, MARTIN and McALLISTER, Circuit Judges.

MARTIN, Circuit Judge.

After careful consideration of the record as a whole and thoughtful study of the authorities cited in the briefs, we have reached the conclusion that the petition of the National Labor Relations Board for enforcement of its order must be granted. We are unable to distinguish, in principle, the present controversy from National Labor Relations Board v. Tappan Stove Company, 6 Cir., 174 F.2d 1007, wherein we reluctantly granted enforcement of the Board's order. The same authorities which impelled our conclusion there are found controlling here.

There is substantial evidence to support the findings of the Labor Board, which adopted with only one inconsequential deviation the findings of the Trial Examiner. The pith of the Board's findings are thus stated in the following paragraph: "Moreover, we are convinced, from the entire record, that the effect of the five nominally separate committees is that of a single employee representation plan dealing with all the matters normally the subject of collective bargaining. As the committees deal with the Respondent concerning grievances, wages, hours of work, and conditions of employment, we find that all of them collectively, as well as each of them separately, including the Finance Committee, constitute labor organizations within the meaning of the Act. The Respondent's interference with, and domination and support of, these committees constitute a continuing obstacle to the full exercise by its employees of their right to self-organization and to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, in violation of Section 8(a) (2) and Section 8(a) (1) of the Act 29 U.S.C.A. § 158(a) (1, 2)."

Actually, there were no controverted issues of fact in the case. The respondent, a Tennessee corporation with its principal office at Nashville, owns and operates eighteen manufacturing plants and three warehouses in Tennessee, Kentucky, Georgia and Alabama, and concedely is engaged in interstate commerce in the manufacture, distribution and sale of shoes and other related leather goods. It has never recognized any labor organization at any of its plants as the bargaining representative of its employees.

The complaint of the Labor Board against the respondent was based upon a charge by Boot and Shoe Workers Union, A. F. of L., that the respondent has engaged in, and is now engaging in, unfair labor practices as defined in the National Labor Relations Act. There were no members of the complaining union in the employ of the respondent corporation. This is immaterial, however, to the right of the Labor Board to issue and maintain the complaint. In National Labor Relations Board v. Indiana & Michigan Electric Co., 318 U.S. 9, 17, 18, 63 S.Ct. 394, 399, 87 L.Ed. 579, the Supreme Court, in reversing the decision of this court, said: "We cannot agree with the view of the Circuit Court of Appeals that the evidence might disqualify Local B-9 from making the charge of violation against the Company or deprive the charge of force and effect, and thereby defeat the Board's jurisdiction to hear the case.

"The Act requires a charge before the Board may issue a complaint, but omits any requirement that the charge be filed by a labor organization or an employee. Italics supplied. In the legislative hearings Senator Wagner, sponsor of the Bill, strongly objected to a limitation on the classes of persons who could lodge complaints with the Board. He said it was often not prudent for the workman himself to make a complaint against his employer, and that strangers to the labor contract were therefore permitted to make the charge. The charge is not proof. It merely sets in motion the machinery of an inquiry. When a Board complaint issues, the question is only the truth of its accusations. The charge does not even serve the purpose of a pleading. Dubious character, evil or unlawful motives, or bad faith of the informer cannot deprive the Board of its jurisdiction to conduct the inquiry." See also Kansas Milling Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 10 Cir., 185 F.2d 413; Consumers Power Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 6 Cir., 113 F.2d 38.

While, as previously stated, no labor union functioned at any of the respondent's plants as a bargaining representative, there were five committees constituted, organized and installed in its plants by the company, namely: Advisory, Grievance, Benefit, Safety, and Finance. The functions of these committees were described in an "Employees Handbook," published by the company and distributed to its various employees. This handbook listed "guaranteed policies, practices and procedures" of the company in relation to personnel. Almost every conceivable kind of suggestion or complaint by employees could be handled by one of these committees. The company, moreover, published and distributed to its employees a newspaper, "The General," and a newsletter, "Keeping Posted."

Employees elected committeemen at regular intervals in the plants during working hours. Such elections were conducted jointly by the personnel office of the company and a member of the Advisory Committee. The time for an election was set by the management; and the ballots used were prepared and furnished by it at the company's expense. Election to membership on the various committees was made by popular vote of the employees and, under respondent's policy or rule, a committee member must have been a non-supervisory employee and a worker in the department in which the election was held. His term of office was six months, or one year, and no employee could be a member of more than one committee. If he were transferred to another department or promoted to a supervisory position, he lost membership on the committee automatically. All committees conducted their business on company time and on company property and were supplied by the employer with stationery and with stenographic, secretarial, bookkeeping and printing services, without charge.

Employee representatives on the five committees were paid at the rate of $1.60 an hour for time spent at committee meetings. This expense was borne by the company with respect to the Advisory, Grievance and Safety Committees, but the members of the...