National Labor Relations Board v. Standard Trouser Co.

• Decision Date: 17 July 1947
• Docket Number: No. 4919.,4919.
• Parties: NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD v. STANDARD TROUSER CO.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

162 F.2d 1012 (1947)

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD v. STANDARD TROUSER CO.

No. 4919.

Circuit Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

July 17, 1947.

Reeves R. Hilton, of Washington, D. C. (Gerhard P. Van Arkel, Gen. Counsel, Morris P. Glushien, Associate Gen. Counsel, A. Norman Somers, Asst. Gen. Counsel, and Dominick L. Manoli, all of Washington, D. C., on the brief), for petitioner.

Whiteford S. Blakeney, of Charlotte, N. C. (Guthrie, Pierce & Blakeney, of Charlotte, N. C., on the brief), for respondent.

Before PARKER, SOPER, and DOBIE, Circuit Judges.

DOBIE, Circuit Judge.

The National Labor Relations Board (hereinafter called the Board) in June, 1946, filed a petition in this Court, asking that the Standard Trouser Company, (hereinafter called Standard), and certain of its officers and agents, be adjudged in contempt of a decree of this Court entered March 9, 1942. This decree directed that

"Standard Trouser Company, Buckhannon, West Virginia, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall cease and desist from:

"(a) In any manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing its employees in the exercise of their right to form, join or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection."

The Board's petition to adjudge Standard, its officers and agents in contempt alleges that they have violated the injunction contained in the decree by (1) making statements and threats tending to discourage employees from membership and activity in the Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, C. I. O. (hereinafter called the Amalgamated); (2) refusing to meet with the Amalgamated, as representative of Standard's employees, or to permit the superintendent of their plant to do so, for the purpose of discussing grievances; (3) unilaterally granting concessions to the employees without first advising or conferring with the Amalgamated as representative of the employees; (4) refusing to bargain collectively in good faith with the Amalgamated as the duly certified and exclusive representative of Standard's employees; and (5) discriminatorily laying off and/or discharging five employees because of their activity in promoting the Amalgamated.

Standard filed an answer, also a motion to dismiss. We overruled the motion to dismiss and referred the matter to the Honorable Haymond Maxwell, Senior, as Special Master, to "hear relevant evidence on the issues of fact raised by the petition and the answer as to whether the respondents, or any of them, have wilfully violated the decree of this court entered in this cause on March 9, 1942, and to report the evidence to this court with his findings of fact and conclusions of law."

The Special Master conducted an elaborate hearing at Buckhannon, West Virginia, at which he heard the testimony of witnesses produced by the Board and Standard. Briefs were filed by the parties. After due consideration, the Special Master filed an extended report, concluding:

"Upon consideration of all that appears above herein, the Special Master is of opinion that the respondents are not shown to have violated the injunction of March 9, 1942; therefore,

"The Special Master recommends that this Honorable Court exonerate the respondents of the contempt which has been charged against them by the petitioner."

Thereupon, the Board filed exceptions to the Special Master's report and moved us to set the report aside, while Standard moved that the report be confirmed. We think the motion of the Board must be denied and that the motion of Standard must be granted.

Three principles of law, quite important here, should be noted at the outset. (1) A showing of contempt requires something more than a mere preponderance of evidence; a rather heavy burden rests upon the party urging contempt, and clear and convincing proof is necessary. Oriel v. Russell, 278 U.S. 358, 364, 49 S.Ct. 173, 73 L.Ed. 419; Kansas City Power & Light Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 8 Cir., 137 F.2d 77, 79; National Labor Relations Board v. Tupelo Garment Co., 5 Cir., 122 F.2d 603, 606. (2) The findings of a Special Master should be set aside by a court only if these findings are clearly erroneous. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 53(e) (2), 28 U.S.C.A. following section 723c; Polish National Alliance v. National Labor Relations Board, 7 Cir., 159 F. 2d 38. (3) The Special Master, who saw and heard the witnesses and could observe their demeanor while testifying, is in a better position than a court to pass on the credibility of witnesses. Wallace Corporation v. National Labor Relations Board, 4 Cir., 159 F.2d 952, 954; National Labor Relations Board v. Arcade-Sunshine Co., 76 U.S.App.D.C., 312, 132 F.2d 8.

In the light of these principles, we discuss very briefly the findings of the Special Master on the five points set out in the petition of the Board.

1. Threats and Statements of Standard's Officers Tending to Discourage Membership in Amalgamated.

There was here, as in almost every aspect of the instant case, conflicting testimony. The Special Master reviewed every incident set out by the Board, particularly the statements alleged to have been made by the Lerners, and Plant Superintendents, Walker and Stevenson. We cannot properly interfere because the Special Master, as to these statements, in the main believed the witnesses whose testimony was on the side of Standard rather than the witnesses who favored the Board. A detailed review of this testimony would serve no useful purpose. The evidence found by the Special Master to be credible is ample warrant for his finding that there were no threats or statements...