National Labor Relations Board v. Williams

• Decision Date: 01 April 1952
• Docket Number: No. 6370.,6370.
• Citation: 195 F.2d 669
• Parties: NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD v. WILLIAMS et al.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

195 F.2d 669 (1952)

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD v. WILLIAMS et al.

No. 6370.

United States Court of Appeals Fourth Circuit.

Argued March 6, 1952.

Decided April 1, 1952.

Arnold Ordman, Attorney, National Labor Relations Board, Washington, D. C. (George J. Bott, Gen. Counsel, David P. Findling, Associate Gen. Counsel, A. Norman Somers, Asst. Gen. Counsel, National Labor Relations Board, Washington, D. C., and Rosanna A. Blake, Atty., National Labor Relations Board, Takoma Park, Md., on the brief), for petitioner.

Isadore S. Bernstein, Columbia, S. C. (Randolph Murdaugh, Hampton, S. C., and Henry H. Edens, Columbia, S. C., on the brief), for respondents.

Before PARKER, Chief Judge, and SOPER and DOBIE, Circuit Judges.

DOBIE, Circuit Judge.

This is a petition by the National Labor Relations Board (hereinafter called the Board) for the enforcement of its order issued against L. J. Williams, doing business as the L. J. Williams Lumber Company, and Ada W. Williams, doing business as the Varnville Wood Products Company, following the usual procedure under section 10 of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, 61 Stat. 136, 29 U.S.C.A. § 160.

The Board found that the respondents had violated section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 158(a)(1, 5), by refusing, upon request, to bargain collectively with Plywood and Veneer Workers Local Unions No. 3130 and 3135 of the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, A. F. of L. (hereinafter called the Union), after the Union had been certified by the Board as the proper exclusive representative of the respondents' employees. The Board also found that the respondents had violated section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 158(a)(1, 3), by interfering with, restraining, and coercing their employees in the exercise of their rights guaranteed them in Section 7 of the Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 157, and by discriminating against three employees in particular.

We are called upon to decide (1) whether the Board's determination of the appropriate bargaining unit was reasonable and (2) whether the Board's findings are supported by substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole. We think that both these questions must be answered in the affirmative.

The two respondents both have their principal offices and places of business in Varnville, South Carolina. The Williams Company is engaged in the manufacture of pine lumber, the Varnville Company in hardwood dimension stock. On July 20, 1949, the Union, pursuant to an organizational campaign among respondents' employees, petitioned the Board for certification as the exclusive bargaining representative of the employees of both companies. The respondents opposed the Union's petition on the ground that the employees of the two companies should be regarded as separate bargaining units.

Thereafter, a representation hearing was held and testimony taken as to the operation of the businesses of the respondents. Upon the basis of this testimony, the Board found as follows:

"L. J. Williams is the owner and manager of Williams, and is the general manager of Varnville, which is owned by Ada W. Williams, his wife * * *. Williams\' plant consists of three buildings, and Varnville\'s plant consists of five. All are located on a single tract of land, and, together with their machinery and equipment, are owned by Ada Williams. For his use of the buildings and machinery, L. J. Williams pays his wife rent in the form of fuel, consisting of waste lumber from his plant, for the steam boilers required by both companies. Otherwise there are no sales or exchanges of materials between the companies.

"The two companies share a single office building, as well as a single heat and steam plant. They jointly employ one head bookkeeper and each pays one-third of his salary. The assistant bookkeeper is employed by Williams but spends about 10 percent of his time working for Varnville. The wages of the firemen who fire the boilers and those of the watchman and saw filer are paid by the two companies in equal shares.

"Each company, although under the general supervision of L. J. Williams, is separately directed by a superintendent who has complete charge of all the various operations of that company, including the hire and discharge of its employees. Each superintendent pays the employees under his direction with funds drawn upon a joint account carried by the two companies. The checks, of different colors for each company, are signed by the superintendent and countersigned by the head bookkeeper. Although there is no interchange of employees between the companies, the rates of pay and other conditions of employment in the two concerns are the same.

"In view of the close proximity and single ownership of plants and equipment, and the common overall management of both businesses, together with the joint employment of some employees within the unit, we find that the employees of the two companies may appropriately be joined in a single unit for the purpose of collective bargaining."

Pursuant to this finding, the Board designated the employees of both companies as a single bargaining unit, and directed an election which the Union won by a vote of 60 to 4. Thereupon the Union was duly certified by the Board as the exclusive bargaining agent for the unit.

As we stated in National Labor Relations Board v. Clarksburg Publishing Company, 4 Cir., 120 F.2d 976, 980:

"Subsection 9(b) of the Act, 29 U.S. C.A. § 159(b) gives the Board power to determine the appropriate group of employees for the bargaining unit; and a decision of the Board as to the appropriate unit cannot be disturbed unless the Board exercises the power conferred on it in an arbitrary and unreasonable manner."

See, also, Packard Motor Car Company v. National Labor Relations Board, 330 U.S. 485, 491-492, 67 S.Ct. 789, 793, 91 L.Ed. 1040, 1050; May Department Stores Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 326 U.S. 376, 380, 66 S.Ct. 203, 206, 90 L.Ed. 145, 151.

This principle has been left untouched by the 1947 amendments to the Act. See Mueller Brass Company v. National Labor Relations Board, 86 U.S.App.D.C. 153, 180 F.2d 402, 404; National Labor Relations Board v. Continental Oil Company, 10 Cir., 179 F.2d 552, 554-555. In the light of all the evidence we cannot say that the Board's determination of the present bargaining unit was unreasonable and arbitrary.

The respondents, however, urge upon us a change in their operations since the first...