National Lock Co. v. Chicago Regional Labor Board

• Decision Date: 05 January 1934
• Docket Number: No. 446.,446.
• Citation: 8 F. Supp. 820
• Parties: NATIONAL LOCK CO. v. CHICAGO REGIONAL LABOR BOARD et al.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois

8 F. Supp. 820

NATIONAL LOCK CO. v. CHICAGO REGIONAL LABOR BOARD et al.

No. 446.

District Court, N. D. Illinois, W. D.

January 5, 1934.

Dwight H. Green, U. S. Dist. Atty., and Leo Hassenauer, Asst. U. S. Dist. Atty., both of Chicago, Ill., for Chicago Regional Labor Board.

Hall & Dusher, of Rockford, Ill., for National Lock Co.

WOODWARD, District Judge.

This suit in equity was commenced in the Winnebago county, Ill., circuit court to enjoin the defendants from conducting any hearing or making any report or making any finding or statement of any kind with reference to the walkout on August 31, 1933, of plaintiff's then employees. Upon the presentation of the bill to the judge of the circuit court of Winnebago county, a temporary injunction was issued. The defendants moved in the circuit court to remove the cause to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Western Division, which motion, the court infers, was denied. Thereupon, the defendants procured a transcript of the record of the circuit court of Winnebago county and filed the transcript in the office of the clerk of this court.

The defendants filed a motion to dissolve the temporary injunction. Plaintiff filed a cross-motion to remand the cause to the circuit court of Winnebago county. The court was of the view that the questions raised by the motion to remand should first be determined and directed an argument on the question of remanding. The court has heard oral arguments and has also been furnished with written briefs of counsel.

In substance the bill avers that the plaintiff is an industrial corporation having its principal place of business at Rockford; that the defendant Chicago Regional Labor Board is a voluntary or appointive board, the exact nature of which is unknown to plaintiff; that the defendant Lapp purports to be the executive or acting secretary of said board; that the defendant Mullenbach is in some manner connected with the board as mediator or otherwise, the exact nature of which is unknown to plaintiff; that the defendant Hutchins is supposed to be chairman of the board.

The plaintiff maintains a manufacturing plant at Rockford and now and prior to August 31, 1933, employed several hundred persons in its manufacturing business. On August 31, 1933, certain of plaintiff's employees left plaintiff's employment without having presented any demands with reference to wages, hours of work, or working conditions which had not been promptly attended to and without any unadjusted claims or demands by the plaintiff and its employees. Later a larger number of the employees who walked out on August 31, 1933, returned and have been re-employed by the plaintiff, but a small group has refused to return and insisted upon annoying the plaintiff. The plaintiff now has in its employ as many persons as it can conveniently use in the prosecution of its business.

The bill then avers that the small group of former employees have persistently attempted to annoy and harass the plaintiff and have made representations to a board called the National Labor Board and requested the labor board to conduct some investigation or have some hearing or make some finding of some kind. The bill further avers that the organization's functions and powers, both of the National Labor Board and the Chicago Regional Labor Board, are unknown to the plaintiff. The bill then avers that the plaintiff on November 14, 1933, received a notice in writing signed by the Chicago Regional Labor Board by John A. Lapp, acting secretary, stating that the Chicago Regional Labor Board, representing the National Labor Board, is desirous of obtaining all the facts concerning the industrial dispute between the plaintiff, National Lock Company, and its employees, and with that end in view the Chicago Regional Labor Board would come to Rockford to hear both sides of the case on November 17, 1933. The plaintiff avers that there is no industrial dispute or disturbance at plaintiff's plant and that any hearing by the labor board would tend to disturb the peace and happiness of the community of Rockford and cause unemployment instead of employment. Paragraph 12 of plaintiff's bill provides as follows:

"That said board and all persons connected with it, should not in any way annoy or harass or disturb your orator by any purported hearing, by any report or conclusion or finding and that to do so will be an invasion of the Constitutional rights of your orator in the pursuit of its business and will deprive your orator of its property and business without due process of law, and will deny to your orator the equal protection of the law as said rights are guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the State of Illinois."

The bill then prays for a writ of injunction, temporary and permanent, as hereinbefore set out.

The petition for removal states that the defendants are officers and agents of the Chicago Regional Labor Board created and acting by and under the authority and direction of the National Labor Board pursuant to the power conferred under title 1 of the National Industrial Recovery Act, approved June 16, 1933, 11:55 a. m. (15 USCA § 701 et seq.). The petition further avers that the Chicago Regional Labor Board was created by executive order of the President on August 5, 1933, under the power and authority vested in the President under title 1, § 2, of the National Industrial Recovery Act (15 USCA § 702). The officers of the Chicago Regional Labor Board are officers of the United States.

Paragraph 9 of the petition reads as follows:

"That the acts alleged to be threatened to be done by your petitioners are alleged to be threatened to be done at a time when they were engaged in the discharge of their lawfully authorized duties as officers and agents of the Chicago Regional Labor Board and of the United States, and while said officers were engaged in their discharge of their official duties as such officers and agents in making and attempting to make an investigation concerning a violation of the National Industrial Recovery Act, as aforesaid, and while reporting and preparing to report the results of said investigation to said National Labor Board in accordance and in compliance with regulations made in conformity to the provisions of the National Industrial Recovery Act."

The petition then avers that the defendants were directed and authorized by the National Labor Board to investigate and report the results of an investigation and hearing in regard to the industrial dispute at the National Lock Company since August 31, 1933.

Paragraph 12 of the petition reads as follows:

"That this is a suit of a civil nature, in equity, arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States, of which the district courts of the United States are given original jurisdiction, and that the matter in dispute exceeds the sum of Three Thousand Dollars, exclusive of interest and costs, and as such may be removed to the District Court of the United States for the Northern District of Illinois, Western Division thereof, as provided in title 28, USCA, section 71 thereof."

The petition then avers that the controversy is with the defendants as officers of the United States and involves them in the exercise of their official functions as officers and agents of the Chicago Regional Labor Board. The petition then prays for the removal of the cause.

The pertinent statutes are as follows:

"Any suit of a civil nature, at law or in equity, arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States, * * * of which the district courts of the United States are given original jurisdiction, in any State court, may be removed by the defendant or defendants therein to the district court of the United States for the proper district." 28 USCA § 71.

"Whenever any cause shall be removed from any State court into any district court of the United States, and the district court shall decide that the cause was improperly removed, and order the same to be remanded to the State court from whence it came, such remand shall be immediately carried into execution, and no appeal or writ of error from the decision of the district court so remanding such cause shall be allowed." 28 USCA § 71.

It will be noted that all cases arising under the laws of the United States are not removable. By the express terms of the statute, only those "of which the district courts of the United States are given original jurisdiction" are removable. What, then, are the cases arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States, of which the District Courts are given original jurisdiction?

"The district courts shall have original jurisdiction as follows:

"(1) First. Of all suits of a civil nature, at common law or in equity, brought by the United States, or by any officer thereof authorized by law to use; * * * or, where the matter in controversy exceeds, exclusive of interest and costs, the sum or value of $3,000, and (a) arises under the Constitution or laws of the United...