National Motor Fleets, Inc. v. Brown

• Decision Date: 25 July 1968
• Docket Number: 6 Div. 552
• Citation: 213 So.2d 570,282 Ala. 572
• Parties: NATIONAL MOTOR FLEETS, INC. v. Bradley BROWN, Director, Dept. of Revenue, Jefferson County.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Page 570

213 So.2d 570

282 Ala. 572

NATIONAL MOTOR FLEETS, INC. v. Bradley BROWN, Director, Dept. of Revenue, Jefferson County.

6 Div. 552.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

July 25, 1968.

Rehearing Denied Aug. 22, 1968.

Deramus & Johnston, Birmingham, for appellant.

MacDonald Gallion, Atty. Gen., Willard W. Livingston and Wm. H. Burton, Asst. Attys. Gen., for appellee.

COLEMAN, Justice.

Appellant, owner and lessor of a motor vehicle, appeals from a judgment denying appellant's application for mandamus to require the licensing authority sell to appellant a vehicle license for $250.00 instead of $500.00. Appellant will sometimes be referred to as taxpayer.

Taxpayer is the owner of a truck tractor having a gross vehicle weight of 72,000 pounds. Taxpayer has leased the vehicle to a lessee who operates the truck tractor exclusively to carry lessee's own products. Lessee has not hauled the property of others in the leased vehicle. Lessee furnishes its own driver and has exclusive control over the driver and the use of the truck tractor. Lessee does not haul anything for compensation or for hire. The facts are substantially identical with the facts in Brown v. National Motor Fleets, Inc., 276 Ala. 493, 164 So.2d 489. There has been a change, however, in the licensing statute.

The license tax is levied by the state on trucks and truck tractors, used on the public highways of this state, under § 697, Title 51, Code 1940, as amended by Act No. 580, 1967 Acts, Vol. II, page 1343. ¹ As amended, § 697 divides trucks and truck tractors into two classes.

By the terms of subsection (a), a tax is levied on all trucks and truck tractors which are not taxed under subsection (b). In subsection (b), a tax is levied on trucks and truck tractors 'used . . . to transport goods . . . of any kind . . . for compensation of any kind, or operated under any rental, lease or other agreement where compensation is charged for the use of such vehicle . . .,' with certain specified exceptions. The vehicles taxed are thus divided into two general classes. Under subsection (a) are taxed vehicles not operated for compensation or under a lease agreement where compensation is charged for use of the vehicle. Under subsection (b) are taxed vehicles which are operated for compensation or under a lease agreement where compensation is charged for use of the vehicle. In both subsections, the price of the license is graduated according to the weight of the vehicle. The price is higher for most vehicles under subsection (b). As we understand the case, taxpayer contends that, for the 72,000-pound truck tractor here involved, it is due to pay only $250.00 under subsection (a) and not $500.00 under subsection (b). Taxpayer argues three propositions to support its contention.

1.

Appellant contends that § 697[b], as amended, does not apply to appellant's vehicle.

§ 697(b), as amended by Act No. 580, recites in pertinent part:

'(b) For each truck or truck-tractor . . . which are (sic) used on public highways of this State to transport goods . . . for compensation of any kind, or Operated under any rental, lease or other agreement where compensation is charged for the use of such vehicle, . . . shall pay the following licenses:' (Emphasis Supplied);

which language is followed by the table setting out on a graduated scale the weights of vehicle and the tax due, respectively, for the various weights. Appellant's vehicle is used on the public highways of this state to transport goods and is operated under a lease agreement where compensation is charged for use of the vehicle. We think the quoted language of § 697(b) plainly imposes a license tax on appellant's vehicle.

Appellant appears to argue in brief that we held in Brown v. National Motor Fleets, Inc., 276 Ala. 493, 164 So.2d 489, that the same or similar language did not apply to trucks leased pursuant to a bona fide lease, citing the opinion on second rehearing.

We do not agree. On first rehearing, we said:

'The term 'operate for hire' has a well-known and definite meaning in the jurisprudence of this country. The term means in law, in commercial usage, and in ordinary parlance, the transportation of persons or property for compensation and could not possibly apply to a lessor, such as the appellee, which leases the vehicles to a lessee to carry his own goods or products. (Citations Omitted)

'The fact that Section (b) in the body of the Act purports to enlarge the definition of 'for hire' is inefficacious to render the appellee liable for the license since the enlarged definition is directly conflictory with the Title of the Act which gives no notice of this broad definition and, as to this appellee, the enlargement of the definition contains more than one subject and would be unconstitutional under Section 45.

'. . .

'We are at the conclusion that the Act is broader than the Title and, therefore, that part which is within both the Title and the body of the Act will stand, while that part not indicated by the Title will fall. (Citations Omitted)' (276 Ala. at pages 494 and 495, 164 So.2d at page 490)

The holding was that, although the language in the Body of Act No. 672 (considered in 276 Ala. 493, 164 So.2d 489, supra), included leased vehicles, the Title of Act No. 672 did not include leased vehicles, and, therefore Act No. 672 violated the requirement of Section 45 of the Constitution that the subject of the act 'shall be clearly expressed in its title.'

Appellant argues that, because appellee mailed to appellant, and others, certain forms or notices indicating that appellant's vehicle would be taxed under § 697(a) instead of § 697(b), it is not clearly apparent that, or is at least doubtful whether, the language of Act No. 580 shows a legislative intent to tax appellant's vehicle under amended § 697(b). We will not undertake to explain or understand why such notices were mailed, but we think it is beyond dispute that the language of the statute, and not the notices, must determine the law which controls this decision.

We are of opinion that § 697(b), as amended, does apply to a leased vehicle which is used to haul exclusively the property of lessee, including appellant's vehicle, and that appellant's first contention is not sustained.

2.

Appellant's second contention is that if § 697[b] be construed to apply to a leased vehicle used to haul exclusively the property of lessee, than § 697(b) conflicts with § 1 and § 35 of the Constitution of 1901, and, therefore, is invalid. Appellant contends that classifying such a leased vehicle with vehicles operated for hire, and classifying vehicles operated to haul exclusively the goods of the vehicle owner at a lower tax rate under § 697(a), constitute an arbitrary and unreasonable classification which offends constitutional requirements governing classification for taxation. This court has said:

'It has been repeatedly held that 'In levying a privilege or license tax as to trades, businesses or occupations, the legislature may not discriminate between members of the same class, and the tax must not be so exorbitant as to prohibit or unreasonably restrain or oppress legitimate and useful trades, businesses or occupations, that are not productive of disorder or injurious to the public. In applying the tax the classification or reclassification cannot be arbitrary, fanciful or capricious, but must have a substantial basis as distinguished from a mere fictitious or fanciful basis. Aside from these restrictions, the legislative power is unrestrained. (Citations Omitted)'

"Tests for the determination of the operation or administration of a law or ordinance as to a classification contained therein within the Constitutions, state and federal, are that the class (1) must be germane to the purpose of the law; (2) must bring within its influence all who are under the same conditions and apply equally to each person or member of the class, or each person or member who may become one of such class; (3) must not be so restricted and made to rest upon existing circumstances only as not to include proper additions to the number included within the class; (4) must be based on substantial distinctions which make one class different from another; and (5) must be reasonable under the facts of the case, and not oppressive and prohibitive. (Citations Omitted) This is necessary to secure uniformity in the operation, administration, and proper distribution of the burden of government. Ex parte Smith, 212 Ala. 262, 102 So. 122; Republic I. & S. Co. v. State, 204 Ala. 469, 86 So. 65.' Woco Pep Co. of Montgomery v. City of Montgomery, 213 Ala. 452, 105 So. 214, 218.

'Statutory discrimination between classes must be presumed to be relevant to a permissible legislative purpose and will not be deemed to be a denial of equal protection if any state of facts could be conceived which would support it. (Citations Omitted)

'As pointed out in Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495, 57 S.Ct. 868, 872, 81 L.Ed. 1245, 'A state legislature, in the enactment of laws, has the widest possible latitude within the limits of the Constitution. In the nature of the case it cannot record a complete catalogue of the considerations which move its members to enact laws. In the absence of such a record courts cannot assume that its action is capricious, or that, with its informed acquaintance with local conditions to which the legislation is to be applied, it was not aware of facts which afford reasonable basis for its action. Only by faithful adherence to this guiding principle of judicial review of legislation is it possible to preserve to the legislative branch its rightful independence and its ability to function. '' State v. Pure Oil Co., 256 Ala. 534, 538, 539, 55 So.2d 843, 846.

The question presented is whether the legislature, in conformity with constitutional requirements for equal protection and against arbitrary discrimination, can classify appellant's vehicle with...