National Pork Producers Council v. Ross
| Decision Date | 11 May 2023 |
| Docket Number | 21-468 |
| Parties | 598 U.S. ____ (2023) v. KAREN ROSS, in her official capacity as SECRETARY OF THE CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF FOOD & AGRICULTURE, et al. NATIONAL PORK PRODUCERS COUNCIL, et al., PETITIONERS |
| Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
This case involves a challenge to a California law known as Proposition 12, which as relevant here forbids the in-state sale of whole pork meat that comes from breeding pigs (or their immediate offspring) that are "confined in a cruel manner." Cal. Health &Safety Code Ann §25990(b)(2). Confinement is "cruel" if it prevents a pig from "lying down, standing up, fully extending [its] limbs, or turning around freely." §25991(e)(1). Prior to the vote on Proposition 12, proponents suggested the law would benefit animal welfare and consumer health, and opponents claimed that existing farming practices did better than Proposition 12 protecting animal welfare (for example, by preventing pig-on-pig aggression) and ensuring consumer health (by avoiding contamination). Shortly after Proposition 12's adoption two organiza-tions-the National Pork Producers Council and the American Farm Bureau Federation (petitioners)-filed this lawsuit on behalf of their members who raise and process pigs alleging that Proposition 12 violates the U.S. Constitution by impermissibly burdening interstate commerce. Petitioners estimated that the cost of compliance with Proposition 12 will increase production costs and will fall on both California and out-of-state producers. But because California imports almost all the pork it consumes, most of Proposition 12's compliance costs will be borne by out-of-state firms. The district court held that petitioners' complaint failed to state a claim as a matter of law and dismissed the case. The Ninth Circuit affirmed.
Held The judgment of the Ninth Circuit is affirmed. 6 F. 4th 1021 affirmed.
JUSTICE GORSUCH delivered the opinion of the Court, except as to Parts IV-B, IV-C, and IV-D, rejecting petitioners' theories that would place Proposition 12 in violation of the dormant Commerce Clause even though petitioners do not allege the law purposefully discrimi- nates against out-of-state economic interests. Pp. 5-17, 27-29.
(a) The Constitution vests Congress with the power to "regulate Commerce . . . among the several States." Art. I §8, cl. 3. Although Congress may seek to exercise this power to regulate the interstate trade of pork, and many pork producers have urged Congress to do so, Congress has yet to adopt any statute that might displace Proposition 12 or laws regulating pork production in other States. Petitioners' litigation theory thus rests on the dormant Commerce Clause theory, pursuant to which the Commerce Clause not only vests Congress with the power to regulate interstate trade, but also "contain[s] a further, negative command," one effectively forbidding the enforcement of "certain state [economic regulations] even when Congress has failed to legislate on the subject." Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 179. This Court has held that state laws offend this dormant aspect of the Commerce Clause when they seek to "build up . . . domestic commerce" through "burdens upon the industry and business of other States." Guy v. Baltimore, 100 U.S. 434, 443. At the same time, though, the Court has reiterated that, absent purposeful discrimination, "a State may exclude from its territory, or prohibit the sale therein of any articles which, in its judgment, fairly exercised, are prejudicial to" the interests of its citizens. Ibid.
The antidiscrimination principle lies at the "very core" of the Court's dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence. Camps New-found/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 581. This Court has said that the Commerce Clause prohibits the enforcement of state laws "driven by . . . 'economic protectionism-that is, regulatory measures designed to benefit in-state economic interests by burdening out-of-state competitors.'" Department of Revenue of Ky. v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 337-338 (quoting New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 273-274). Petitioners here disavow any discrimination-based claim, conceding that Proposition 12 imposes the same burdens on in-state pork producers that it imposes on out-ofstate pork producers. Pp. 5-8.
(b) Given petitioners' concession that Proposition 12 does not implicate the antidiscrimination principle, petitioners first invoke what they call the "extraterritoriality doctrine." They contend that the Court's dormant Commerce Clause cases suggest an additional and "almost per se" rule forbidding enforcement of state laws that have the "practical effect of controlling commerce outside the State," even when those laws do not purposely discriminate against out-of-state interests.
Petitioners further insist that Proposition 12 offends this "almost per se" rule because the law will impose substantial new costs on out-ofstate pork producers who wish to sell their products in California. Petitioners contend the rule they propose follows ineluctably from three cases: Healy v. Beer Institute, 491 U.S. 324; Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Authority, 476 U.S. 573; and Baldwin v. G. A. F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511. But a close look at those cases reveals that each typifies the familiar concern with preventing purposeful discrimination against out-of-state economic interests. In Baldwin, a New York law that barred out-of-state dairy farmers from selling their milk in the State for less than the minimum price New York law guaranteed in-state producers "plainly discriminate[d]" against out-of-staters by "erecting an economic barrier protecting a major local industry against competition from without the State." Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354 (discussing Baldwin). In Brown-Forman, a New York law that required liquor distillers to affirm that their in-state prices were no higher than their out-of-state prices impermissibly sought to force out-of-state distillers to "surrender" whatever cost advantages they enjoyed against their in-state rivals, which amounted to economic protectionism. 476 U.S., at 580.
The Court reached a similar conclusion in Healy, which involved a Connecticut law that required out-of-state beer merchants to affirm that their in-state prices were no higher than those they charged in neighboring States. 491 U.S., at 328-330. As the Court later explained, "[t]he essential vice in laws" like Connecticut's is that they "hoard" commerce "for the benefit of" in-state merchants and discourage consumers from crossing state lines to make their purchases from nearby out-of-state vendors. C &A Carbone, Inc. v. Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 391-392.
Petitioners insist that Baldwin, Brown-Forman, and Healy taken together suggest an "almost per se" rule against state laws with "extraterritorial effects." While petitioners point to language in these cases pertaining to the "practical effect" of the challenged laws on out-of-state commerce and prices, "the language of an opinion is not always to be parsed as though we were dealing with language of a statute." Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 341. The language highlighted by petitioners in Baldwin, Brown-Forman, and Healy appeared in a particular context and did particular work. A close look at those cases reveals nothing like the "almost per se" rule against laws that have the "practical effect" of "controlling" extraterritorial commerce that petitioners posit, and indeed petitioners' reading would cast a shadow over laws long understood to represent valid exercises of the States' constitutionally reserved powers. Baldwin, Brown-Forman, and Healy did not mean to do so much. In rejecting petitioners' "almost per se" theory the Court does not mean to trivialize the role territory and sovereign boundaries play in the federal system; the Constitution takes great care to provide rules for fixing and changing state borders. Art. IV, §3, cl. 1. Courts must sometimes referee disputes about where one State's authority ends and another's begins-both inside and outside the commercial context. Indeed, the antidiscrimination principle found in the Court's dormant Commerce Clause cases may well represent one more effort to mediate competing claims of sovereign authority under our horizontal separation of powers. But none of this means, as petitioners suppose, that any question about the ability of a State to project its power extraterritorially must yield to an "almost per se" rule under the dormant Commerce Clause. This Court has never before claimed so much "ground for judicial supremacy under the banner of the dormant Commerce Clause." United Haulers Assn., Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Management Authority, 550 U.S. 330, 346-347. Pp. 8-14.
(c) Petitioners next point to Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, which they assert requires a court to at least assess" 'the burden imposed on interstate commerce'" by a state law and prevent its enforcement if the law's burdens are" 'clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.'" Brief for Petitioners 44. Petitioners provide a litany of reasons why they believe the benefits Proposition 12 secures for Californians do not outweigh the costs it imposes on out-of-state economic interests.
Petitioners overstate the extent to which Pike and its progeny depart from the antidiscrimination rule that lies at the core of the Court's dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence. As this Court has previously explained, "no clear line" separates the Pike line of cases from core antidiscrimination precedents. General Motors Corp v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278,...
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