National Rifle Ass'n v. Dayton Newspapers, Inc.

• Decision Date: 01 February 1983
• Docket Number: No. C-3-79-436.,C-3-79-436.
• Parties: NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION, Plaintiff, v. DAYTON NEWSPAPERS, INC., dba Dayton Daily News, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Ohio

555 F. Supp. 1299

NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION, Plaintiff, v. DAYTON NEWSPAPERS, INC., dba Dayton Daily News, et al., Defendants.

No. C-3-79-436.

United States District Court, S.D. Ohio, W.D.

February 1, 1983.

David H. Martin, Washington, D.C., Richard E. Gardiner, National Rifle Ass'n of America, Washington, D.C., William R. Coen, Dayton, Ohio, for plaintiff.

Robert P. Bartlett, Charles Horn, Dayton, Ohio, for defendants.

DECISION AND ENTRY SUSTAINING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; JUDGMENT TO BE ENTERED FOR DEFENDANTS; TERMINATION ENTRY

RICE, District Judge.

I. Introduction

On December 21, 1979, the National Rifle Association (NRA) instituted the present defamation action against Dayton Newspapers, Inc., a corporation which publishes the Dayton Daily News, and against several employees of the Dayton Daily News,¹ based on the publication in the Dayton Daily News on December 28, 1978, of an editorial entitled "NRA again murders good sense."² In addition, the NRA sued Springfield Newspapers, Inc., a corporation which publishes the Springfield Daily News, and several employees of that newspaper,³ based on the Springfield Daily News' reprinting of the foregoing editorial under the title "NRA Power."

According to the Complaint, the NRA is a non-profit New York corporation, "dedicated to protecting and defending the inalienable right of the people to keep and bear arms as set forth in the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution."⁴ The NRA, which as of May 13, 1980, had approximately 1,794,304 members,⁵ publishes three magazines, The American Rifleman, The American Hunter, and The American Marksman, which as of December 9, 1980, had a combined total circulation of approximately 1,954,000.⁶ With regard to the issue of gun control, the NRA has opposed the individual registration of firearms, and has objected to any law which would require individuals to register firearms.⁷ The editorial which is the subject of the present lawsuit is, in general, a derisive comment on the NRA's opposition to, and the subsequent withdrawal of former President Carter's nomination of Norval Morris for the position of Administrator of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA). The editorial is sarcastic in tone and is sharply critical of the NRA's stance on the appointment of Morris, who advocated more stringent gun control and the decriminalization of certain "victimless" crimes.

Based on the publication of this editorial, the NRA initiated the present action, alleging in Count I of the Complaint that the Defendant Dayton Newspapers, Inc., and its employees had printed certain false statements of fact with knowledge of their falsity and in reckless disregard of their falsity. Specifically, the following "facts" are alleged to be untrue:

Said editorial stated as fact that Plaintiff, National Rifle Association, happily encourages murders and robberies....

....

Said editorial intended to convey as fact that the National Rifle Association, to sell guns and acquire financing from the manufacturers of guns, happily encourages murders and robberies: by promoting the sale of guns to known criminals and assassins, such as Lee Harvey Oswald, the Reverend Jim Jones and Richard Speck; by promoting the sale of guns to assorted punks for use in robbing gas stations, convenience stores and individual citizens of their assets; and by acting to prevent the police and courts from concentrating on these crimes; while continuing to sell guns and express false sorrow for the victims of the crimes it encourages.

Complaint, Doc. # 1, ¶s 16 and 18. The Second Count of the Complaint repeats the above allegations in connection with the purported liability of Springfield Newspapers, Inc., and its employees for the verbatim republication of the NRA editorial in the Springfield Daily News on January 6, 1979.⁸ In addition, the Complaint invokes the jurisdiction of this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1), based on the diverse citizenship of the Plaintiff and all Defendants.

The Defendants filed an Answer to the Complaint on January 23, 1980, and subsequently, on January 30, 1981, filed the motion for summary judgment which is presently under consideration. Defendants have submitted an extensive memorandum in support of their summary judgment motion, and have attached thereto various affidavits and exhibits. See, Doc. # 10 and Ex. A-H. On March 11, 1981, Plaintiff filed a memorandum in opposition to the Defendants' motion for summary judgment, and included therewith the affidavits of four officers employed by the NRA. See, Doc. # 14, Ex. 1-4. Finally, on March 23, 1981, Defendants submitted a reply memorandum responding to those points raised by Plaintiff's memorandum, and the Court then took the matter under advisement. It should be noted that in ruling upon the Defendants' motion, the Court has considered not only the materials referred to above, but has also examined the depositions of various employees of the Plaintiff and the Defendants, all of which have been properly filed herein as directed by Fed.R. Civ.P. 30(f).⁹

Defendants predicate their request for summary judgment upon two grounds. First, Defendants contend that Plaintiff cannot, based on the undisputed facts disclosed herein, meet the exacting requirements of proof established by New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964) (New York Times) and its progeny, that is, of demonstrating that the statements in question were made with "`actual malice.'" Id. at 280, 84 S.Ct. at 726. As a second and independent basis for summary judgment, Defendants claim that the editorial involved in this case was absolutely privileged as an expression of pure opinion.

In response to the arguments advanced by Defendants, Plaintiff contends initially that while the NRA editorial is phrased as an opinion, it contains allegations and inferences of fact which are false, and which, therefore, are not entitled to protection. Plaintiff next suggests that summary judgment is particularly inappropriate in libel actions where matters pertaining to the defendant's state of mind are placed in issue. As a final matter, Plaintiff sets forth various "facts," primarily those contained in the editorial itself, which allegedly justify permitting this case to proceed to trial on the question of actual malice.

In answer to the points presented by Plaintiff, the Defendants claim, "without conceding that there are any facts—disclosed, undisclosed, or otherwise—expressed or inherent in the editorial opinion," Doc. # 17 at 6, that:

Only one fact need be assumed in the present instance in order to preclude any interpretation of the editorial opinion as defamatory—that "fact" is that the NRA is an active and vocal opponent of gun control legislation at every level of government.

Id. Based on this assumed, notorious, and non-defamatory fact regarding the NRA's position on gun control, Defendants maintain that the editorial, while rhetorical and fraught with hyperbole, is nonetheless entitled to absolute constitutional protection. As a further matter, and in conclusion, Defendants contend that summary judgment still remains a triable and appropriate means of resolving libel actions in which, as here, no evidence of actual malice has been presented.

Each of the arguments advanced by the parties will be addressed in greater detail below. However, based on the undisputed facts presented herein, and the applicable legal authority, the Court has concluded that the Defendants' motion for summary judgment is well-taken, and must be granted.

II. Discussion

A. Applicable Summary Judgment Standard

As was previously noted, Plaintiffs contend, based on the Supreme Court decision in Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 99 S.Ct. 2675, 61 L.Ed.2d 411 (1979) (Hutchinson), that summary judgment in libel actions may be entirely inappropriate, and that resolution of issues related to a defendant's state of mind should be left to the jury. In Hutchinson, the Supreme Court did not directly address the propriety of granting summary judgment in libel actions, because that issue was not before the Court. The facts recounted by the Supreme Court indicate that in April, 1979, Senator Proxmire awarded a "Golden Fleece of the Month Award" to several government agencies which had given Hutchinson approximately $500,000 over a period of seven years to investigate, inter alia, "an objective measure of aggression, concentrating upon the behavior patterns of certain animals, such as the clenching of jaws when they were exposed to various aggravating stressful stimuli." Id. at 115, 99 S.Ct. at 2678. Based on the publication of certain remarks by Proxmire in the Congressional Record, in a press release and in a newsletter,¹⁰ which inferred that Hutchinson had "made a monkey out of the American taxpayer," id. at 116, 99 S.Ct. at 2678, Hutchinson initiated an action for defamation against Proxmire and his legislative assistant. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants, finding that some of the publications were absolutely immune under the Speech or Debate Clause, and that the remaining claims were not actionable because there had been no demonstration of actual malice. See, id., at 118-120, 99 S.Ct. at 2679-81. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Although the Supreme Court reversed the judgment, it did so based on the fact that the lower courts had erred both in holding the transmittal of Proxmire's press release and newsletter absolutely immune, and, in finding that Hutchinson was a public figure for the purpose of applying the New York Times standard of actual malice. See, id. at 132-136, 99 S.Ct. at 2686-89.¹¹ The Court thus did not specifically reach any issue relating to the propriety of utilizing summary judgment in libel actions.

The Supreme Court did, however, in passing, note the District Court's comment to the effect that "in determining whether a plaintiff had made an...