Nationstar Mortg. LLC v. Ravenstar Invs., LLC
| Decision Date | 11 June 2021 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 3:16-cv-00638-MMD-WGC |
| Parties | NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE LLC, Plaintiff, v. RAVENSTAR INVESTMENTS, LLC, et al., Defendants. AND ALL RELATED CASES |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Nevada |
This is one of hundreds of cases filed in this district to quiet title following a foreclosure sale conducted by a homeowners' association under NRS 116.3116, et seq. (the "HOA Sale"), specifically regarding 6453 Caddo Court, Sun Valley, NV 89433 (the "Property"). (ECF No. 1.) Before the Court are: (1) Defendant Highland Ranch Homeowners' Association (the "HOA")'s motion for summary judgment on the crossclaims Defendant Ravenstar Investments, LLC ("Ravenstar") asserted against the HOA (ECF No. 118 (the "HOA's Motion"));1 and (2) Plaintiff Nationstar Mortgage LLC ("Nationstar")'s motion for partial summary judgment on its quiet title claim and the counterclaims Ravenstar asserted against it (ECF No. 119 ("Nationstar's Motion")).2 As further explained below, the Court will grant both motions. The Court will grant the HOA's Motion primarily because the evidence shows Ravenstar purchased the Property via a quitclaim deed without any warranties. The Court will grant Nationstar's Motion primarilybecause following through on Nationstar's predecessor-in-interest's tender offer would have been futile.
The following facts are undisputed.3 (ECF No. 124 at 2 ().) Kyle Natenstedt (the "Borrower") purchased the Property in 2004 with a $189,989 loan. (ECF No. 119-1 at 2- 4.) The deed of trust associated with the loan (the "DOT") was assigned to BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP f/k/a Countrywide Home Loans Servicing LP ("BAC") in 2010. (ECF No. 119-2.) BAC merged into Bank of America, N.A. ("BANA") (ECF No. 119-3), and BANA assigned the DOT to Nationstar in 2013 (ECF No. 119-4 at 2).
The Borrower fell behind on his payments to the HOA, and the HOA recorded a notice of delinquent assessment lien on the Property through its counsel Gayle A. Kern. (ECF No. 119-5.) The notice of delinquent assessment was followed by the statutorily required notice of default and election to sell, and three notices of sale. (ECF Nos. 119-6, 119-7, 119-8, 119-10.)
In response to the notice of sale filed in March 2013 (ECF No. 119-10), BANA's counsel, Rock K. Jung, sent Kern a letter requesting the amount of the HOA's superpriority lien, offering to pay that amount upon presentation of adequate proof from the HOA. (ECF No. 119-11 at 2-3, 6-7.) Kern wrote back, refusing to provide thesuperpriority amount, but stating that BANA could pay off the HOA's lien for $7,210.34. (Id. at 9.) Kern went on to write, (Id. at 9-11.) Kern also testified at her deposition that she would not have accepted a payment from Mr. Jung for nine months of assessments if the check were accompanied by an assertion that the payment satisfied the lender's obligation to the HOA in full. (ECF No. 119-12 at 36-37.) And Mr. Jung testified consistently in his declaration prepared for another case, but proffered by Nationstar here, where he stated that, in his experience, Kern uniformly rejected checks for the superpriority lien accompanied by a condition that the check fully satisfied the lender's obligation. (ECF No. 119-14 at 2-3.)
Kern held the HOA Sale in April 2013. (ECF No. 119-15.) The HOA purchased the Property from itself at the HOA Sale for $2,501. (Id. at 2.) The HOA later sold its interest in the Property to Ravenstar via quitclaim deed in November 2013. (ECF No. 119-17 at 2.) Ravenstar subsequently recorded another deed of trust on the Property, designating Nicholas Heathman as beneficiary, and purportedly securing a $25,000 loan. (ECF No. 119-18 at 2.)
In addition to the HOA and Ravenstar, Nationstar sued Kern (Gayle A. Kern & Associates, Ltd. d/b/a Kern & Associates, Ltd.), the agent who conducted the HOA Sale, and Heathman. (ECF No. 1 at 2, 7.) The Court dismissed Kern from this case after granting Kern's motion to dismiss. (ECF Nos. 69, 70.) In addition, Nationstar and the HOA settled their claims against each other. (ECF No. 137.) The live issues in this case have accordingly narrowed since its inception.
Heathman's status in this case is less clear than the HOA's and Kern's. The most recent order referencing Heathman is a minute order issued by U.S. Magistrate Judge Carla L. Baldwin granting one of his former attorney's motion to withdraw as counsel anddirecting that the parties serve a copy of all documents subsequently filed on him at an address in Reno. (ECF No. 96.) That appears to be happening, (see, e.g., ECF No. 119 at 18), but the parties otherwise do not refer to Heathman, and he has not participated in the briefing on the motions this order addresses. Normally, this would raise a question as to the status of Nationstar's claims against Heathman. However, because the Court finds Nationstar's DOT continues to encumber the property as described infra, and because the only claim Nationstar asserted against Heathman was its quiet title claim (ECF No. 1 at 7-12), Heathman's lack of participation in the pending motions is immaterial. As also explained infra, the Court finds that Nationstar is entitled to its requested injunctive relief of an order declaring that Ravenstar and Heathman's interests in the Property are subject to Nationstar's DOT—this order.
The following claims accordingly remain for adjudication. First, Nationstar's quiet title claim against Ravenstar and Heathman (ECF No. 1 at 7-12), and its claim for injunctive relief against Ravenstar (id. at 15-16). Second, Ravenstar's counterclaims for unjust enrichment and equitable mortgage against Nationstar. (ECF No. 14 at 8-9.) Third, Ravenstar's crossclaims against the HOA for unjust enrichment and equitable mortgage. (ECF No. 15 at 6-7.) Only Ravenstar asserts the counter and crossclaims, not Heathman. (ECF Nos. 14, 15.) As the pending motions (ECF Nos. 118, 119) address all these claims, and as explained in more detail infra, the Court will grant both motions, this order resolves all outstanding issues in this case.
"The purpose of summary judgment is to avoid unnecessary trials when there is no dispute as to the facts before the court." Nw. Motorcycle Ass'n v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 18 F.3d 1468, 1471 (9th Cir. 1994) (citation omitted). Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits "show there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). An issue is "genuine" if there is a sufficient evidentiary basis on which a reasonable factfinder couldfind for the nonmoving party and a dispute is "material" if it could affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1986). Where reasonable minds could differ on the material facts at issue, however, summary judgment is not appropriate. See id. at 250-51. "The amount of evidence necessary to raise a genuine issue of material fact is enough 'to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties' differing versions of the truth at trial.'" Aydin Corp. v. Loral Corp., 718 F.2d 897, 902 (9th Cir. 1983) (quoting First Nat'l Bank v. Cities Service Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288-89 (1968)). In evaluating a summary judgment motion, a court views all facts and draws all inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Kaiser Cement Corp. v. Fishbach & Moore, Inc., 793 F.2d 1100, 1103 (9th Cir. 1986) (citation omitted).
The moving party bears the burden of showing that there are no genuine issues of material fact. See Zoslaw v. MCA Distrib. Corp., 693 F.2d 870, 883 (9th Cir. 1982). Once the moving party satisfies Rule 56's requirements, the burden shifts to the party resisting the motion to "set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256. The nonmoving party "may not rely on denials in the pleadings but must produce specific evidence, through affidavits or admissible discovery material, to show that the dispute exists," Bhan v. NME Hosps., Inc., 929 F.2d 1404, 1409 (9th Cir. 1991), and "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Orr v. Bank of Am., 285 F.3d 764, 783 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986)). "The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff's position will be insufficient[.]" Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252.
The Court first addresses the HOA's Motion, and then Nationstar's Motion.
As noted, the HOA moves for summary judgment on the unjust enrichment and equitable mortgage crossclaims Ravenstar asserted against the HOA. (ECF No. 118.)The HOA generally argues that Ravenstar is a sophisticated purchaser who purchased the Property along with several others via quitclaim deed, and Ravenstar got what it paid for—whatever interest the HOA owned in the Property. (Id.) As to unjust enrichment, Ravenstar counters that it paid the HOA "$22,500 based on the representation that Ravenstar would own the Property free and clear of the First Deed of Trust[,]" and further notes that it has subsequently paid for upkeep and HOA fees on the Property. (ECF No. 123 at 4-5.) As to equitable mortgage, Ravenstar simply states the Court may impose one. (Id. at 5.) The HOA replies that Ravenstar's...
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