Nationwide Affinity Ins. Co. of Am. v. Logan
| Decision Date | 14 January 2022 |
| Docket Number | C. A. 3:20-cv-03696-SAL |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina |
| Parties | Nationwide Affinity Insurance Company of America, Plaintiff, v. Kristie Logan, Defendant. |
This insurance declaratory judgment matter is before the court on Plaintiff Nationwide Affinity Insurance Company of America's (“Plaintiff”) Motion for Summary Judgment (“Motion”). [ECF No. 15.] For the reasons set forth below, the court grants Plaintiff's Motion.
This coverage dispute presents the question of whether Defendant Kristie Logan's (“Defendant”) injuries sustained as a result of a gunshot, arise out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of a vehicle such that she is entitled to uninsured motorist (“UM”) coverage pursuant to her insurance policy with Plaintiff. Plaintiff submits that the undisputed facts establish that the injuries do not arise out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of an uninsured vehicle as a matter of law. Defendant counters that there is a dispute of fact as to whether her injury occurred as the result of the “use” of the automobile meaning summary judgment would not be appropriate.
The facts surrounding the shooting and Defendant's injuries are largely undisputed[1] for purposes of this action. On September 15, 2017, Defendant went to Empire Nightclub located at 920 Lady Street, Columbia, South Carolina. [ECF No. 15-2, Logan Dep. at 13:24-14:7.] Two rappers, John Bates, Jr. (“Bates”) and Maleik Houseal (“Houseal”), were scheduled to perform at the Empire Nightclub that night. [ECF No. 1-2, Underlying Compl. at ¶¶ 11, 15-16, 20.] At the time of the event, Bates was a member of the “Blood” gang, and Houseal was a member of the “Cripp” gang. Id. at ¶¶ 22-23. An altercation between the two rappers occurred inside the nightclub before guests, including Defendant, were ushered outside around 2:00 a.m. Id. at ¶¶ 26- 31, 37; see also Logan Dep. at 23:3-15. The altercation continued outside.
After leaving the nightclub, Defendant was standing on the sidewalk at an intersection, and she saw a flash come from a car window. Logan Dep. at 28:7-18; 30:19-22. Defendant was then struck by a bullet to her right knee. Id. at 29:12-25; Underlying Compl. at ¶ 38. The intended target, according to Defendant's complaint in an underlying action, was not Defendant. Underlying Compl. at ¶ 34. It was Houseal. Id. Defendant's injuries relate exclusively to the bullet fired from the car; Defendant was not injured by the car itself. Logan Dep. at 49:15-19.
During Defendant's deposition, she testified that at the time she saw the flash, the car from which the shots were fired was sitting still. Logan Dep. at 47:16-19; 49:4-12, 23-25; 66:18-25. The surveillance video taken from the corner of Lady Street and Park Street shows a vehicle pull up to a spot on the sidewalk near the nightclub and come to a stop at 2:10:42 a.m. [ECF No. 15 3.] The vehicle stays stopped in that same location for just over a minute. At 2:11:57 a.m., the surveillance video shows shots fired from the vehicle, and the vehicle moving from its stopped position. Id. Whether the vehicle was or was not moving at the time the shots were fired appears to be the one point of disagreement between the parties.[2] Plaintiff submits that the surveillance video shows the vehicle was stopped at the time the shots were fired. [ECF No. 15-1 at 9-10 (“The injuries occurred when the vehicle was not moving[.]”).] Defendant's opposition submits that “the shooter's vehicle was in fact moving both before, during and after the incident.” [ECF No. 16 at 3.]
On October 21, 2020, Defendant filed a personal injury lawsuit against the nightclub and two John Doe individuals in the Court of Common Pleas for Richland County, South Carolina. [ECF No. 1-2.] Defendant also made a claim for UM coverage pursuant to her automobile insurance policy with Plaintiff.
Plaintiff is an insurance company that issued a personal automobile policy, Policy No. 6139P393928, to Defendant with effective dates of August 19, 2017 to October 3, 2017 (the “Policy”). [ECF No. 1-1.] The Policy provides UM limits of $50, 000 per person for bodily injury and $50, 000 per occurrence for property damage. Id. at 7. The Policy's UM provision provides in relevant part:
Id. at 25. Accordingly, Defendant is not entitled to coverage under the Policy unless her injuries resulted “from an accident arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use” of the uninsured motor vehicle.[3]
Plaintiff filed a declaratory judgment complaint on October 21, 2020. [ECF No. 1.] Therein, Plaintiff seeks two declarations: (1) the Policy does not provide UM coverage for any injuries arising out of the September 16, 2017 shooting because the injuries did not arise out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of the uninsured vehicle and (2) the Policy does not provide UM coverage for the injuries because there was not any physical contact between the uninsured vehicle and Defendant. See generally, Id. Plaintiff moved for summary judgment on July 7, 2021. [ECF No. 15.] Defendant filed her response in opposition, ECF No. 16, and Plaintiff filed a reply, ECF No. 17. The matter is now ripe for resolution by the court.
Summary judgment is appropriate if a party “shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). “In determining whether a genuine issue has been raised, the court must construe all inferences and ambiguities in favor of the nonmoving party.” HealthSouth Rehab. Hosp. v. American Nat'l Red Cross, 101 F.3d 1005, 1008 (4th Cir. 1996). The party seeking summary judgment shoulders the initial burden of demonstrating to the court that there is no genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).
Once the moving party makes this threshold demonstration, the non-moving party may not rest upon mere allegations or denials averred in the pleading, but rather must, by affidavits or other means permitted by the Rule, set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56; see also Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323. A party asserting that a fact is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by “citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1)(A). A litigant is unable to “create a genuine issue of material fact through mere speculation or the building of one inference upon another.” Beale v. Hardy, 769 F.2d 213, 214 (4th Cir. 1985). “[W]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, disposition by summary judgment is appropriate.” Teamsters Joint Council No. 83 v. Centra, Inc., 947 F.2d 115, 119 (4th Cir. 1996).
The present dispute surrounds whether Defendant's gunshot injuries arose out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of the uninsured vehicle. To resolve the dispute, the court must apply the South Carolina Supreme Court's three-part test as set forth in State Farm Insurance & Casualty Co v. Aytes, 503 S.E.2d 744, 745 (S.C. 1998). The test provides that an injury arises out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of a vehicle when (1) there is a causal connection between the vehicle and the injury; (2) no act of independent significance occurred which broke the causal link; and (3) the vehicle was being used for transportation at the time of the assault. Id.
Here, Plaintiff argues that Defendant cannot establish any of the three Aytes test requirements. [ECF No. 15-1.] In making the arguments, Plaintiff relies primarily on a South Carolina Supreme Court case, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Bookert, 523 S.E.2d 181 (S.C. 1999). Defendant argues that Plaintiff's reliance on Bookert is “misplaced” and the Aytes test favors a finding of UM coverage. [ECF No. 16.] As outlined below, the court finds the first element of the Aytes test-causal connection-dispositive of this case and focuses its analysis there.
The first requirement of the Aytes test is met when there is a causal connection between the injury and the vehicle. Causal connection has several requirements of its own. See Bookert, 523 S.E.2d at 182 (). First, the vehicle must be an “active accessory” to the assault. Aytes, 503 S.E.2d at 745. Second, the connection must be “something less than proximate cause and something more than the vehicle being the mere site of the injury.” Id. And third, the “injury must be foreseeably identifiable with the normal use of the vehicle.” Id. at 745-46.
As to whether the “causal connection” requirement is met in this case, the parties submit two lines of cases. Plaintiff's line of cases focuses on the third causal connection requirement- foreseeably identifiable injury with the normal use of the vehicle. Defendant's cases, two of which predate Aytes, found a causal connection in similar factual...
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