Nationwide Ins. Co. v. Storm, 4879
| Decision Date | 26 January 1959 |
| Docket Number | No. 4879,4879 |
| Citation | 200 Va. 526,106 S.E.2d 588 |
| Parties | NATIONWIDE INSURANCE COMPANY v. JUNE E. STORM. Record |
| Court | Virginia Supreme Court |
William B. Eley (Rixey & Rixey, on brief), for the plaintiff in error.
A. A. Bangel (Herbert K. Bangel; Bangel, Bangel & Bangel, on brief), for the defendant in error.
June E. Storm obtained a judgment for $12,000 against Richard E. Goodwin for personal injuries sustained in an automobile accident. Later she filed suit against Nationwide Insurance Company seeking judgment for $5,000, together with interest on the sum of $12,000 from November 1, 1955, the date of the judgment against Goodwin.
As a basis for her suit against the insurance company plaintiff alleged that she had obtained a judgment against Goodwin for injuries received while he was operating an automobile owned by Martha V. Olsen. She further alleged that there was in existence at the time a $5,000 liability insurance policy issued by the defendant company to Mrs. Olsen which also covered Goodwin as an insured due to the fact that at the time of the accident he was operating the car with the consent of the owner.
To this motion for judgment the insurance company filed a plea of res judicata and a motion for summary judgment based thereon. The plea alleged that in a prior action brought in the circuit court Richard E. Goodwin was the plaintiff and the insurance company the defendant.
The lower court in that prior action had construed the policy and held that Goodwin was not an insured under the policy at the time of the accident; and on July 13, 1956, the court entered an order sustaining the plea of res judicata and entered summary judgment. This judgment was reversed on appeal (199 Va. 130) and the case remanded for a new trial.
Upon retrial, the lower court, without a jury, heard the case and entered an order granting judgment in favor of the plaintiff in the amount sued for. We granted the insurance company an appeal.
The court having heard the case without a jury, the facts are to be stated in the light most favorable to the prevailing party. 1 Mich. Jur., Appeal and Error, § 276, pp. 705, 706; Brumfield v. Brumfield, 194 Va. 577, 580, 74 S.E.2d 170, 172; Code, 1950, § 8-491.
The facts disclosed that the Chevrolet automobile involved in the litigation was purchased in the name of Martha Virginia Olsen, and the assigned risk liability insurance policy was issued in her name. Later, Richard E. Goodwin bargained to purchase the automobile, making two payments thereon and owing the final payment. From the date of the first payment he had operated the car with the consent of Mrs. Olsen and was so operating it at the time of the accident. The final payment was made on a Saturday and it was agreed that the title would not be transferred or assigned until the following Monday when the parties could go to the office of the Division of Motor Vehicles. The accident occurred on Sunday, the day following the final payment, at which time title to the said automobile had not been transferred to Goodwin. Goodwin testified that he could not get liability insurance until the title was transferred to him.
Evidence was introduced by the insurance company in an attempt to show that Melvin C. Olsen (Martha V. Olsen's son), a minor, was the actual owner of the car. However, he, his mother, and the prospective purchaser, Goodwin, testified that before agreeing to sell the automobile it was necessary for Melvin Olsen to secure authority to do so from the title holder, Martha Virginia Olsen.
The controlling question is: who was the owner of the automobile at the time of the accident -- Mrs. olsen or Goodwin.
The insurance company contends that the formal requisites of Code, § 46-84 * 'need not be complied with in order to transfer ownership of the motor vehicle from one party to another.'
While we have no case in Virginia on all fours with the instant case, we have held that in order to complete the sale upon his part it is essential that the seller conform to the statutory requirement by delivering to the...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Travelers Indemnity Company v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company
...Appeals of Virginia has adopted a very strict attitude in construing Virginia's motor vehicle registration laws. Nationwide Ins. Co. v. Storm, 200 Va. 526, 106 S.E.2d 588 (1959); Sauls v. Thomas Andrews & Co., 163 Va. 407, 175 S.E. 760 (1934); Thomas v. Mullins, 153 Va. 383, 149 S.E. 494 (1......
-
Maryland Cas. Co. v. American Family Ins. Group of Madison, Wis., 44762
...870; Brewer v. DeCant, 167 Ohio St. 411, 149 N.E.2d 166; Garlick v. McFarland, 159 Ohio St. 539, 113 N.E.2d 92; Nationwide Insurance Company v. Storm, 200 Va. 526, 106 S.E.2d 588; Couch on Insurance 2d § 45:386.) Representative of these cases is Sabella v. American Indemnity Co., supra, whe......
-
Central Nat. Bank of Richmond, Va. v. Rich, 667
...153 Va. 383, 391, 149 S.E. 494. See also United States v. One Hudson Hornet Sedan, D.C., 110 F.Supp. 41.' Nationwide Insurance Company v. Storm, 200 Va. 526, 106 S.E.2d 588. The Division of Motor Vehicles is required, when it receives an application for a certificate of title, to 'show upon......
-
Wilson v. Commonwealth
...See generally Allstate Ins. Co. v. Atlanta Cas. Co., 260 Va. 148, 154-55, 530 S.E.2d 161, 165 (2000); Nationwide Ins. Co. v. Storm, 200 Va. 526, 528-29, 106 S.E.2d 588, 589-90 (1959). Wilson's successful attempt,just weeks after Jones's death, to manipulate DGIF into issuing a new title to ......