Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Guman Bros. Farm, No. 94-1113

• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Ohio
• Writing for the Court: COOK; MOYER
• Citation: 652 N.E.2d 684,73 Ohio St.3d 107
• Parties: , 101 Ed. Law Rep. 1070 NATIONWIDE MUTUAL FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellee, v. GUMAN BROTHERS FARM et al.; Mercer et al., Appellants.
• Docket Number: No. 94-1113
• Decision Date: 16 August 1995

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73 Ohio St.3d 107 652 N.E.2d 684, 101 Ed. Law Rep. 1070 NATIONWIDE MUTUAL FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellee,
v.
GUMAN BROTHERS FARM et al.; Mercer et al., Appellants. No. 94-1113. Supreme Court of Ohio. Submitted June 6, 1995.
Decided Aug. 16, 1995.

[652 N.E.2d 685] The defendant-appellee, seventeen-year-old Donald Mercer ("Donald"), was seriously injured while working in a silo on the Guman Brothers Farm. Donald's father, Charles Mercer ("Mercer"), filed suit on behalf of himself and as next friend, against Guman Brothers Farm, Nathan Guman and Gregory Guman ("the farm"), claiming their negligence caused Donald's injuries. At the time of the accident, the farm had liability insurance with Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance Company ("Nationwide"). Nationwide filed a complaint seeking a declaratory judgment that its policy with the farm excluded coverage for claims for Donald's injuries, based on his status as a farm "employee." Mercer took the position in the declaratory-judgment action that because his son's work on the farm was part of an Occupational Work Experience ("OWE") program through his high school, that he was a student and not an "employee." ¹

After the injury, Donald applied for and received workers' compensation payments, although the farm's workers' compensation coverage had presumably lapsed by reason of nonpayment of premium. Because it was a noncomplying employer, the farm was not entitled to the immunity accorded to complying employers by R.C. 4123.74; thus, the insurance coverage through Nationwide was a potential source of recovery for Donald's injuries.

The trial court declared Nationwide contractually obligated to defend the farm and pay any judgment rendered against it on behalf of Mercer. The court determined that Donald's participation in the OWE program rendered him a student, and, therefore, precluded him from qualifying as an "employee" for purposes of Nationwide's policy exclusion.

The court of appeals reviewed the decision de novo as an issue of law, and reversed the trial court, holding that while Donald had a dual status as both a

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student and an employee, his student status was incidental to his primary function as that of an employee [652 N.E.2d 686] on the farm. Accordingly, Nationwide had no duty to indemnify or defend the farm.

The cause is now before this court pursuant to an allowance of a discretionary appeal.

Baker, Hackenberg & Collins Co., L.P.A., I. James Hackenberg and Richard A. Hennig, Painesville, for appellee.

Sindell, Lowe & Guidubaldi, Mark L. Wakefield and Daniel M. Sucher, Cleveland, for appellants.

COOK, Justice.

This case presents two issues. We first determine that the court of appeals properly reviewed the trial court decision de novo because the interpretation of a clear and unambiguous insurance contract is a matter of law. Second, we conclude that a student who works part of the school day in an OWE program nevertheless qualifies as an "employee" while at work.

I

In his first proposition of law, Mercer argues that the judgment of the trial court was a factual determination rather than a legal interpretation, and that the appellate court's de novo review was therefore erroneous. Mercer contends that because the insurance contract failed to define "employee," the term is ambiguous and this ambiguity makes the interpretation one of fact rather than law.

The mere absence of a...