Native Vill. of Eklutna v. U.S. Dep't of Interior

Decision Date22 September 2021
Docket Number19-cv-2388 (DLF)
PartiesNATIVE VILLAGE OF EKLUTNA, Plaintiff, v. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, et al., Defendants, and STATE OF ALASKA, Defendant-Intervenor.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Columbia
MEMORANDUM OPINION

DABNEY L. FRIEDRICH UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

[O]ne problem has always plagued most Alaska Native governments-the lack of a clearly defined territory subject to their jurisdiction.” David S. Case & David A. Voluck Alaska Natives and American Laws 33 (3d ed. 2012). The complexity of this problem-and what sets it apart from federal-Indian relations in the Lower 48-is due in no small part to Alaska-specific federal statutes and the lack of treaties between Alaska Natives and the federal government. See Id. at 42. As a result, when it comes to federal-Indian relations, “Alaska is often the exception, not the rule.” Yellen v. Confederated Tribes of the Chehalis Rsrv., 141 S.Ct. 2434, 2438 (2021) (quoting Sturgeon v. Frost, 577 U.S. 424, 440 (2016)).

In this action, the Native Village of Eklutna (“Tribe” or “Eklutna”) challenges the Department of the Interior's (Interior) rejection of its application for an “Indian lands” determination under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, Pub. L. No. 100-497, 102 Stat. 2467 (1988) (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 2701 et seq.), as arbitrary and capricious and contrary to law under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The State of Alaska has intervened in support of Interior. Before the Court is Plaintiff's Partial Motion for Summary Judgment, Dkt. 51, Interior's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, Dkt. 54, and Alaska's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, Dkt. 58. For the reasons that follow, the Court will grant summary judgment in favor of Interior and Alaska and deny the plaintiff's motion.

I. BACKGROUND

Eklutna is a federally recognized Indian tribe of the Dena'ina people whose traditional homeland is the upper Cook Inlet region of Alaska. See A.R. 779, 811-12 (Eklutna Indian Lands Submission & Ex. 1); Indian Entities Recognized by and Eligible to Receive Services from the United States Bureau of Indian Affairs, 85 Fed. Reg. 5462 5466 (Jan. 30, 2020). The Tribe is headquartered about twenty-seven miles northeast of Anchorage on the Knik Arm of Cook Inlet where it owns fifty-five acres of fee land. A.R. 977-99, 2052 (Eklutna Indian Lands Submission Exs. 12-13; Eklutna Indian Lands Third Submission). A tribal council exercises the Tribe's inherent sovereign powers under a constitution enacted in 1996. A.R. 953-63 (Eklutna Indian Lands Submission Ex. 7).

In June 2016, the Tribe requested that the Bureau of Indian Affairs permit the Tribe to use a parcel of land known as the Ondola Allotment for gambling under Indian Gaming Regulatory Act. A.R. 778-805 (Eklutna Indian Lands Submission). Eklutna submitted its request-known as an “Indian lands determination”-along with a proposed commercial lease of the Allotment for Department approval. A.R. 742-73, 778 (Proposed Lease, Eklutna Indian Lands Submission).

The Ondola Allotment is an 8.05-acre parcel of land that the Bureau of Land Management issued to Olga Ondola in November 1963 under the Alaska Native Allotment Act, Pub. L. No. 59-171, ch. 2469, 34 Stat. 197 (1906), amended by Pub. L. No. 84-931, ch. 891, 70 Stat. 954 (1956), repealed by Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, Pub. L. No. 92-203, § 18(a), 85 Stat. 688, 710 (1971) (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601-28). A.R. 87-88 (Ondola Native Allotment). Ondola lived there until her death in 1964, and her son, George Ondola, inherited an interest in the land and lived there from 1985 until his death. See A.R. 743, 981 (Proposed Lease, Eklutna Indian Lands Submission Ex. 13). George was also an Eklutna tribal member and served twice as the Tribal Council President. A.R. 981. Their heirs and successors now own the land, and they are all members of the Tribe. A.R. 742-43, 981, 1249 (Proposed Lease, Eklutna Indian Lands Submission Ex. 13; Eklutna Indian Lands Second Submission). The allotment sits twenty-two miles northeast of Anchorage and seven miles southwest of the Village. A.R. 784, 977-99 (Eklutna Indian Lands Submission & Ex. 12).

On June 18, 2018, John Tahsuda, the Acting Assistant Secretary of Interior, issued a determination that the Ondola Allotment is not Indian lands under Indian Gaming Regulatory Act and thus is ineligible for an Indian gaming facility. A.R. 45-61. In his letter, the Assistant Secretary explained that his analysis was governed by a 1993 opinion by then-Solicitor of Interior, Thomas Sansonetti (hereinafter “Sansonetti Opinion”), and he rejected the Tribe's argument that the Sansonetti Opinion had been superseded by intervening changes in law. A.R. 45, 49-50 (discussing Governmental Jurisdiction of Alaska Native Villages Over Land and Nonmembers, Op. Sol. Interior M-36975 (Jan. 11, 1993)). Under the Sansonetti Opinion's framework for Alaska Native tribal authority, the Assistant Secretary examined the history of statutes governing Alaska Natives, the Eklutna people, and the Ondola Allotment site. A.R. 50- 55.

He then employed five factors “that reflect the fact-specific concerns expressed in” the Sansonetti Opinion to determine whether the Allotment had the requisite nexus with the Tribe to be “Indian lands”-that is, whether tribal jurisdiction existed. A.R. 56. Those factors were “(1) “Tribal membership of the original allottees and their heirs; (2) proximity to an existing Indian reservation; (3) allotment location relative to treaty-recognized hunting, fishing, and gathering territories; (4) the provision of Tribal police and other services in the area; and (5) acknowledgment by local governments of Tribal regulatory and enforcement authority at the site.” A.R. 56; see A.R. 56-60 (analyzing each factor). Weighing these factors, the Assistant Secretary concluded they counseled against a finding of tribal jurisdiction because there was never an Indian reservation near the Allotment, the local authorities did not acknowledge the Tribe's territorial authority over the site, and the ownership by Tribal members alone was insufficient to counteract all the other factors. A.R. 61. Since the Allotment was not “Indian lands, ” the Assistant Secretary rejected the Tribe's proposed lease of the Allotment. A.R. 61.

On August 8, 2019, the Tribe filed the instant action in this Court bringing three claims against Interior and its officers. See generally Compl., Dkt. 1. First, the Tribe alleges that Department of Interior's Indian lands determination was arbitrary, capricious, and contrary to law in violation of the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), (C). Compl. ¶¶ 101-16. Second, the Tribe alleges that Interior's decision was improperly influenced by political considerations in violation of the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). Compl. ¶¶ 117-22. Third, the Tribe alleges that the disapproval of the proposed lease was arbitrary and capricious in violation of the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). Compl. ¶¶ 123-27. The Tribe requests declaratory relief holding that the Ondola Allotment is Indian lands and an injunction requiring Interior to approve the proposed lease. Id. at 26.

Before briefing on the cross-motions for summary judgment and in furtherance of Eklutna's second count, the Tribe sought extra-record discovery in the form of depositions of senior Department officials. See Motion for Leave to Take Extra-Record Discovery, Dkt. 36. This Court denied the motion because the plaintiff failed to adduce evidence that “r[o]se to a ‘strong showing of bad faith or improper behavior.' Order at 6, Dkt. 47 (quoting Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420 (1971)). Thereafter, the plaintiff moved for partial summary judgment as to counts one and three. Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Dkt. 51. Interior filed a cross-motion for summary judgment in December, followed by intervenor-defendant Alaska in January. Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, Dkt. 55; Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, Dkt. 59. These motions are now ripe for resolution.

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

A court grants summary judgment if the moving party “shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). A “material” fact is one with potential to change the substantive outcome of the litigation. See Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 248; Holcomb v. Powell, 433 F.3d 889, 895 (D.C. Cir. 2006). A dispute is “genuine” if a reasonable jury could determine that the evidence warrants a verdict for the nonmoving party. See Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 248; Holcomb, 433 F.3d at 895.

In an APA case, summary judgment “serves as the mechanism for deciding, as a matter of law, whether the agency action is supported by the administrative record and otherwise consistent with the APA standard of review.” Sierra Club v. Mainella, 459 F.Supp.2d 76, 90 (D.D.C. 2006). The Court will “hold unlawful and set aside” agency action that is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law, ” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), “in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right, ” id. § 706(2)(C), or “unsupported by substantial evidence, ” id. § 706(2)(E).

In an arbitrary-and-capricious challenge, the core question is whether the agency's decision was “the product of reasoned decisionmaking.” Motor Vehicle Mfrs Ass'n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 52 (1983); see also Nat'l Telephone Coop. Ass'n v. FCC, 563 F.3d 536, 540 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (“The APA's arbitrary-and-capricious standard requires that agency rules be reasonable and reasonably explained.”). ...

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