Naughgle v. Feeney-Hornak Shadeland Mortuary, Inc.

• Decision Date: 28 October 1986
• Docket Number: No. 49A02-8603-CV-96,FEENEY-HORNAK,49A02-8603-CV-96
• Citation: 498 N.E.2d 1298
• Parties: Daniel NAUGHGLE (Defendant and Counterclaimant below), Barbara Naughgle, Thomas Naughgle, II, and Steven Naughgle (Plaintiff-Intervenors below), Appellants, v.SHADELAND MORTUARY, INC., (Plaintiff and Counter Defendant and Defendant by Intervention, below), Appellee.
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

Page 1298

498 N.E.2d 1298

Daniel NAUGHGLE (Defendant and Counterclaimant below),

Barbara Naughgle, Thomas Naughgle, II, and Steven

Naughgle (Plaintiff-Intervenors below), Appellants, v. FEENEY-HORNAK SHADELAND MORTUARY, INC., (Plaintiff and Counter Defendant and Defendant by Intervention, below), Appellee.

No. 49A02-8603-CV-96.

Court of Appeals of Indiana,

First District.

Oct. 28, 1986.

Rehearing Denied Dec. 16, 1986.

Gregory A. Young, Larry A. Minnix, Cohen Malad & Hahn, Indianapolis, for appellants.

Danford R. Due, Catharine H. Stewart, Stewart Reeder Due & Miller, Indianapolis, for appellee.

RATLIFF, Judge.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The Naughgle family appeals the trial court's granting of summary judgment in favor of Feeney-Hornak Shadeland Mortuary, Inc. on the Naughgles' claim for emotional distress and the tort of outrage. We affirm.

FACTS

On September 1, 1984, Thomas Naughgle, Sr. died. Shortly thereafter, Daniel Naughgle, the deceased's son, made arrangements with Feeney-Hornak Shadeland Mortuary, Inc. (Feeney-Hornak) for the burial preparations and funeral of his father. Feeney-Hornak embalmed and prepared the body for viewing, provided the casket and viewing room, assisted in obtaining a burial plot, and transported the body for burial.

The Naughgles allege that at the private family viewing on September 4, 1984, they were "shocked and distressed by the grotesque and distorted facial features of the deceased, Thomas Naughgle, Sr., attributable to severe swelling." Record at 30, 76. The family confronted Michael Feeney, an employee of Feeney-Hornak, who assured them the situation was normal. Aware of the swelling problem, the Naughgles proceeded with an open-casket viewing of the body on September 4th, 5th, and 6th.

On December 7, 1984, Feeney-Hornak filed suit against Daniel for monies owed for goods and services rendered for the funeral. Daniel filed a counterclaim against Feeney-Hornak on March 8, 1985, for tortious breach of contract resulting in the infliction of emotional distress and for outrageous conduct in caring for the body of the deceased. Daniel claimed that as a result of the public viewing he and his family suffered shock, distress, humiliation, embarrassment, and mental anguish. On July 8, 1985, Feeney-Hornak filed a motion for summary judgment on Daniel's counter-claim. On August 21, 1985, Barbara Naughgle, widow of the deceased, along with her two other sons filed a motion to intervene as plaintiff-intervenors in this action. Their complaint was virtually identical to Daniel's counterclaim. Daniel and the other Naughgles admitted that their claim did not result from or manifest itself in any physical injury. On October 8, 1985, and January 27, 1986, the trial court granted summary judgment against Daniel and the Naughgle family respectively.

Thereafter, the Naughgles, collectively, perfected this appeal.

ISSUE

Whether the trial court erred in granting Feeney-Hornak's motion for summary judgment.

a. Whether there was an invasion of a legal right to support the Naughgles claim for mental anguish absent any physical harm.

b. Whether the trial court erred in failing to address the Naughgles claim based on the tort of outrage.

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

Issue One

Summary judgment is a procedure for applying the law to facts when no factual controversy exists. Poxon v. General Motors Acceptance Corp. (1980), Ind.App., 407 N.E.2d 1181, 1183. The trial court should grant summary judgment only where "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits and testimony, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Indiana Rules of Civil Procedure, Trial Rule 56(C). See also Moll v. South Central Solar Systems, Inc. (1981), Ind.App., 419 N.E.2d 154, 159; Kendrick Memorial Hospital, Inc. v. Totten (1980), Ind.App., 408 N.E.2d 130, 131. On appeal, this court applies the same standard of review as does the trial court. Matter of Estate of Belanger (1982), Ind.App., 433 N.E.2d 39, 42, trans. denied; Richardson v. Citizens Gas and Coke Utility (1981), Ind.App., 422 N.E.2d 704, 710. We look to determine whether any genuine issue of material fact exists and whether the law was correctly applied. Smith v. P and B Corp. (1979), 179 Ind.App. 693, 695, 386 N.E.2d 1232, 1234, trans. denied. In determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, we accept as true all facts set forth by the non-moving party and resolve all doubts against the movant. Barnd v. Borst (1982), Ind.App., 431 N.E.2d 161, 165, trans. denied; English Coal Co., Inc. v. Durcholz (1981), Ind.App., 422 N.E.2d 302, 303, trans. denied. Only where there is no dispute as to the material facts or the inferences to be drawn therefrom, and the moving party is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law, may the court grant such a motion.

The general rule in Indiana is that a person can recover damages for mental anguish only when it is accompanied by, and results from, a physical injury. Baker v. American States Insurance Co. (1981), Ind.App., 428 N.E.2d 1342, 1349, trans. denied; Indiana Motorcycle Association v. Hudson (1980), Ind.App., 399 N.E.2d 775, 779; Kaletha v. Bortz Elevator Co., Inc. (1978), 178 Ind.App. 654, 657, 383 N.E.2d 1071, 1074; Charlie Stuart Oldsmobile, Inc. v. Smith (1976), 171 Ind.App., 315, 325, 357 N.E.2d 247, 253, modified on rehearing (1977), 175 Ind.App. 1, 369 N.E.2d 947, trans. denied. Fearing a flood of fictitious claims with the potential for unlimited liability, courts have been reluctant to award such damages. Charlie Stuart, at 325, 357 N.E.2d at 253. There is, however, an exception to the general rule:

"Indiana courts have awarded compensatory damages for mental anguish unaccompanied by a physical injury in certain tort actions...