Nav Co v. Ginn

• Decision Date: 10 April 1922
• Docket Number: No. 170,OREGON-WASHINGTON,170
• Citation: 66 L.Ed. 689,42 S.Ct. 332,258 U.S. 409
• Parties: R. & NAV. CO. v. McGINN
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

258 U.S. 409

42 S.Ct. 332

66 L.Ed. 689

OREGON-WASHINGTON R. & NAV. CO.

v McGINN.

No. 170.

Argued and Submitted March 17, 1922.

Decided April 10, 1922.

Messrs. Wm. R. Harr, of Washington, D. C., and John F. Reilly, of Portland, Or., for petitioner.

Mr. R. L. Edmiston, of Spokane, Wash., for respondent.

[Argument of Counsel from page 410-411 intentionally omitted] Mr. Justice CLARKE delivered the opinion of the Court.

The respondent shipped two carloads of horses from Grand Island, Neb., to Spokane, Wash., for which the initial carrier, the Union Pacific Railroad Company, issued a through bill of lading, in the form of the customary live stock contract, and routed the shipment over its own lines to Granger, Wyo., thence over the line of the Oregon Short Line Railroad Company to Huntington, Or., and thence over the lines of petitioner to Spokane, Wash.

While in transit the animals developed disease, which resulted in the death of several and in such condition of the others that they were delivered to the shipper consignee on the line of the petitioner before reaching the destination to which they were billed. The illness is alleged to have been caused by the stock having been given unwholesome food and water at Pocatello, Idaho, a station on the line of the intermediate carrier, the Oregon Short Line Railroad Company.

This suit to recover damages is against the delivering, the terminal, carrier; the allegation of the complaint, however, being that the unwholesome food and water were given to the stock while in transit over the route of the intermediate carrier, the Oregon Short Line Railroad Company. Thus we have presented for decision the question: Is a terminal carrier liable to a shipper who, in this case, is also the consignee, for injury to horses caused by the negligence of a prior and independent carrier from which they were received?

The live stock contract, under which the shipment moved contained the following provision:- '1. Except as otherwise provided by statute law, the carrier undertakes to transport said shipment only over its own line, and acts only as the agent of the shipper with respect to the portion of the route beyond its own line. No carrier shall be liable for damages for loss, death, injury or delay to said animals, or any thereof, not caused by it, but nothing contained in this contract shall be deemed to exempt the initial carrier in case of a through interstate transportation from any liability for loss, death, damage or injury caused by it or any common carrier, railroad or transportation company to which the livestock may be delivered under this contract.'

It is plain that this paragraph was framed to comply with the requirements of the Cummins Amendment to the Carmack Amendment to the Interstate Commerce Act (34 Stat. § 20, 593, 595; 38 Stat. 1196, c. 176 [Comp. St. § 8604a]); but, except as therein provided, the initial carrier limits its undertaking to its own line, declares that it acts only as the agent of the shipper with respect to the route beyond its own line, and the express contract is that 'no carrier shall be liable for damages for loss, death, injury or delay to said animals not caused by it.'

A verdict was rendered in favor of the shipper consignee, subject to the court's action on a question reserved by stipulation of the parties, and the court, acting thereunder, set aside the verdict and rendered judgment for the defendant. The Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the District Court, and held that Georgia, Florida & Alabama Railway Co. v. Blish Milling Co., 241 U. S. 190, 36 Sup. Ct. 541, 60 L. Ed. 948, required that, under the Carmack (now Cummins) Amendment, the terminal carrier should be bound by the contract of the initial carrier to deliver, precisely as the initial carrier is bound, and was therefore liable for any loss or damage to the property that had been occasioned in transit through the conduct of any of the carriers.

In this we think the Circuit Court of Appeals fell into error.

The settled federal rule is that, in the absence of statute or special contract, each connecting carrier on a through route is bound only to safely carry over its own line and safely deliver to the next connecting carrier, Myrick v. Michigan Central Railroad Co., 107 U. S. 102, 107, 1 Sup. Ct. 425, 27 L. Ed. 325; Railroad Co. v. Manufacturing Co., 16 Wall. 318, 324, 21 L. Ed. 297; and the liability of a connecting carrier for the safety of property delivered to it for transportation, commences when it is received and is discharged by its delivery to and acceptance by a succeeding carrier, or its authorized agent, Pratt v. Railway Co., 95 U. S. 43, 24 L. Ed. 336.

The Cummins Amendment deals with and modifies the common-law liability only of the initial carrier. It renders that carrier liable for loss or damage to the property...