Nava v. Dep't of Homeland Sec.

Citation435 F.Supp.3d 880
Decision Date24 January 2020
Docket NumberCase No. 18 C 3757
Parties Margarito Castañon NAVA, et al., Plaintiffs, v. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois

Mark M. Fleming, Katherine E. Melloy Goettel, Keren Hart Zwick, National Immigrant Justice Center, Aaron J. Siebert-llera, Karen A. Sheley, Kathryn Hunt Muse, Rebecca Kim Glenberg, Roger Baldwin Foundation of ACLU, Inc., Dan Huy Hoang, Nasir Hussain, Ivan Michael Poullaos, Zachary L. Sorman, Winston & Strawn LLP, Chicago, IL, for Plaintiffs.

Linda Y. Cheng, Sarah Abigail Byrd, Wisecup Lloyd Jason, J. Max Weintraub, William Herrick Weiland, U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Immigration Litigation, Washington, DC, AUSA, Craig Arthur Oswald, United States Attorney's Office, Chicago, IL, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

REBECCA R. PALLMEYER, United States District Judge

Five Individual Plaintiffs (Margarito Castañon Nava, John Doe, Miguel Cortes Torres, Guillermo Hernandez Hernandez, and Erick Rivera Sales) and two Organizational Plaintiffs (the Illinois Coalition for Immigrant and Refugee Rights and Organized Communities Against Deportations) filed this putative class action to ensure that Defendant U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) "complies with its clear statutory obligations under 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(2) when conducting warrantless arrests." (Second Am. Compl. [58] ¶ 1.)1 Plaintiffs Nava, Hernandez, and Sales also seek, on behalf of a proposed sub-class, to ensure that ICE complies with the Fourth Amendment when making traffic stops. Before the court is Defendants' motion to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint for lack of jurisdiction or, in the alternative, for failure to state a claim. For the following reasons, Defendants' motion is denied.

BACKGROUND

The court takes the following facts from the allegations in Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint.

Defendant DHS is responsible for enforcing federal laws governing border control, customs, trade, and immigration. (Second Am. Compl. ¶ 24.) Defendant ICE is the component of DHS charged with enforcing federal immigration law. (Id. ¶ 25.) Under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), immigration officials may conduct warrantless arrests, but only if the officials have "reason to believe" that the potential arrestee (1) "is in the United States in violation of [an immigration] law or regulation" and (2) "is likely to escape before a warrant can be obtained for his arrest." 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(2). Courts equate "reason to believe" under the INA with probable cause. See, e.g. , United States v. Cantu , 519 F.2d 494, 496 (7th Cir. 1975) ; Moreno v. Napolitano , 213 F. Supp. 3d 999, 1007 (N.D. Ill. 2016) ("[T]he phrase ‘reason to believe’ in § 1357(a)(2) requires the equivalent of probable cause, see Cantu , 519 F.2d at 496, which in turn requires a particularized inquiry.").

Plaintiffs allege that "[i]n recent months, ICE has been conducting indiscriminate, large-scale immigration sweeps, principally targeting states and localities that have adopted so-called ‘sanctuary laws,’ which limit state and local participation in civil immigration enforcement." (Second Am. Compl. ¶ 29.) This lawsuit arises from a large-scale ICE enforcement action that occurred in the Chicago area during a week-long period in May 2018. (Id. ¶ 32.) Plaintiffs allege that ICE arrested 156 people during that time. (Id. ) They further allege that by ICE's own account, 106 of the arrests were "at-large collateral arrests"—meaning "arrests of individuals for whom ICE lack[ed] an arrest warrant." (Id. ¶¶ 4, 32 (internal quotation marks omitted).) According to the Second Amended Complaint, the collateral arrests included those of the Individual Plaintiffs in this action, all of whom have lived in the Chicago area for at least four and as many as thirty years. (See id. ¶¶ 5, 8, 17-21.) Plaintiffs allege that ICE arrested and detained each Individual Plaintiff "without a warrant or an individualized determination that he is a flight risk," in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(2). (Id. ¶¶ 17-21.) They allege, further, that ICE's actions reflect a widespread policy and practice of violating the INA in this manner.

In Count I of the Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs assert a claim for violations of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. §§ 101 - 913, which governs the conduct of federal administrative agencies. Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that "ICE's policy and practice of making warrantless arrests without the required individualized flight risk analysis is ‘final agency action’ that is ‘arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.’ " (Second Am. Compl. ¶ 97) (quoting 5 U.S.C. §§ 704, 706(2)(A) ). Plaintiffs also allege that the same policy and practice is " ‘final agency action’ that is ‘in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations’ under § 1357(a)(2)." (Second Am. Compl. ¶ 98 (quoting 5 U.S.C. §§ 704, 706(2)(C) ).)

In addition to their APA claim, Plaintiffs assert a claim under the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. (See Second Am. Compl., Count II.) This claim is based on ICE's traffic stops of four Individual Plaintiffs, which ultimately led to their arrests and detention. (See id. ¶¶ 37, 42, 47, 52, 101-113.)2 Plaintiffs allege that ICE officers have authority to stop a vehicle only if they have "reasonable suspicion of an immigration violation" by a driver or passenger. (Id. ¶¶ 73-75 (citing 8 U.S.C. §§ 1357(a)(4), (a)(5), which describe circumstances in which ICE officials can make criminal arrests and do not "include the authority to issue traffic citations").) According to the Second Amended Complaint, ICE officers stopped the Individual Plaintiffs without reasonable suspicion that they, or any other individuals in the vehicles, had violated an immigration law. (See, e.g. , id. ¶¶ 104, 106, 108.) Plaintiffs allege, further, that the ICE officers stopped the Individual Plaintiffs' vehicles merely because the drivers and passengers therein appeared to be Hispanic. (See, e.g. , id. ¶¶ 9, 104, 108.) And Plaintiffs allege that ICE's actions reflect a policy and practice of violating the Fourth Amendment while conducting traffic stops. (See id. ¶¶ 109-110.)

As indicated above, Plaintiffs in this action include not only five individuals, but also two organizations: the Illinois Coalition for Immigrant and Refugee Rights (ICIRR) and Organized Communities Against Deportations (OCAD). ICIRR is a nonprofit, statewide organization "dedicated to promoting the rights of immigrants and refugees to full and equal participation" in "civic, cultural, social, and political life." (Second Am. Compl. ¶ 22.) Its work includes "educat[ing] and organiz[ing] immigrant and refugee communities to assert their rights; promot[ing] citizenship and civic participation; monitor[ing], analyz[ing], and advocat[ing] on immigrant-related issues; provid[ing] support and information during times of crisis; and educat[ing] the public about the contributions of immigrants and refugees." (Id. ) OCAD, too, is a nonprofit organization. (Id. ¶ 23.) It "organizes against deportations, detention, criminalization, and incarceration, of black, brown, and immigrant communities in Chicago." (Id. ) Among other things, OCAD participates in "grassroots organizing, legal and policy work, [and] direct action" to "defend its communities, challenge the institutions that target and dehumanize them," and help "its communities thrive, work, and organize with happiness and without fear." (Id. ) Like ICIRR, OCAD "provid[es] information and education about [community members'] rights and provid[es] support during times of crisis." (Id. )

ICIRR and OCAD (hereinafter, the Organizational Plaintiffs) allege that they "have had to divert considerable, additional resources to" counteract the effects of Defendants' allegedly illegal actions. (Id. ¶¶ 94, 112; see also id. ¶¶ 6, 72.) For example, according to the Second Amended Complaint, a telephone hotline that the Organizational Plaintiffs operate jointly "has experienced nearly a 50% increase in call volume from those seeking help trying to find loved ones detained by ICE, those seeking information about their rights, and those reporting the increased ICE raids throughout the community." (Id. ¶ 72; see also June 2018 Decl. of Lawrence Benito, CEO and Executive Director of ICIRR, Ex. D to Second. Am. Compl. ("Benito Decl.") [58-5], ¶ 12 ("In the last month alone we have received 836 inbound calls, which is an increase of almost 50% over the previous month when no raids were reported."); June 2018 Decl. of Xanat Sobrevilla, Co-Founder of OCAD, Ex. E to Second Am. Compl. ("Sobrevilla Decl.") [58-6] ¶¶ 7-9 (stating that the marked increase in calls to the hotline began on May 19, 2018).) Plaintiffs allege that to answer the calls and provide the support that the callers request, the Organizational Plaintiffs have had to "hire and train new staff," give additional "Know Your Rights" presentations, and "develop other strategies to defend the rights of the communities they serve." (Second Am. Compl. ¶ 72; see Benito Decl. ¶ 12 (stating that "historically, the hotline has been staffed by 3 operators from OCAD," but that "as a result of the flood of calls, we have had to pull multiple ICIRR staff members off other duties to deal with call backlogs. We are also now in the process of trying to train up to 10 more operators, so that we can meet the needs of affected families in light of ICE's escalating enforcement"); Benito Decl. ¶ 13 (stating that ICIRR has received more community requests for "Know Your Rights" programs "[a]s a result of the increase in ICE enforcements," and has had to "expend more personnel time" and "re-work" the programs to meet those needs).)

Plaintiffs further allege that to meet the increased need for services, the Organizational Plaintiffs "have been forced to seek...

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