Navajo Nation Human Rights Comm'n v. San Juan Cnty.

• Decision Date: 07 September 2017
• Docket Number: Case No. 2:16–cv–00154–JNP–BCW
• Citation: 281 F.Supp.3d 1136
• Parties: NAVAJO NATION HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION; Peggy Phillips; Mark Maryboy; Wilfred Jones ; Terry Whitehat; Betty Billie Farley; Willie Skow; and Mabel Skow, Plaintiffs, v. SAN JUAN COUNTY; John David Nelson; in his official capacity as San Juan County Clerk; and Phil Lyman, Bruce Adams, and Rebecca Benally, in their official capacities as San Juan County Commissioners, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Utah

281 F.Supp.3d 1136

NAVAJO NATION HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION; Peggy Phillips; Mark Maryboy; Wilfred Jones ; Terry Whitehat; Betty Billie Farley; Willie Skow; and Mabel Skow, Plaintiffs,

v.SAN JUAN COUNTY; John David Nelson; in his official capacity as San Juan County Clerk; and Phil Lyman, Bruce Adams, and Rebecca Benally, in their official capacities as San Juan County Commissioners, Defendants.

Case No. 2:16–cv–00154–JNP–BCW

United States District Court, D. Utah.

Signed September 7, 2017

Ezra D. Rosenberg, Pro Hac Vice, Arusha Gordon, Pro Hac Vice, Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, Washington, DC, Brenna D. Kelly, Pro Hac Vice, Lauren Marie Wilchek, Pro Hac Vice, Patrick Castaneda, Raymond M. Williams, Pro Hac Vice, DLA Piper LLP U.S., Philadelphia, PA, John M. Mejia, Leah M. Farrell, Aclu of Utah, Salt Lake City, UT, M. Laughlin McDonald, Pro Hac Vice, American Civil Liberties Union Foundation, Atlanta, GA, Maya L. Kane, Pro Hac Vice, Kane Law LLC, Durango, CO, Nicole O. Orjiakor, Pro Hac Vice, DLA Piper LLP, Los Angeles, CA, William A. Rudnick, Pro Hac Vice, DLA Piper US LLP, Chicago, IL, M. Eileen O'Connor, Pro Hac Vice, for Plaintiffs.

Britton R. Butterfield, Carl F. Huefner, Jesse C. Trentadue, Suitter Axland, Salt Lake City, UT, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER DISMISSING CERTAIN CLAIMS AS MOOT, DENYING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT, DENYING COUNTY DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, and DENYING DEFENDANT BENALLY'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Jill N. Parrish, United States District Court Judge

Before the court is a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment filed by Plaintiffs Navajo Nation Human Rights Commission, Peggy Phillips, Mark Maryboy, Wilfred Jones, Terry Whitehat, Betty Billie Farley, Willie Skow, and Mabel Skow, (Docket No. 144); a Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendants San Juan County, John David Nelson, Phil Lyman, Bruce Adams, and Rebecca Benally (collectively, "County Defendants"), (Docket No. 141); and a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment filed by Defendant Rebecca Benally, (Docket No. 127).

I. BACKGROUND

San Juan County is a sparsely populated and geographically vast political subdivision of the State of Utah, occupying the state's southeastern corner. The County's southern boundaries encompass a large section of the federally established Navajo Reservation. As a result, approximately half of the County's residents are members of the Navajo Nation, a federally recognized Indian tribe. Most of the County's Navajo residents live within the boundaries of the Reservation. Much of the rest of the County's residents are centralized in the northern half of the County. This geographic segregation has often resulted in significant political tension between Navajo and white residents, which has played out in numerous cases before this court. See, e.g. , Navajo Nation v. San Juan Cty. , 162 F.Supp.3d 1162 (D. Utah 2016) (addressing voting rights and election districts in San Juan County).

These motions for summary judgment come before the court in the context of a lawsuit initiated by the Navajo Nation Human Rights Commission and several named plaintiffs¹ who allege that the voting procedures in place in San Juan County violate the Voting Rights Act ("VRA") and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The voting procedures at issue here span several years of elections. Prior to 2014, the County conducted elections through nine polling places open on Election Day. Each polling place provided some form of language assistance to Navajo-speaking voters. In 2014, the County transitioned to a predominantly mail-in voting system, leaving a single physical polling location operating at the County Clerk's office in Monticello, Utah. Ballots were distributed to voters through available mailing addresses approximately one month prior to Election Day. This system was in place for the 2014 election cycle.

During 2014 and early in 2015, the Navajo Nation and the Navajo Nation Human Rights Commission officially opposed the mail-in system, asserting that the closure of polling locations and switch to mailed ballots burdened rural Navajo voters. The County acknowledged the opposition, but indicated that it would continue to utilize the mail-in system for upcoming elections. Sometime thereafter, the Commission contacted the United States Department of Justice's Voting Rights Section (the "DOJ"), requesting an evaluation of the County's mail-in voting system.² In October of 2015, a DOJ representative met with both Commission and County officials and inspected the voting procedures then in place. Evidently, the DOJ did not come to any definitive conclusions regarding the mail-in voting system or the Commission's concerns.

After some unfruitful back-and-forth between the County and various civil-liberties organizations opposed to the mail-in ballot system, the Commission filed the Complaint underlying this Motion on February 25, 2016, alleging that the mail-in ballot system violated the VRA and the Equal Protection Clause. (Docket No. 2). Shortly thereafter, Defendants filed their Answer, which asserted that the County was making significant changes to its election procedures in anticipation of the June 2016 primary elections.³ (Docket No. 41 at 3–4). For the June 2016 elections, the County maintained the predominantly mail-in voting system, but also opened three physical polling locations on the Navajo Reservation in addition to the election center in Monticello, for a total of four physical polling locations. The County also provided language assistance to voters through Navajo-speaking interpreters at all four locations on Election Day. In October 2016, the court denied a motion for preliminary injunction filed by Plaintiffs seeking to enjoin these procedures and impose new procedures prior to the general election. (Docket No. 129). As a result, essentially the same procedures (with some modification) were in place for the general election in November 2016.

After the parties unsuccessfully attempted to resolve the case through settlement in early 2017, the instant motions for summary judgment were filed. (Docket Nos. 141, 144). Each party filed a response and a reply to the respective cross-motions. (Docket Nos. 149, 151, 154 155). A previously filed motion for partial summary judgment on behalf of Defendant Benally alone is also before the court for resolution. (Docket No. 127). Both a response and a reply were filed to that Motion as well. (Docket Nos. 130, 133). The court heard oral argument on July 26, 2017. (Docket No. 170). The court now rules on the Motions under jurisdiction granted by 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

II. MOOTNESS CHALLENGES

Before addressing the merits of Plaintiffs' claims, the court must address certain challenges to its subject-matter jurisdiction raised by County Defendants. Specifically, County Defendants assert that any controversy regarding the 2014 procedures is no longer live and, as a result, any claims based thereon are moot. As the party asserting that claims regarding the 2014 procedures are moot, the County "bears the burden of coming forward with the subsequent events that have produced the alleged result."

Chihuahuan Grasslands All. v. Kempthorne , 545 F.3d 884, 891 (10th Cir. 2008) (internal quotations omitted).

To that end, the County explains that it has abandoned the 2014 procedures in favor of the 2016 procedures for an entire election cycle and that the County Clerk has "no intention to return to the 2014 procedures." (Docket No. 154, at 48). Plaintiffs respond that the County's shift from the 2014 procedures to those used in 2016 occurred "under mysterious circumstances," (Docket No. 149, at 5), and assert that the shift was "a temporary move[ ] intended to derail this litigation," (id. at 50). As explained below, the court concludes that Plaintiffs' claims regarding the 2014 procedures are indeed moot and must be dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. However, the court also holds that Plaintiffs' newly-minted claims regarding the legality of the 2016 procedures are fit for resolution and may be added to the complaint. Additionally, the court concludes that Plaintiffs' claims for injunctive relief are not mooted by the implementation of the 2016 procedures and may also proceed.

A. PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS REGARDING THE 2014 PROCEDURES ARE MOOT.

In general, "a federal court cannot give opinions absent a live case or controversy before it," In re Overland Park Fin. Corp. , 236 F.3d 1246, 1254 (10th Cir. 2001) (citation and quotations omitted), because "the existence of a live case or controversy is a constitutional prerequisite to federal court jurisdiction," Disability Law Ctr. v. Millcreek Health Ctr. , 428 F.3d 992, 996 (10th Cir. 2005) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting McClendon v. City of Albuquerque , 100 F.3d 863, 867 (10th Cir. 1996) ). Thus, "[m]ootness is a threshold issue," see id. , that must be decided before addressing the merits of Plaintiffs' request for declaratory relief, Rio Grande Silvery Minnow v. Bureau of Reclamation , 601 F.3d 1096, 1109–10 (10th Cir. 2010) ("Declaratory judgment actions must be sustainable under the same mootness criteria that apply to any other lawsuit.").

In evaluating whether a claim for declaratory judgment is moot, "[t]he crucial question is whether granting a present determination of the issues offered will have some effect in the real world." See id. at 1110 (internal quotations and emphasis omitted) (quoting Wyoming v. U.S. Dep't of Agric. , 414 F.3d 1207, 1212 (10th Cir. 2005) ); Overland Park , 236 F.3d at 1254 ("A case is moot when it is impossible for the court to grant any effectual relief whatever to a prevailing party." (citation and quotations omitted)); Kennecott Utah Copper Corp. v. Becker , 186 F.3d 1261, 1266 (10th Cir. 1999) ("The core question in mootness inquiry is whether granting a present determination of the...